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 Taiwan’s Officials’ Perceptions of Fiscal Decentralization: 
An Analysis Using Q Methodology 
Kai-Hung Fang, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2006
This is a study of subjectivity investigating Taiwanese officials’ patterns of attitudes toward 
fiscal decentralization.  This research attempts to understand the process and issues of fiscal 
decentralization in Taiwan through the eyes of officials participating in this study.  It is hoped to 
examine the national-local dichotomy based on revealed patterns of officials’ attitudes and to 
formulate policy recommendations based on policy consensuses revealed from the study. 
Five theories of fiscal decentralization are identified.  It is confirmed that national-local 
dichotomy exists.  Authoritative fiscal decentralization is a centralized theory emphasizing 
national control and monitoring.  In contrast, unrestrained fiscal decentralization is a 
decentralized theory maximizing local administrative and financial freedom.  This research 
further shows that multiple theories of fiscal decentralization coexist in addition to the 
dichotomy.  Cooperative fiscal decentralization is a moderate centralized theory highlighting the 
importance of trusting and empowering local governments.  Democratic fiscal decentralization, 
on the other hand, is a decentralized theory advocating democratic local participation.  Finally, 
conflicted fiscal decentralization is a moderate decentralization theory asking for more local 
financial resources and autonomy while ignoring the problem of dysfunctional local politics. 
Three short-term policy recommendations were developed: (1) developing indicators of 
fiscal efforts with local officials’ participation; (2) encouraging local governments to apply the 
General Law on Local Taxation; and (3) increasing the size of national shared tax and 
eliminating the use of general grants.  In addition, three long-term policy recommendations were 
proposed: (1) sharing power of policymaking with local officials; (2) allowing people to vote on 
local fiscal policies; and (3) controlling only the minimum level of local tax revenue.  It is hoped 
that these recommendations would be adopted to improve the local fiscal system in Taiwan. 
What also matters, however, is the process through which policy decisions are made.  As 
suggested, policy learning of fiscal decentralization has to occur, and an incremental approach 
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should be adopted for future reforms of fiscal decentralization.  Only after a culture of learning, 
deliberation, and collaboration is developed among stakeholders involving in the policy process, 
can the local fiscal system in Taiwan begin to evolve and gradually to improve. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
This is a study of subjectivity.  By employing Q methodology, this study investigates Taiwanese 
officials’ patterns of attitudes toward fiscal decentralization.  This chapter will begin by defining 
the problem being studied and briefly discussing the background of this study.  The third section 
of this chapter will discuss contributions that this study intends to make.  Finally, the 
organization of this dissertation will be outlined in the final section. 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This research aims at investigating officials' patterns of attitudes toward fiscal decentralization in 
Taiwan.  In the broadest sense, the process of fiscal decentralization can be divided into three 
distinguished but interrelated components, including decentralizing spending responsibilities, 
transferring national revenues to local governments, and collecting local own-source tax 
revenues from local residents.  Interestingly, some countries pursuing fiscal decentralization, 
including Taiwan, have mainly focused on decentralizing spending responsibilities and 
transferring national revenues to local governments while neglecting the decentralization of 
authority to collect own-source tax revenues, which has been identified by many scholars as one 
of the key components of fiscal decentralization.  In an attempt to better understand the policy 
process of fiscal decentralization and the obstacles to decentralize the collection of own-source 
tax revenues in Taiwan, this research will explore patterns of officials' attitudes toward fiscal 
decentralization, examine factors shaping the identified patterns, and find their differences and 
similarities to search for policy consensus. 
Various reforms of the local fiscal system have been initiated in the past decade to 
address the problem of poor local fiscal health.  Past and ongoing reforms have focused heavily 
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on making adjustments to the national transfer system in order to make more revenues available 
to be transferred to local governments.  However, this approach has failed since local fiscal 
health has not improved and in some cases is deteriorating.  Although improving local fiscal 
health through transferring more national revenue to local governments has failed to produce the 
desired outcome, officials at different levels of government have been unable to reach a 
consensus on how to decentralize revenue-raising responsibilities to local governments. 
The importance of the ability of local governments to collect “own-source” taxes has 
been well documented in theories of local public finance.  Miller (2002: 15) called it “a 
significant and defining feature of the American system” which makes it possible for local 
governments to internalize benefits of local public services and enhance economic efficiency, as 
Tiebout theorized in 1956.  Studies of fiscal decentralization around the world have also 
indicated that a mechanism to strengthen the link between public services received and taxes 
paid by local residents is essential to successful fiscal decentralization (Giugale, Nguyen, Rojas, 
and Webb, 2000: 11; Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998: 13).  This may, in part, explain why past 
reforms to improve local fiscal health through transferring more national revenues to local 
governments have not been successful.  As policymakers and local elected officials keep 
ignoring or delaying the pending reform of shifting the majority of revenue-raising responsibility 
to local governments, it is important to understand officials’ attitudes toward fiscal 
decentralization before one can conclude what issues are at stake in the prevention of the 
adoption of this new system. 
Granting local governments authority to collect own-source revenues may have profound 
implications, both positive and negative, for local fiscal systems.  Reliance on own-source 
revenues, which Miller identified as a “two-edged sword,” may provide ultimate autonomy to 
local governments for local resource allocation, but it may also “set in motion a potentially 
dangerous and fiercely competitive battle between governments” (Miller, 2002: 15).  Downs 
(1973) argued that the American “trickle-down” process has resulted in legal and political 
separation between rich and poor.  This indeed reveals a key dilemma for the US local fiscal 
system.  The process Tiebout (1956) theorized for achieving greater economic efficiency has also 
produced both political and social impairment.  In order to minimize political chaos and social 
harm resulting from pursuing fiscal decentralization, officials from all levels of government 
should engage in a policy deliberation process for consensus building and addressing their 
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concerns based on their respective perceptions of what fiscal decentralization is all about.  The 
first step of this process is to better understand their own and other stakeholders' attitudes toward 
fiscal decentralization before they can compromise to agree on a set of shared objectives and 
strategies. 
This research utilizes Q methodology to uncover officials' patterns of attitudes toward 
fiscal decentralization.  The surveys for this research were developed by combining two general 
approaches with five objectives of fiscal decentralization supported by current research and 
theories.  A centralist approach is to decentralize financial resources to local governments 
through national transfers, and a localist approach is to decentralize by granting local 
governments authority to collect own-source revenues.  Policy objectives discussed in this 
research include: efficiency, autonomy, accountability, development, and equity.  These two 
approaches and five objectives can provide a framework to understand and classify officials' 
patterns of attitudes toward fiscal decentralization.  After obtaining officials' patterns of attitudes 
through Q methodology, this research intends to find background factors shaping these revealed 
patterns.  It is hoped that conclusions can be drawn from these analyses regarding what patterns 
of attitudes toward fiscal decentralization Taiwan's officials possess, what background factors 
have played a role in shaping these patterns, and whether it is possible to reach a policy 
consensus in order to formulate policies to pursue fiscal decentralization in Taiwan. 
Before we go further, it should be noted that, in this study, the term “local governments” 
generally refers to special cities, counties, and provincial cities, which can be considered as the 
highest level of local self-governing units after a series of reforms in the local governments 
system.  As we will later discuss in chapter three, urban townships, rural townships, and county 
cities are also considered local self-governing units based on the Law on Local Governments 
System.  However, because they do not have significant influence in the policy process of fiscal 
decentralization, they will not be the focus of this study.  Accordingly, the terms “local officials” 
and “local elected officials “ will refer to officials working at special cities, counties, and 
provincial cities. 
  3
1.2 BACKGROUND OF STUDY 
Poor local fiscal health is not a new problem in Taiwan.  In FY 1992, the annual budgetary 
expenditures of the counties of Ilan, Nantou, Yunlin, Chiayi, Pingtung, Taitung, Hualien, and 
Penghu exceeded all of the tax revenues, including local tax revenues and national tax revenues 
collected within these jurisdictions (Huang, Ming-Sheng, 1995:13).  In October 1999, a report 
released by the Control Yuan1, the audit branch of the national government, showed that the 
fiscal condition for 8 out of the 21 county/provincial city governments was rated “very bad” 
(Central News Agency, October 20, 1999).  In an effort to improve local fiscal health, the Law 
on Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures, which regulates tax assignments and 
expenditures among all levels of government in Taiwan, was amended on January 13, 1999.  The 
amendment reassigned tax revenues to expand the national shared tax pool for revenues to be 
transferred to local governments.  However, the 1999 amendment failed in the sense that while it 
was intended to provide sufficient local revenue to improve local fiscal health, poor local fiscal 
health still exists as a problem today.  In fact, most reform recommendations to improve the 
current system have focused on improving the distribution formula of national grants and aids.  
These recommendations implicitly assume that insufficient local revenues received from the 
national government are the main reason for poor local fiscal health and that the cure is to 
distribute additional national financial resources to meet local spending needs.  However, no 
satisfactory result has been achieved. 
In addition to the Law on Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures, the 
General Law on Local Taxation may also have a deep impact on local fiscal systems.  The bill, 
the General Law on Local Taxation, was first introduced to Congress in 1999 and was intended 
to decentralize taxing authority to local governments.  It is the first bill to give local governments 
flexibility to determine local tax rates.  The draft was passed in committee in 2001, but it never 
received enough support and attention to be reviewed on the floor by all members of 4th 
Congress.  Though the bill was later passed by the 5th Congress on November 19, 2002, local 
                                                 
1 The national government in Taiwan consists of five branches: the Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan, Judicial Yuan, 
Control Yuan, and Examination Yuan.  The Executive Yuan is the highest executive branch in the government.  The 
Legislative Yuan is the congress.  The Judicial Yuan is similar to the Supreme Court in the US; it has the power of 
constitutional review and oversees the judicial system in Taiwan.  The Control Yuan is the audit branch.  Finally, the 
Examination Yuan is a branch which handles public service examinations and other personnel-related affairs. 
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governments have been reluctant to utilize this new authority to increase local tax rates for 
additional local tax revenues. 
Taiwan, like many other unitary counties, implements a centralized local fiscal system.  
The majority of local revenues are generated from local taxes, national shared tax, and 
intergovernmental aid.  The national government influences the level of local revenue through 
the power to set the level of local taxes and the rules for distributing the national shared tax and 
intergovernmental aid.  In FY 2004, 32.42% of overall local revenues were generated from local 
tax revenues, 19.46% were received from national shared tax revenue, and 34.72% were received 
from intergovernmental aid.    Local taxes include land tax (50.42%), property tax (14.54%), 
deeds tax (2.54%), license tax (22.18%), stamp tax (3.44%), amusement tax (0.33%), estate and 
gift tax (2.73%), and cigarette and alcohol tax (3.82%).  Except property tax and amusement tax, 
the tax rates and bases of most local taxes are nationally set in applied national tax laws.  Local 
governments do not have autonomy to adjust the level of local taxation.  The national shared tax 
system is a revenue-sharing mechanism in which funds are distributed from a national shared 
pool to local governments based on a set of formulas, and it is a national transfer in nature.  In 
fact, national shared tax and intergovernmental aid combined accounted for approximately 55% 
of local overall revenue in FY 2004.  In other words, more than half of the local revenue was 
directly transferred by the national government in a form of either national shared tax or 
intergovernmental aid.  This further reveals the importance of the national government in 
determining the level of local revenues. 
The power to collect both national and local taxes is centralized.  Although local 
governments can collect local taxes, tax rates and bases are nationally specified in the statute.  
Before the General Law on Local Taxation was passed in 2002, rates of four local taxes, 
including the land value tax, land value increment tax, license tax, and stamp tax, were nationally 
unified.  The only exception to this unified approach among taxes significantly contributing to 
local tax revenues is property.  Local governments can set the rates of residential properties at a 
level between 1.2% and 2%.  Even so, the law specifically set the rate of owner-occupied 
residential properties at 1.2%, which is the lowest point in the range, and eliminates any 
flexibility for local governments to adjust the rate.  Even after the passage of the General Law on 
Local Taxation, in which local governments can levy new taxes or increase specified national 
and local tax rates up to 30%, the national government still has the power of final approval. 
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Although national shared tax revenue is categorized as one of the local tax revenues, it is 
a national transfer in nature.  The current shared tax system is based on the 1999 amendment of 
the Law on Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures, which specifies that 10% of 
the income tax revenue, 40% of the net sales tax revenue, 10% of the commodity tax revenue, 
20% of the land value increment tax revenue, and the interest from the shared tax revenue 
account should be contributed to the national shared tax pool.  6% of the shared tax revenues 
from income tax, sales tax, and commodity tax are called “special shared tax revenue”, which is 
distributed by national government discretion for support of local governments' emergent or 
other major needs.  The remaining revenue is called “general shared tax revenue”, which is 
distributed based on a yearly-adjusted national formula.  One of the major debates on the reform 
of the local fiscal system focuses on increasing the amount of tax revenues to be contributed to 
the national shared pool and how the formula of distributing general shared tax revenue can be 
amended to better reflect local spending needs. 
Intergovernmental aid represents the largest revenue source of local governments in FY 
2004.  Unlike national shared tax revenues, the funds of intergovernmental aid come from 
different ministries of the national government.  Based on the Law on Allocation of Government 
Revenues and Expenditures, the national government can give grants to local governments for 
the purposes of equalizing economic development in different localities.  As a part of the effort 
to improve the national transfer system, in 2001 the national government made major changes to 
the system of distributing intergovernmental aid.  On the one hand, the Method for Granting 
Intergovernmental Aid to Special Cities and Counties/Provincial Cities was published to guide 
national government decisions on distribution of intergovernmental aid.  On the other hand, the 
Executive Yuan, the highest level of the executive branch of the national government, reviewed 
all of the national ministries' practices in distributing intergovernmental aid and integrated all aid 
previously granted for local general expenditures, local development projects, and small local 
construction projects under direct supervision of the Directorate General of Budget, Accounting, 
and Statistics (DGBAS), the Executive Yuan.  In order for the distribution of intergovernmental 
aid to be equitable, transparent, and reasonable, the national government specified the ways the 
aid is distributed.  First, the funds were prioritized to bridge the gap between local basic fiscal 
needs and basic income.  Then, a formula was developed to distribute the remaining 
intergovernmental aid for local basic development.  These changes were aimed at not only 
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fulfilling local governments’ basic fiscal needs, but also providing sufficient revenue for 
educational facilities, social welfare, and basic local construction (Li, 2000: 71). 
This centralized local fiscal system had remained virtually the same since 1949.  Due to 
unique political circumstances that Taiwan has encountered internally and internationally, 
political institutions, including local government systems and local fiscal arrangements, had not 
made major changes until the democratization movements in the late 1980s and a series of 
government reforms that followed.  In January 1999, the Law on Local Governments System 
was passed to launch a new era in local self-governance in Taiwan and to reinforce a trend to 
decentralize public service provisions.  Gaining more authority to determine how and how much 
local public services are provided, local governments have played a much more significant role 
in providing public services.  The trend of decentralizing expenditure responsibilities will 
continue since a new amendment to the Law on Local Governments System has been proposed 
and is expected to decentralize more authority, especially to county/provincial city governments.  
At the same time, a new wave of reform to the system of raising local revenues is expected as 
well in order for local governments to obtain sufficient revenues for supporting their new 
expenditure responsibilities.  However, there are constant debates among officials regarding how 
the system of raising local revenues should be designed.  In order to better understand the nature 
of these debates and search for potential resolutions, it is important to uncover officials' patterns 
of attitudes toward fiscal decentralization.  Knowing how officials working at different posts 
perceive the concept of fiscal decentralization, where their priorities are, and what is at stake, a 
feasible proposal for a future system may emerge to improve the current local fiscal system. 
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
An analysis of officials' patterns of attitudes toward fiscal decentralization is the first step 
necessary to design a feasible and successful fiscal decentralization proposal.  Many scholars 
studying fiscal decentralization have focused their research on either building a normative model 
or documenting efforts taken in many developing countries.  This body of literature provides 
knowledge of principles of designing an ideal fiscal decentralization proposal.  However, as 
Eaton (2001:122) pointed out, “short-term political calculations determine the form that 
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decentralization actually takes.”  Noticing the fact that public policy is not made and 
implemented in a vacuum, Stone (1997) has taught us the importance of politics, political claims, 
and policy arguments.  Wildavsky (1969) further argued that “the purpose of policy analysis is 
not to eliminate advocacy, but to raise the level of argument among contending interests.”  In 
other words, if a proposal of fiscal decentralization is going to be successfully legislated and 
implemented, each of policy stakeholders' interests should be respected and discussed in the 
policy deliberation process.  Therefore, this research intends to raise the level of current policy 
debates by understanding how these officials perceive fiscal decentralization and what policy 
objectives they considered important to achieve during the process.  After different policy 
interests of officials involved in the process are uncovered, it is possible to search for a feasible 
proposal which will properly address these different interests and concerns. 
This study further adds to the literature of fiscal decentralization by testing whether these 
identified patterns of attitudes are closely correlated with certain local jurisdiction attributes.  
This line of inquiry is important for policymakers to ensure that social equity is not lost during 
the fiscal decentralization process.  Frederickson (1971) has emphasized the importance of 
“social equity” in the delivery and performance of public services.  He said that “[p]luralistic 
government systematically discriminates in favor of established stable bureaucracies and their 
specialized minority clientele and against those minorities who lack political and economic 
resources” (Frederickson, 1971).  In the context of designing a fiscal decentralization proposal in 
Taiwan, it is essential for policymakers to address the concerns and interests of officials from 
jurisdictions with less political and economic resources.  By examining whether officials who 
possess the same pattern of attitudes also serve at jurisdictions with similar social and economic 
attributes, it becomes possible for policymakers to identify these concerns and interests which 
need to be addressed during the fiscal decentralization process in order to ensure social equity. 
This study also adds to the literature of fiscal decentralization by examining whether a 
central-local dichotomy exists in pursuing fiscal decentralization in Taiwan.  Fiscal 
decentralization can only be realized when the national government and local governments work 
together to legislate a set of shared principles and then implement them.  In Taiwan, there seems 
to be a major difference between the national government and local governments in ways of 
pursuing fiscal decentralization.  For example, in December 2001, disregarding strong opposition 
from the national government, Taipei City Mayor Ying-jeou Ma utilized his popularity and 
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support in the Congress to successfully amend the Law on Allocation of Government Revenues 
and Expenditures, thereby securing 15.5% of the general shared tax for the Taipei City 
government which would be received annually from the national government.  In addition, more 
than three years after the General Law on Local Taxation was passed, there have been only a few 
attempts of special city, provincial city, and county governments to utilize their new authority for 
collecting additional local revenues.  After identifying officials' patterns of attitudes toward fiscal 
decentralization, this study will further examine whether officials from the national government 
and local governments possess different opinions.  If so, this study not only will demonstrate that 
a central-local dichotomy does exist, but also will facilitate policymakers’ awareness of these 
differences in order to search for the best possible compromise proposals. 
Finally, this study contributes to the existing literature of fiscal decentralization by 
examining whether officials’ perception of the national-local dichotomy can be generalized and 
whether officials’ perceptions of fiscal decentralization can be summarized into two general 
patterns.  It is often noted that national officials tend to resist reforms decentralizing the revenue-
raising authority while local officials are often strong supporters of such reforms.  In fact, such a 
notion may not be true in Taiwan since local officials have been hesitant to utilize new 
authorities granted by the General Law on Local Taxation to locally raise taxes.  Therefore, by 
probing into officials’ perceptions of fiscal decentralization, this study can confirm whether such 
notions can be generalized or, at least, applied to Taiwan’s case.  In addition, this notion 
implicitly suggested that there are only two general patterns of perceptions of fiscal 
decentralization, namely a national pattern and a local pattern.  By revealing patterns of 
Taiwanese officials’ perceptions of fiscal decentralization, this study provides evidence to see 
whether officials’ views can be summarized into two general patterns.  If there are more than two 
patterns of officials’ perceptions revealed, this study further adds to the literature by identifying 
these patterns in addition to the often perceived national and local patterns. 
In summation, as Bird and Vaillancourt argued, “policy recommendations in the area of 
intergovernmental finance must be firmly rooted in understanding the rationale of the existing 
intergovernmental system and its capacity for change if they are to be acceptable and if accepted, 
successfully implemented” (1998: 35).  While this study alone does not pretend to offer an ideal 
reform proposal to the current fiscal decentralization movement in Taiwan, it can be a step 
toward understanding the nature of the current system and its potential for change by 
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systematically analyzing concerns and interests possessed by major participants involved in the 
policy process. 
1.4 ORGANIZATION OF DISSERTATION 
This dissertation contains eight chapters.  The first chapter, an introductory chapter, intends to 
provide a basic understanding of this dissertation research.  The second chapter, a literature 
review, surveys literature written concerning fiscal decentralization.  There are three sections in 
this chapter, including concept and theoretical debates of fiscal decentralization, the political 
nature of the fiscal decentralization process, and approaches to achieve policy objectives of fiscal 
decentralization.  The goal of the second chapter is to provide a theoretical rationale for 
conducting this research. 
Chapters Three and Four provide an overview of current Taiwan’s local governments 
system and the local fiscal system.  The first section of Chapter Three is a historical review of 
the local governments system development, which is followed by the discussion of two recent 
reforms of the local governments system.  The chapter ends with analyses on four selected issues 
of future reforms.  Chapter Four begins to introduce the local fiscal system in Taiwan with an 
overview of the local revenue-raising system.  Then more detailed discussion is conducted for 
three major local revenue sources, including local taxes, national shared tax, and 
intergovernmental aid.  The third section of the chapter examines the impact that a centralized 
and uniform local revenue-revenue raising system has made on setting the level of local spending.  
At the end of the chapter, the direction of future reforms of the local fiscal system is suggested. 
Chapter Five introduces the methodology used in this dissertation to conduct research and 
analyses.  Research questions and hypotheses are developed in the first section, and the research 
design is provided in the second section of this chapter.  The third section of this chapter explains 
and documents the process to select Q statements used in this research.  There are four sections 
in Chapter Six.  The results obtained from using Q methodology and a preliminary analysis of 
these revealed patterns are provided in the first section.  Through each pattern’s factor arrays, we 
explore which approach and which policy objectives of fiscal decentralization these patterns tend 
to be in favor of.  The second section of this chapter defines each pattern by identifying 
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distinguishing statements and statements they feel very strongly about.  The third section of this 
chapter examines hypotheses formulated in the beginning of Chapter Five to see whether the 
organizations or positions officials served have impacts on their perception and attitudes toward 
fiscal decentralization.  In the final section, theories of fiscal decentralization are developed to 
conceptualize national-local relationships and policy actions of each revealed pattern in Taiwan. 
The focus of the Chapter Seven is to compare, contrast, and evaluate five revealed 
patterns of attitudes in order to identify issues as to which policy consensus might be reached.  
The first section of the chapter compares the differences in views toward fiscal decentralization 
among the five patterns.  The second section analyzes their consensus concerning points of 
disagreement in pursuing fiscal decentralization, and the final section of this chapter analyzes 
their consensus concerning points of agreement.  Chapter Eight, the final chapter of this 
dissertation, provides policy recommendations and conclusions for the study.  Policy 
recommendations are made based on the consensus shared by officials among all patterns to 
suggest what should be done in promoting fiscal decentralization in Taiwan.  Then the study is 
concluded with a briefly summary of this study and suggestions for future research. 
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2.0  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The main objective of this research is to investigate officials’ patterns of attitude toward fiscal 
decentralization.  This inquiry attempts, first, to see if there are differences between officials’ 
attitude toward fiscal decentralization, and what factors may play a role in shaping these 
differences.  Second, this research will analyze these different patterns of attitude in the search 
for potential policy consensus.  It is hoped that these policy consensuses might become a starting 
point for implementing fiscal decentralization in Taiwan.  In order to provide a theoretical 
background for this study, this chapter surveys current literature on fiscal decentralization, the 
politics of fiscal decentralization, and competing views on ways to achieve policy objectives of 
fiscal decentralization. 
The first part of this chapter will define the concept of fiscal decentralization and 
theoretical debates concerning how to pursue fiscal decentralization.  The second part of this 
chapter will shift the focus to the political arena.  It will review existing literature on why and 
how politics affect the outcome of fiscal decentralization reform.  The rationale for developing 
this study’s hypotheses will also be discussed in this section.  Finally, the last part of this chapter 
will identify five policy objectives essential to fiscal decentralization, along with competing 
views on how to achieve these objectives.  These debates will also become a basis for 
constructing the Q statements used in this research. 
2.1 CONCEPT AND DEBATES OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
Fiscal decentralization has become a popular policy means in many developed and developing 
countries to improve their governance.  Fukasaku and Mello (1999: 9) asserted that “[f]iscal 
decentralization – the devolution of taxing and spending powers to lower levels of government – 
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has become an important element of fiscal reform in both OECD and non-OECD countries.”  
The goal is to give local governments more financial resources for delivering local public goods 
and services.  The assumption is that local governments are closer to local people, and are more 
familiar with what is necessary to adequately address growing and different local needs.  As Rao 
(1998:87) argued, “efficiency under fiscal decentralization is enhanced because of the matching 
of the supply of public services with demand.” 
Although many countries have used the term “fiscal decentralization” to label their fiscal 
reform efforts, actual designs vary from country to country.  A question can be derived from this 
observation: is there a set of universal principles by which to design fiscal decentralization 
reforms?  Litavck, Ahmad, and Bird (1998: 10) have pointed out that the emphasis of fiscal 
decentralization “is on setting the appropriate expenditure and tax assignment for each tier of 
government and on designing intergovernmental transfers.”  In other words, the core of 
designing a fiscal decentralization reform is to redefine fiscal relationships between a national 
government and its subnational governments.  It seems, however, that there is no simple answer 
in regards to how this relationship should be redefined.  Citations from Norregaard (1995), Bird 
and Vaillancourt (1998: 22) assert that as wide a range of institutional structures and relations is 
found within nominally federal countries as within nominally unitary countries.  They further 
argue that “[t]he constitutional label matters less than the reality of how intergovernmental 
relations work in practice” (Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998: 22).  Each country pursuing fiscal 
decentralization must “develop its own strategy of decentralization and its own particular 
institutional infrastructure in accordance with its history, its objectives, and the constraints it 
faces” (Giugale, Nguyen, Rojas, and Webb, 2000: 2).  Bird and Vaillancourt (1998: 2) agreed 
and stated that: 
 
The essence of decentralization is that it does not occur in general but rather in 
a particular country – in a country with its own specific institutional, political, 
and economic context.  Moreover, … decentralization has taken many 
different forms in different countries at different time, and even exactly the 
same variety of decentralization may have very different effects under 
different conditions 
 
While institutional designs to pursue fiscal decentralization vary from one country to 
another, they nonetheless can be categorized into two broad patterns (Bird and Vaillancourt, 
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1998: 22-28).  Bird and Vaillancourt called the first model “fiscal federalism” under which 
“local governments may for most purposes be considered to be agents of the [national] 
government rather than independent actors” (1998:23), while the second model, called “federal 
finance”, involves “bargaining between principles” (1998: 25).  What distinguishes these two 
patterns is the degree of autonomy subnational governments possess in making local spending 
and revenue-raising decisions.  It is noted that fiscal federalism is a centrally-oriented model 
which emphasizes the role of a national government in ensuring the success of fiscal 
decentralization reform.  In contrast, federal finance is a locally-oriented model which advocates 
that sub-national governments should have greater autonomy and discretion to make local fiscal 
decisions.  In fact, King (1997) labeled the fiscal federalism model as a “centralist approach” and 
the federal finance model as a “localist approach.”  In hopes of better reflecting the underlining 
meaning and consequences of these two approaches, this study will employ King’s terminology. 
Both approaches have benefits and problems, and neither is superior to the other.  They 
can be viewed as two ends of a continuum for designing fiscal decentralization strategies.  These 
two approaches will be examined in greater detail in order to provide a basic understanding of 
current debates concerning fiscal decentralization. 
2.1.1 Centralist Approach 
The centralist approach recognizes many benefits that will result from decentralizing public 
service provision to lower levels of government, but it also emphasizes the role played by the 
national government in such a decentralized system.  Bird and Vaillancourt (1998: 23) 
elaborated: “the [national] government, acting as the benevolent interpreter of the will of the 
people, is given guidance as to how to structure the institutional rules of the intergovernmental 
system in order to ensure that local government agents act as the [national] government would 
wish.”  Under this approach, it is usually observed that national governments are heavily 
involved in centrally-directed fiscal decentralization to transfer more financial resources through 
intergovernmental transfers and to grant local governments additional authority for service 
provision while maintaining their dominant role in collecting revenues. 
Boadway offered a rationale for the national government to raise more revenue than it 
needs and to transfer the excess to local governments (2001a: 111-112).  He argued that the case 
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for decentralizing expenditures to local governments is much greater than the case for 
decentralizing taxes.  While many countries have decentralized public service provision in major 
policy areas, taxes are still administered at the center.  Under such a system, distortion, which 
derives from a fragmented tax system, can be avoided, and a uniform standard of redistribution 
can be applied.  In addition, intergovernmental transfers can be utilized as a policy tool for the 
national government to fulfill its responsibility of achieving efficiency and equity for the entire 
country. 
The centralist approach claims that an efficiency gain will result from decentralizing 
public service provision to local governments.  Public goods and services provided by national 
governments are usually uniform and are unable to respond to different preferences among 
taxpayers.  As Oates (1999: 1123) observed, “there are typically political pressures (or perhaps 
even constitutional constraints) that limit the capacity of central governments to provide higher 
levels of public services in some jurisdictions than others do.”  Efficiency will be improved 
through decentralization of public service provision because local residents will have an 
opportunity to choose from different public service packages to best meet their different 
preferences.  Oates (1999: 1122) noted, “the level of welfare will always be at least as high (and 
typically higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of consumption are provided in each jurisdiction than 
if any single, uniform level of consumption is maintained across all jurisdictions.” 
Decentralization of information and authority can also lead to increased efficiency.  
Inman and Rubinfeld (1997: 44) identified the value of decentralization, stating that “it 
encourages an efficient allocation of national resources; it fosters political participation and a 
sense of the democratic community; and it helps to protect basic liberties and freedoms.”  Qian 
and Weingast (1997: 85-88) elaborated and claimed that efficiency would be increased through 
decentralization of authority and information.  They argued that decentralization of authority and 
information would give local executives more incentives and more policy means to provide local 
public services more efficiently.  Since local governments are closer to the people, they are in a 
better position to make informed decisions and to be more responsive.  In addition, because of 
the opportunities, as well as constraints, faced by local officials, decentralization will lead to 
more improved and innovative ways of providing public services and, therefore, will result in an 
efficiency gain (Boadway, 2001a: 100-101). 
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The main benefit to be gained by adopting the centralist approach is to ensure that 
national objectives will not be undermined during the process of decentralization.  While most 
local revenues are decentralized through intergovernmental transfers, national governments will 
maintain their control over local governments.  As Boadway (2001a: 102) argued, the “benefits 
of decentralization can only be acquired by inducing some potential sacrifices in efficiency and 
equity.”  In order to maximize the benefits of fiscal decentralization while controlling the costs 
deriving from local dysfunctional competition and fragmentation, there is a need for national 
governments to maintain their control over financial resource distribution in a decentralized 
fiscal system. 
However, there are risks involved in using intergovernmental transfers as a main avenue 
for decentralizing financial resources to local governments.  First, intergovernmental grants tend 
to encourage local overspending.  After analyzing the effect of intergovernmental transfers on 
local spending, Oates (1999: 1129) confirmed the “flypaper effect,” whereby “state and local 
government spending is much more responsive to increases in intergovernmental receipts than it 
is to increases in the community’s private income.”  Buchanan (1987: 131) articulated Puviani’s 
idea of fiscal illusion to demonstrate that taxpayers may fail to make correct fiscal choices when 
“the connection between the total amount of resources actually utilized in producing or 
supplying public services and any individualized share in this total may be obscured to the 
taxpayer.” 
Another concern raised for the extensive use of intergovernmental grants is a loss of local 
autonomy.  As King (1988: 13) noted, “[i]t is unlikely that any central government would, and 
very debatable whether any such government should, distribute grants without exercising fairly 
close control over the way in which they are spent.”  In other words, because central 
governments can tightly control how those grants are spent, local preferences will be distorted.  
Moreover, this distortion is more serious for a recipient government of a matching grant, which 
requires additional local revenues to be spent on non-local prioritized policy initiatives.  
Accordingly, efficiency is lost because of local governments’ inability to meet local preferences 
after receiving intergovernmental grants. 
When adopting the centralist approach, national governments decentralize selected public 
service functions to gain efficiency while maintaining considerable revenue-raising 
responsibility at the center.  Local governments are merely agents of the national government 
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and act on behalf of the national government to provide decentralized public services.  In this 
pattern, intergovernmental transfers play a central role in decentralizing local revenues.  The 
localist approach, where local governments play a more significant role in making both local 
revenue-raising and spending decisions, provides an alternative choice to fiscal decentralization. 
2.1.2 Localist Approach 
Contrary to the centralist approach, where the national government’s policy preferences are 
clearly dominant, in the localist approach, fiscal policy decisions are determined jointly by both 
levels of government in some appropriate political forum (Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998: 25).  In 
other words, local governments are not merely agents of a national government, and they usually 
enjoy greater discretion to make local fiscal decisions, including the authority to collect own-
source revenue.  Such authority is, in fact, critical in the localist approach because it makes local 
governments more financially independent and better positioned to resist mandates from the 
center.  Once local governments have more autonomy to decide the level of local public 
spending and to meet different local needs, according to public choice theorists, there would be 
an efficiency gain. 
As first outlined in Tiebout’s (1956) seminal work, public choice theorists argue that 
efficiency of local resource allocation would be improved through private-market-like 
competition among localities.  As Tiebout (1956: 421) said, his model “is presented to show the 
assumptions needed in a model of local government expenditures, which yields the same optimal 
allocation that a private market would.”  Public choice theory is concerned with “the possibility 
that consumer residential mobility among competing local communities may lead to efficiency in 
providing local public goods.  [Differences] in public-good demand may also be resolved by 
moving or, more correctly, by grouping together consumers with the same demand” (Fisher, 
1996: 104).  In Tiebout’s original model (1956), the level of services is a reflection of the median 
voter’s preference in a community, and taxpayers move in order to find a community that best 
satisfies their preference.  Aggregate efficiency in a society is maximized when everyone moves 
to the community exactly matching his or her preference.  In order for the efficiency gain 
theorized by public choice theorists to be realized, it is essential for local governments to set the 
level of local spending to reflect taxpayer preference. 
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Public choice theory was extended to focus more on competition and on efficiency 
achieved through competition.  Boyne (1996: 704) argued that “competition is necessary for 
‘allocative efficiency’ which concerns responsiveness to public preference in the allocation of 
resources between services and areas.”  He further pointed out that competition is also necessary 
for “x-efficiency (technical efficiency) which concerns the production of services at minimum 
cost” (Boyne, 1996: 704).  Qian and Weingast (1997: 88) noted that “competition among local 
governments helps to limit government’s predatory behavior.  Mobile resources can quickly 
leave jurisdictions with inappropriate behavior.”  For example, if a local government cannot 
properly maintain public infrastructure, residents and businesses will soon move to other 
competing jurisdictions where public infrastructure is properly maintained. 
Though public choice theory was extended to point out the benefits resulting from 
competition, its original argument is more relevant to the discussion of the localist approach to 
fiscal decentralization.  In fact, what distinguishes a centralist approach from a localist approach 
is local governments' authority to raise own-source revenues.  Without this authority, there 
would be no clear linkage between the level of local public spending and local voters’ tax 
payments.  Accordingly, local taxpayers will not be aware of the full costs of local public 
services they receive and, hence, will not be able to make informed decisions about their 
residence.  As a result, efficiency gains derived from local taxpayers' mobility envisioned by 
Tiebout will not be realized.  Boyne (1996: 712) emphasized the importance of local fiscal 
autonomy: “[even] if local government is fragmented and each unit has substantial autonomy 
over the pattern of service provision, the full benefits of competition will not be realized if 
central grants are high.”  Dye (1990: xvi) also pointed out that local governments cannot “be 
truly competitive if the costs of their decisions can be externalized – shifted through federal 
grants-in-aid to the national government and to taxpayers throughout the nation.” 
Scholars have expressed concerns about spillover effects, which “will lead to incentives 
for insufficient resource allocations across regions and inefficient levels of taxes and public 
services within them” (Boadway, 2001a: 104).  Boadway (2001a: 105-106) summarized the 
spillover effect and pointed out that there are tax externalities, expenditure externalities, and 
regulation externalities.  All three externalities can distort the level of local service provision, 
and result in an efficiency loss.  In addition to spillover effects, externalities may also occur 
because some tax bases are co-occupied by the national government and local governments 
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(Boadway, 2001a: 107).  For example, if a local government raises the tax rate on a co-occupied 
tax base, the tax base will shrink.  Because the national government occupies the same tax base, 
its revenue will shrink as well.  This will then lead to a possibility that local governments set tax 
rates too high because a proportion of the tax burden will be exported through shrinking tax 
bases. 
Furthermore, serious concerns about equity have been raised as well.  First, “the extent of 
mobility may differ across different types of households or firms, in which case the most mobile 
command the most preferential policies” (Boadway, 2001a: 100).  Unfortunately, wealthier 
people or households usually have greater mobility and, therefore, enjoy greater advantages in 
accessing favored policies in the system.  Moreover, the system will result in legal and political 
separation between rich and poor, identified by Downs (1973) as the American “trickle-down” 
process.  This process takes place mostly because a poor community will not have an adequate 
tax base to generate sufficient tax revenues for maintaining an appropriate level of public 
services.  As a result, a sorting process starts as relatively wealthier people leave for another 
community and the poor community becomes poorer.  In order to avoid this sorting process, 
communities have to compete for limited business and development to generate tax income and 
remain competitive.  When competition becomes dysfunctional, communities begin to promise 
businessmen and developers tax breaks, which in the end hurt overall development. 
Although public choice theory has provided a theoretical basis for efficiency gain 
resulting from adopting a localist approach, concerns for inefficient levels of local spending and 
inequity have to be addressed.  These concerns also lead to discussion about the role of a national 
government in a localist approach.  Oates (1999: 1126) has pointed out that “[i]ntergovernmental 
transfers can serve as a policy instrument in such a decentralized system to internalize spillover 
benefits to other jurisdictions, to equalize fiscal conditions across jurisdictions, and to improve 
overall tax systems.”  Boadway (2001b: 105) also noted that intergovernmental transfers “can be 
looked at as policies that facilitate the decentralization of fiscal responsibilities, ensuring that the 
benefits of decentralization are achieved without compromising national objectives of efficiency 
and equity.”  That is to say, a national government in the localist approach (like its counterparts 
in the centralist approach) also has to utilize intergovernmental transfers as a policy tool.  
However, instead of transferring additional financial resources to support decentralized public 
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services, the emphasis in the localist approach is to internalize the spillover effect, equalize 
regional fiscal conditions, and ensure equity. 
In terms of the amount to be transferred, combinations of fiscal-capacity-based indicators 
or fiscal-need-based indicators are developed to construct transfer formulae.  Fiscal-capacity-
based indicators intend to capture the magnitude of regional income or economic activities, while 
fiscal-need-based indicators intend to reflect the basic fiscal needs of each locality.  In addition, 
redistributive intergovernmental transfers can be based on a minimal level of service provision 
set up by a national government.  In summation, a national government plays a limited but 
essential role in the localist approach to ensure that national objectives of efficiency, and equity 
would not be undermined by fiscal decentralization efforts. 
Aiming to address many U.S. urban problems, like sprawl, social/economic segregation, 
urban decay, fiscal disparities among jurisdictions, and public service duplication, fiscal 
regionalism has attracted much attention in the United States.  Wheeler (2002: 267) has pointed 
out that “[s]ince the early 1990s, there has been a dramatic resurgence of interest in regional 
planning in North America.”  Fiscal regionalism “is a set of cooperative strategies that recognize 
the governmental structure of the existing configuration of local governments but create regional 
funding mechanisms for a wide variety of public purposes” (Miller, 2000: 8; 2002: 101).  It is a 
voluntary, non-threatening, bottom-up process that encourages local governments and their 
constituencies to recognize the need for regional fiscal cooperation.  Bish (1978: 29) argued that 
cooperation is likely only when “each political unit offers something of value to the other, e.g., 
the exchange of efficient production capacity for revenue.”  He further pointed out that 
“intergovernmental cooperation – especially that involving fiscal transfers – may be undertaken 
precisely because each party has different capabilities and different policies” (Bish, 1978: 30).  
When a locally funded program or service has regional impact or benefits, it creates not only 
incentives but also the need to create a regional funding mechanism.  This mechanism enables 
benefits to spill over local governments' boundaries while internalizing funding responsibilities 
within a beneficial regional area. 
Fiscal regionalism has many forms, including culture asset districts, tax-base (revenue) 
sharing, and peaceful coexistence strategies (Miller, 2000: 8; 2002; and Hollis, 1998).  It makes 
it possible to transfer fiscal resources without higher-level government intervention.  Although it 
provides a new way of thinking in financing regional programs, it may be extremely difficult to 
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implement, as best demonstrated by the inability to duplicate the Twin Cities’ tax-base sharing 
program.  As Boadway (2001b: 108) argued, “interregional bargaining is likely to come to 
naught since better-off regions are unlikely to condone a bargaining outcome which gives them 
negative transfers.”  Nonetheless, fiscal regionalism points out a way for local governments to 
cooperatively deal with inefficiency and inequity that result from the adoption of the localist 
approach while maintaining their local autonomy and authority during the process. 
Whether intergovernmental transfers are used or a fiscal regional approach is adopted to 
address concerns of the localist approach, the key is to “strengthen the link between subnational 
spending choices and self-taxing decisions” (Giugale, Nguyen, Rojas, and Webb, 2000: 11).  
Indeed, fiscal decentralization generally involves decentralizing either expenditure 
responsibilities or revenue-raising responsibilities, or both.  Relationships between these two 
local financial functions will deeply affect the behavior of local governments.  Bird and 
Vaillancourt (1998: 5) observed, “if countries decentralize more expenditure responsibilities than 
revenue resources, either service levels will likely fall or else local governments will press – 
successfully, it is usually assumed – for either more transfers or more loans, or both. …  On the 
other hand, if more revenues than expenditures are decentralized, it is often argued that local 
revenue mobilization may decline.”  Thus, a successful strategy based on the localist approach 
will require a careful design to decentralize both expenditure and revenue-raising 
responsibilities. 
2.1.3 Is There a Right Approach 
Both the centralist approach and the localist approach cannot only be viewed as descriptive 
theories but also as normative theories.  That is to say, in addition to summarizing current 
practices of many countries pursing fiscal decentralization, these two approaches can be utilized 
as guidelines for countries to design their strategies for fiscal decentralization.  In addition, these 
two approaches can also be deemed as two ends of a continuum.  On the centralist approach end 
of the continuum is the pursuit of centrally directed fiscal decentralization with the national 
government maintaining primary control.  On the localist approach end of the continuum is the 
achievement of fiscal decentralization by giving local governments greater authority to collect 
own-source revenues with little interference from the national government.  The actual models of 
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fiscal decentralization used by various countries can be expected to fall somewhere between 
these two ends of the continuum.  In other words, having these two general approaches in mind, 
countries pursuing fiscal decentralization should adjust their models to reflect their respective 
cultures, political institutions, and economic capacities and capabilities. 
Some have argued that a unitary state tends to adopt the centralist approach, whereas a 
federal state tends to adopt the localist approach.  Although not directly dealing with national-
local fiscal relations, Zimmerman’s work (1981) on analyzing U.S. state-local fiscal relations 
provided insights relevant to our discussion.  He suggested that there is no rule of thumb for 
decentralizing discretionary authority to local governments, whether in states where state 
governments are fiscally dominant (the centralist approach) or in states where state governments 
are not fiscally dominant (the local approach) (Zimmerman, 1981).  Bird and Vaillancourt (1998: 
22) confirmed by emphasizing that “[t]he constitutional label matters less than the reality of how 
intergovernmental relations work in practice.”  For example, “[d]espite the fact that 
constitutional provisions suggest that the federal finance (localist approach) perspective 
characterizes intergovernmental fiscal relations, the empirical evidence that has been gathered 
clearly shows that Argentina is one of the more fiscally concentrated federations in the world” 
(Rezk, 1998: 214-215).  That is to say that the decision to choose one approach of fiscal 
decentralization over the other is not only based on economic efficiency and constitutional 
provisions.  In order to gain a complete understanding of how fiscal decentralization decisions 
are made, it is necessary to take politics into account. 
2.2 THE PROCESS OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
The two approaches discussed in the earlier section provide a theoretical rationale for and means 
to pursue fiscal decentralization.  However, public policies are not made and implemented in a 
vacuum, and compromises made by political actors are usually involved in the process.  As 
Wilson (2003: 319) suggested, “[a] multi-level governance framework incorporates the 
numerous negotiated exchanges which characterize governance at sub-national level.  It 
recognizes changes in the style of governing relationships, not just the number and types of 
institutions.”  Therefore, the political process of fiscal decentralization is discussed in this 
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section to further our understanding of the politics affecting the formulation of fiscal 
decentralization proposals and the interests of different stakeholders in the process. 
2.2.1 Political Maneuver of Fiscal Decentralization 
In an effort to understand why national politicians would surrender power to pursue 
decentralization, Eaton (2001: 104) argued that they “may cede some of their power in the short 
term in order to bolster their overall positions in the long term.”  He continued, “national 
politicians endorse decentralization not so much as a matter of choice, but rather because they 
are forced to do so by pressures from below.  …  [E]ven when decentralization is indeed initiated 
by central state actors, this support may reflect short-term, highly strategic political calculations” 
(Eaton, 2001: 104-105).  Although Eaton was correct in pointing out the importance of national 
politicians’ political calculations in the decision-making process of fiscal decentralization, he 
overlooked the influence that sub-national politicians may have in the reform. 
Indeed, both national and sub-national politicians will try to influence policy outcomes of 
fiscal decentralization based on their respective political interests.  Therefore, as Willis, Garman, 
and Haggard (1999: 7) stated, “[f]iscal decentralization must be understood as a political bargain 
involving presidents, legislators, and subnational politicians, each having somewhat conflicting 
preferences.”  Based on this statement, we can conclude first that policy decisions of fiscal 
decentralization are results of political bargain.  Second, principle actors in the process are 
presidents, legislators, and subnational politicians.  Third, each actor has different policy 
preferences.  These views will be discussed in greater detail in this section to not only better 
understand the policy process of fiscal decentralization but also provide a rationale to study 
officials’ patterns of attitude toward this policy area. 
Although proponents of fiscal decentralization often argue its value from an economic 
efficiency perspective, many case studies in the developing world have suggested that political 
calculations made by national and local politicians are the true forces necessary for the adoption 
of various reform efforts.  Eaton (2001:122) pointed out that “cross-border pressures (e.g. 
democratization, economic liberalization, and the preferences of external donors) certainly set 
the stage for decentralization, however, short-term political calculations determine the form that 
decentralization actually takes.”  Economic efficiency, at least in most cases, may not be the true 
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motivation for political actors in developing countries to pursue fiscal decentralization.  Quoting 
from Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema (1983), Park (1996: 12) argued, “decentralization is 
ultimately a political decision, and its implementation is a reflection of a country's political 
process.” 
While viewing the process of fiscal decentralization as a series of interactions made by 
politicians to maximize their political self-interest, the framework used to analyze such reform 
efforts should go beyond economic efficiency.  In summarizing lessons of fiscal decentralization 
learned in developing countries, Bird and Vaillancourt (1998: 35) asserted, “what may matter 
more than the precise nature of the technical solutions found in the different countries is the 
process through which such solutions are reached.”  Therefore, if policy recommendations are 
“to play a meaningful role in the essential political process of intergovernmental bargaining, the 
institutional framework must be one that accommodates the analysis in the process of achieving 
sufficient consensus for decision-making purposes in a society which is complex and divided” 
(Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998: 36).  This also reveals the value and importance of studying 
political actors’ subjective perception in the area of fiscal decentralization to see if there is 
common ground helpful for reaching a policy consensus. 
As Willis, Garman, and Haggard (1999: 7) pointed out, political actors involved most in 
the process of fiscal decentralization are Presidents (national executive branch), Legislators 
(Congress), and sub-national politicians (local officials).  Indeed, compared with other policy 
areas, the policy process of fiscal decentralization is more complex because it involves not only 
policymakers in the national government but also officials from sub-national governments.  
Although it may be true that national-local negotiations are “rarely exchanges between equals” 
(Wilson, 2003: 335), Falleti (2005: 328) argued that “a wide array of social and political actors, 
including the governors and their ministers, the mayors, the governors’ and mayors’ associations, 
the unions of the sectors to be decentralized, and other sectors of civil society are also the makers 
of decentralization.”  Local governments can often influence policy outcomes of fiscal 
decentralization by complying with or resisting the policies made at the center. 
As a result, in order for fiscal decentralization reform to be successful, not only must 
national politicians in both executive and legislative branches reach an agreement and enact 
reform proposals into the law, but also sub-national politicians (particularly when they are 
popularly elected) need to be included in order to faithfully implement the law.  If sub-national 
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politicians do not agree with the way in which fiscal decentralization takes place, they can easily 
resist the reform by passively taking no action for implementation.  For example, when a law is 
passed by the congress to allow local governments the authority to raise local taxes, local 
governments may choose not to use this authority to increase local revenue because they feel it is 
not politically viable for them to do so.  They can easily resist this national effort to increase 
locally raised tax revenues by doing nothing.  Consequently, participation of sub-national 
politicians in the decision-making process is important for any successful fiscal decentralization 
efforts.  In summation, while national politicians have legislative authority to make and modify 
decisions of fiscal decentralization, their efforts will not be lasting or ultimately successful if 
sub-national politicians do not work closely with them to carry out various initiatives made by 
central authorities. 
Before our discussion switches to each of these political actors' preference in the process, 
we must also note that the general public or citizens seem to be more involved in the process of 
political decentralization, compared with fiscal decentralization.  They have previously neither 
been interested in, nor become a driving force for efforts to pursue fiscal decentralization.  This 
may also explain why fiscal decentralization has not been high on the political agenda (at least in 
Taiwan), even though the issue is widely studied in academia.  This also creates more freedom 
and leverage for political actors to make fiscal decentralization decisions based on their own 
political interests, because their constituents do not have clear preferences on how fiscal 
decentralization should be achieved. 
If key actors in the process share similar views of how reform should proceed, initiatives 
of fiscal decentralization should be more likely to be successfully implemented and longer 
lasting.  Unfortunately, experience in countries pursuing fiscal decentralization often 
demonstrates that decentralization efforts are often challenged by numerous attempts to reverse 
the efforts.  For example, in summarizing Argentina and the Philippines’s efforts for 
decentralization, Eaton (2001: 101) stated: 
 
In Argentina, President Carlos Menem partially reversed the previous 
decentralization of revenue because fiscally-independent provincial governors 
were a challenge to his political interests and capabilities.  In the Philippines, 
legislators attempted to reverse and then circumvent decentralization since it 
threatened their status as brokers claiming personal credit for negotiating fiscal 
transfers from the center. 
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 Eaton (2001: 102) argued that, “the adoption of decentralizing policies is the beginning of 
the story rather than the end, setting into motion open-ended struggles between actors at the 
national and sub-national levels over the form that decentralization will take.”  Eaton’s statement 
above highlights continuous political maneuvering necessary to shape the direction and form of 
fiscal decentralization.  More importantly, it also implicitly points out that there might be an 
inevitable difference between national and sub-national politicians in their preference to pursue 
fiscal decentralization.  Eaton (2001: 101) asserted, “even after the political decision to 
decentralize has been made, national politicians may face deep-seated incentives to preserve 
centralized control over fiscal policy.”  This national-local dichotomy of fiscal decentralization is 
discussed in greater detail in the following subsection. 
2.2.2 National-Local Dichotomy of Fiscal Decentralization 
“Decentralization is a process of state reform composed by a set of public policies that transfer 
responsibilities, resources or authority from higher to lower levels of government in the context 
of a specific type of state” (Falleti, 2005: 328).  When making decisions of transferring 
responsibilities, resources, or authority, all stakeholders take at least two factors into 
consideration: power and trust. 
For most, if not all politicians, control over financial resources is the key to maintaining 
their political power and influence.  Therefore, one of the main objectives of both national and 
local officials in the process of fiscal decentralization is to maximize the gain or minimize the 
loss of their political power.  At the national level, for example, resistance to fiscal 
decentralization emerged from the executive branch in Argentina and from the legislative branch 
in the Philippines (Eaton, 2001: 101).  Presidents and their top political appointees in the national 
executive branch may attempt to delay or reverse the process of fiscal decentralization in order to 
ensure their control over local politicians.  They may also worry that more financially 
independent local elected officials would gain excessive political power and eventually become 
threats to their own national offices in future elections.  In Congress, legislators may want to 
claim personal credit for bringing national funds for local development back to their 
constituencies, and more decentralizing of financial resources to local governments would 
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diminish their ability to do so.  As a result, legislators (at least some of them) have been the 
strongest opponents of fiscal decentralization. 
In contrast, local elected officials often support fiscal decentralization in order to obtain 
more financial resources to pay for more local services.  By doing a better job in serving their 
constituency, local elected officials can gain popularity and increase their political power.  Case 
studies have suggested that administrative and political decentralization are often more advanced 
than fiscal decentralization in developing countries.  While local governments have assumed 
responsibilities to provide decentralized public services, they do not have sufficient financial 
resources to fulfill their new duties.  In addition, after democratization and political 
decentralization, top local executives are elected through competitive popular elections.  Either 
for the purpose of winning re-elections or advancing their political causes and career, these top 
elected officials often have a strong incentive to secure sufficient financial resources necessary 
for providing better local services.  As a result, it is not surprising that local elected officials 
often support efforts to decentralize financial resources. 
Another factor contributing to the difference in views between national and local officials 
is the level of trust in the officials of the other level.  Wilson (2003: 341) stated that “[g]iven the 
very different worlds inhabited by the major actors, the generation of trust, especially when 
different political parties are in control centrally and locally, is a tall order.”  Quoting from Jones 
and Travers (1994: 16), Wilson (2003: 338) highlighted that “[a] gap of understanding exists 
between central and local government, much of which appears to be based on simple ignorance 
(or worse still, mistaken, stereotyped, views).”  National officials feel distrustful of local officials 
when local officials repeatedly fail to administer public programs in the way that national 
officials believe these programs should be delivered.  On the other hand, local officials, who are 
encountered troubles again and again in the delivery of public services in accordance with 
national regulations, cannot understand why national officials always make rules that are not 
feasible.  Moreover, it seems to local officials that national officials do not even intend to make 
efforts to understand the “real world.”  Based on the observation of Jones and Travers (1994: 16), 
Wilson (2003: 338) asserted that “[t]he mundane nature of many local services appears to 
encourage (at least some) civil servants to believe that they possess ‘Rolls Royce minds and local 
government officers have motor cyclists’ minds.’”  In the process of fiscal decentralization, 
national officials often find themselves unable to stop local officials from complaining about 
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insufficiency of local revenue, while local officials can never understand why national officials 
just cannot see the real costs of providing local services and local efforts to improve local fiscal 
accountability. 
When a lack of mutual understanding leads to distrust, national officials believe more 
national control and monitoring are necessary to ensure that policies of fiscal decentralization are 
properly carried out.  National mechanisms are established to enforce local compliance with the 
national regulations.  Local officials, on the contrary, desperately demand more local 
administrative and financial freedom in providing local public services.  These two different 
views make it very difficult for both levels of officials to open their minds to find common 
ground, and the national government has to dominate the process in order to make sure fiscal 
decentralization occurs based on the national agenda.  For example, in the UK, there have been 
consultations galore incorporating endless dialogue in the area of local government finance, but 
little of substance has emerged to challenge the overwhelming dominance of the center (Wilson, 
2003: 336).  In the end, intergovernmental dialogue does not lead to negotiated consensus for 
formulating a proposal for fiscal decentralization, and the process of fiscal decentralization can 
turn into a fierce political struggle between two levels of government. 
The analysis in this subsection shows that there is a national-local dichotomy in fiscal 
decentralization.  This difference in views often has a great impact on how fiscal decentralization 
is designed and on whether efforts of fiscal decentralization can be lasting and successful.  As a 
result, it is important to consider this difference when proposing and analyzing a country’s fiscal 
decentralization reform.  In addition to the difference between national and sub-national 
politicians, there might be differences existing among local officials.  For example, Escobar-
Lemmon (2000: 110-111) observed that although many municipalities in Colombia have chosen 
to depend heavily on national transfers, larger municipalities are less dependent on transfers than 
smaller municipalities are.  In order to test whether there is a difference in opinion among local 
officials in Taiwan, this study will examine whether local officials who perform different duties, 
serve in different types of local government, and work for local governments with different 
levels of reliance on national transfer possess different views regarding the form of fiscal 
decentralization.  Understanding these differences will be the first step in searching for 
consensus in the design of fiscal decentralization policies.  A complete set of research questions 
and hypotheses will be presented in Chapter Five, the chapter on Research Methodology. 
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2.3 APPROACHING THE REFORM: COMPETING VIEWS IN TAIWAN 
In the previous two sections, concepts, theoretical debates, and politics of fiscal decentralization 
have been discussed.  The focus of this section attempts to put the above discussions in the 
context of current policy debates of fiscal decentralization in Taiwan.  As mentioned in the first 
two sections, the centralist approach and the localist approach can be viewed as two ends of a 
continuum for strategies to pursue fiscal decentralization.  This national-local dichotomy can be 
used as a framework to reveal policy debates for achieving five policy objectives of fiscal 
decentralization in Taiwan.  These five objectives include efficiency, autonomy, accountability, 
development, and equity (It should be noted that equalization will not be discussed in this section 
because there is a strong consensus among Taiwanese scholars that equalization should be a 
national function). 
This analysis can provide a basis to collect statements for the concourse, a collection of 
statements describing the concept being studied.  Then statements can be selected from the 
concourse to study Taiwanese officials’ subjective perception on how the reform of fiscal 
decentralization should proceed in Taiwan.  Unlike literature discussed in the previous sections, 
literature used in this section will draw heavily from those written by Taiwanese scholars in 
order to better reflect current policy debates in Taiwan. 
2.3.1 Efficiency 
It is generally agreed that efficiency will be enhanced regardless of whether a centralist or a 
localist approach is chosen to implement fiscal decentralization.  While recognizing the benefits 
of reform, proponents of the centralist approach emphasize the importance of the role a national 
government should play in the effort.  They argue that a national government should utilize 
intergovernmental transfers as a policy tool to internalize any spillover effect, ensure that 
national objectives will not be compromised, and avoid dysfunctional competition among sub-
national governments during the process of fiscal decentralization. 
Among these issues, the spillover effect (derived from fiscal decentralization) seems of 
most concern to scholars in Taiwan.  They argue that the national government in Taiwan should 
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transfer financial resources in the amount necessary to offset inefficiency2 caused by insufficient 
local spending (Lin, 2001: 34; Liu, Qi-Chang, 1994: 103; Wang, 1993: 167; Ma, 1997a: 8; Ma, 
1997b: 59; and Chen, Qing-Xiu, 1996: 329).  Another concern expressed is that after local 
politicians obtain more authority to make local spending decisions, they might irrationally 
increase local spending either to claim personal credit for new development and welfare 
programs or to respond to pressure from local interest groups (Chen, 1995: 79).  Xu (2001: 3) 
further warned that if local governments can tailor their spending allotments to accommodate 
local needs, a consistent nation-wide fiscal policy would be difficult to achieve, and fiscal 
imbalance among localities might become even more severe.  Finally, Huang (2001: 51) 
expressed his deep concern that dysfunctional competition among local governments might 
undermine any efficiency gain resulting from fiscal decentralization.  Therefore, it is argued that 
while transferring additional funding to local governments through intergovernmental transfers, 
the national government should retain the authority to determine the level of local revenue and 
keep the majority of financial resources at the center to ensure that local governments are 
spending these additional funds properly and rationally to meet their local needs. 
On the other hand, proponents of the localist approach recognize the efficiency gain 
resulting from decentralizing authority for setting the level of local spending to local 
governments and allowing them to meet differing local needs.  Lin (2001: 35-44) argued that for 
efficiency to be achieved by local government, it is essential for them to successfully satisfy the 
goal of providing local public goods based on local preferences while having the authority to 
determine the rates of particular taxes or to collect new taxes.  Competition among localities and 
mobility of voters will also be factors for improved efficiency.  Liu (Liu, Qi-Chang, 1994: 99) 
argued that tax competition might enhance efficiency of economic resource allocation because it 
forces local officials to collect local taxes for benefits received by local residents from local 
public services.  In addition, competition will force local officials to improve administrative 
efficiency and to be creative in the provision of local services (Wang, 1993: 166).  When local 
officials can differentiate among local services they provide, people are more likely to find 
services best meeting their preferences (Lin, Quan, 1999: 376).  Proponents of the localist 
                                                 
2 The term efficiency refers to the level of a local service provided by a local government equals to the level that 
local people are willing to pay.  Inefficiency occurs when the local government is providing the service at a level 
that is lower than the level that local people are willing to pay. 
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approach also warned that reliance on intergovernmental transfers would result in local 
overspending because local residents might view these grants as free money from the national 
government (Liu, Qi-Chang, 1994: 90; Wang, 1993: 173; and Sun, 2000: 11). 
2.3.2 Autonomy 
Many people would argue that local autonomy cannot be obtained if financial resources are 
controlled by a central government.  However, in a unitary country like Taiwan, some would 
argue that fiscal decentralization is best achieved through an incremental process and that the 
national government should begin the reform process by substituting conditional grants with 
general grants to give local officials more flexibility to meet local preferences (Lin, Xiang-Kai, 
1999: 70).  They believe that national transfers will still make up a significant portion of local 
revenues and that the national government should not tell local governments how the money 
should be spent.  In addition, they advocate that the national statue defining national-local fiscal 
relations should be amended to limit discretionary authority of the national government to 
distribute intergovernmental transfers.  The key is to regulate standards, formulas, and 
procedures for distributing national grants in the existing laws.  In fact, national officials’ 
discretion in the distribution of funds has been used as a tool to control local political behavior in 
Taiwan (Lin, Quan, 1999: 382; Liang, 1995: 148-149; and Xu, 1999: 35).  Only when this power 
is constrained by law, would it be more likely that local officials can make spending decisions 
without intervention from the central government. 
People who propose the localist approach believe that local autonomy can be improved 
when the national government only regulates what local government cannot do without telling 
them what they must do (Lin, Quan, 1999: 378-379).  In other words, as long as the decisions 
they make do not adversely affect national interests, local governments should be allowed to 
have complete control over local policies.  Furthermore, proponents also argued that in order to 
maintain local autonomy, local governments should collect their own-source revenues to reduce 
their reliance on national transfers (Liu, Qi-Chang, 1994: 86-88; and Sun, 1998: 123).  The 
greater control they have over local revenues, the greater autonomy they will enjoy to make 
policy decisions and to meet local preferences (Ma, 1997b: 74).  King (1997: 47) agreed by 
asserting “when a government pays grants, it is likely to want to control how sub-central 
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authorities spend them.”  Finally, Chen (Chen, Li-Gang, 1996: 172) argued that local people 
should be allowed to vote on proposals for collecting local revenues.  Participation of local 
people in the decision-making process will give local government greater leverage to resist 
intervention from the national government. 
2.3.3 Accountability 
In the era of fiscal decentralization, accountability has become a major concern.  People begin to 
wonder if local officials will abuse their new power to advance their political careers, and they 
wonder, as well, who would hold local officials accountable for their financial mismanagement.  
In fact, some may argue that the national government should play an essential role in this matter, 
while others may see local residents are the ones best suited to do the job. 
People who believe in the centralist approach argue that the national government should 
retain the authority to monitor local debt services, budgeting, and collection of local taxes and 
other revenues (Su, 2002: 29).  In addition, a mechanism should be established by the national 
government to reward good practices of financial management while punishing those with poor 
practices (Lin, Xiang-Kai, 1999: 70; and Sun, 2000: 15).  Many scholars have identified national 
grants as a good policy tool to be included as a part of an accountability mechanism to reward or 
punish local governments’ financial behavior (Xu, 1999: 41; and Su, 2002: 29).  Sun (2000: 15) 
pointed out that a set of objective indicators should be developed to evaluate local financial 
performance and that the national government should utilize the results of this evaluation as a 
basis to increase or decrease the amount of national grants transferred to a locality.  Some 
scholars further proposed that local government’s financial behavior should be regulated in the 
national statues.  For example, Lin (2001: 325) argued that a law on local public debts should be 
enacted to limit local governments’ ability to borrow money.  Zhao (2002: 142) also advocated 
for a Law on Local Budgeting to grant the national government legal status to monitor and 
control local financial behavior. 
Proponents of the localist approach point out that participation of local residents in the 
local policy making process is the key to ensuring local accountability.  Huang (1997: 38) argued 
that local residents should be encouraged to participate in the local policy deliberation process in 
order to realize the true costs and benefits they receive from local services.  In fact, under the 
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current system in Taiwan where the majority of local revenue is made up of national transfers, 
local officials are motivated to inflate the level of local spending and ask for additional national 
transfers (Liu, Qi-Chang, 1994: 88; Sun, 1998: 119; and Chen, Li-Gang, 1996: 170).  As a result, 
Ma (1996: 44) and Huang (2001: 51) both argued that the level of local spending will be set at 
appropriate levels, and more efficient and cost effective methods of providing local services will 
be researched and achieved only when local officials have to collect own-sourced revenues to 
support their own spending.  On the other hand, if the majority of local spending has to be 
collected from local residents, people will feel the “pain” of paying taxes and will keep a close 
eye on whether local officials spend every dollar wisely (Lin, Quan, 1999: 382; and Ma, 1996: 
44).  Moreover, Xu (1999: 43) further argued that local residents should be allowed to vote on 
local fiscal issues so local officials can bear the consequences for their financial mismanagement. 
2.3.4 Development 
In terms of local development, the center of debate is on whether the national government should 
provide the majority of funding and, accordingly, whether it should get involved in the local 
development planning process via their power to decide which projects get funded.  People with 
a centralist mind argue that it is a responsibility of the national government to guarantee 
sufficient funding for basic local services (Chen, Qing-Xiu, 1996: 330).  In addition, the national 
government should retain sufficient financial resources to push development projects with 
national significance in order to promote balanced growth among localities (Lin, 2001: 43).  
They also point out that when certain projects are administered across local boundaries, economy 
of scale would take effect to lower the costs of these programs (Ma, 1997b: 59). 
They believe that in response to the trend of globalization, the national government is in a 
better position to maintain a knowledge base for the rapidly changing global environment.  
Therefore, the national government should organize a technical assistance team to help each 
local government develop a financial plan based on its respective unique economic activities in 
order to provide sufficient financial resources for local development (Xu, 1999: 39).  Finally, 
with its knowledge of the global economy, the national government should also utilize national 
grants as a means to stimulate local private investments for selected industries deemed to have 
greater potential for future growth (Lin, 1991: 49; and Lin, Xiang-Kai, 1999: 70). 
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People who propose the localist approach argue that local governments should have 
complete control over their local planning and development.  For people who think this way, the 
prerequisite is a reduction of their reliance on national transfers and an increase in the collection 
of own-sourced revenues.  They warn that reliance on national grants will result in an imbalance 
of local development because local governments will tend to emphasize projects with an ability 
to bring in national grants (Wang, 1993: 173).  They point out that national grants are often 
conditional, and cannot be used to meet true local needs (Liu, Jun-Qing, 1994: 19-20).  As result, 
if a local government heavily relies on national transfers to support local development, it 
becomes difficult for the local government to implement consistent and comprehensive local 
planning (Ma, 1997b: 60).  Ma (1997b: 59-60) further argued that local governments are closer 
to local people, and their decisions on resource allocation will better reflect local interests and 
needs.  By decentralizing policymaking authority to local governments, they will have policy 
tools necessary to compete with each other and to be more creative in making their local policies. 
2.3.5 Equity 
Musgrave (1959) has identified stabilization, distribution (equity), and allocation as three 
traditional economic functions of government.  Ashworth, Heyndels, and Smolders (2002: 27) 
have pointed out that “[t]he orthodox view is that income distribution should be centralized.  If 
local governments have any role to play, then it is as agents of the central government.”  While 
conventional wisdom has suggested that local governments are limited in achieving effective 
distributional functions, the notion has been challenged in recent years (Fisher, 1996: 27).  
Debates regarding local government’s role to perform distribution functions in Taiwan will be 
discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Most scholars in Taiwan believe that it is national government’s responsibility to enhance 
equity in Taiwan.  They argue that distribution is a national function and that it is inappropriate 
for local government to perform it (Lin, Quan, 1999: 377; and Ma, 1997b: 8).  They warn that 
rich people will move out and the poor will move in if a local government implements 
distribution policies (Lin, Quan, 1999: 377; and Ma, 1996: 40).  Accordingly, the tax base will 
shrink, and local economic resources will be drained (Lin, Quan, 1999: 377).  They point out that 
mobility is more constrained among countries and that the national government is in a better 
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position to impose progressive taxes to promote equity.  By transferring revenues collected from 
progressive taxes to local governments, local income distribution will be better equalized (Liu, 
Qi-Chang, 1994: 103). 
Some scholars believe otherwise and suggest that “many state-local services have 
substantial distributional implications” (Fisher, 1996: 27).  They observe that local governments 
do have sufficient discretion regarding redistribution policies in most federal countries and argue 
that redistributive policies could be a local public good (Ashworth, Heyndels, and Smolders, 
2002).  Since they are closer to local residents, if local governments are given more 
responsibility to perform distributional functions, they can be more creative and better meet local 
preferences (Gainsborough, 2003: 604).  However, very little literature concerning how local 
governments promote equity was found in Taiwan.  In fact, only Lin (2001: 35) and Wang 
(1993: 167) observe and state that local governments often get involved in distribution policies in 
the areas of education, medical care, or housing assistance.  This shows that most scholars in 
Taiwan still consider equality as a national function. 
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3.0  TAIWAN’S LOCAL GOVERNMENTS SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 
The views of officials concerning how the current local fiscal system should be reformed 
inevitably will be influenced by their historical and cultural biases.  As Miller (2002: 8) noted, 
“historical context frames and structures where we are headed.”  This chapter will provide such 
historical context before we can go further to analyze Taiwan’s local fiscal system and to study 
different patterns of officials’ attitudes toward fiscal decentralization. 
Taiwan’s local governments system went through a series of reforms in the past decade.  
These reforms had redefined intergovernmental relationships and empowered local elected 
officials with more autonomy to set local priorities and to administer local programs.  In order to 
provide historical and cultural background for our discussion, this chapter begins by introducing 
the system of local self-governance in Taiwan prior to the reforms of the 1990s.  A brief 
summary of recent reforms of Taiwan’s local governments system will follow, adding our 
understanding about issues of concern, and how they were addressed.  Finally, selected issues 
concerning future reforms will be discussed to anticipate possible local governments system 
changes in the future. 
3.1 PRIOR TO REFORM: GUARDED LOCAL SELF-GOVERNANCE 
Kuomintang, the Nationalist Party, began to rule Taiwan in 1945 after Japan’s surrender in 
WWII.  The Kuomintang government imposed martial law in Taiwan in May 1949.  Later in the 
same year, Kuomintang lost the Chinese Civil War and retreated from Mainland China to 
Taiwan.  Although only effectively controlling Taiwan Province and a few outlying islands of 
Fukien Province, the Kuomintang government proclaimed it as the sole legitimate authority over 
all of China and continued to use the 1947 constitution drawn up for governing the whole of 
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China.  The imposition of martial law and continuous use of the 1947 constitution had profound 
impacts on local governments system in Taiwan for more than three decades.  First, Taiwan’s 
local governments system, including local governments’ roles in providing public services and 
organizing their governing structures, was defined by various executive orders instead of laws.  
Second, while the 1947 constitution granted provincial and county governments power to make 
local self-governing laws and to define the structure of local governments, these powers were not 
given to local governments until reforms took place in the 1990s. 
In 1950, in order to start implementing local self-governance in Taiwan, the government 
of Taiwan Province enacted the Regulation of Local Self-Governance for Counties and 
Provincial Cities in Taiwan Province.  The regulation, an executive order of the provincial 
government, set up principles and became the fundamental legal basis for regulating local self-
governance in Taiwan for the next 44 years.  In fact, referred to as the “Ear of the Regulations” 
(Su, 1999), the organization and authority of local self-governments during this period were 
defined by various national and provincial executive orders, and, thus, they were not protected 
by the national statutes.  The organization of provincial governments was defined by the Act of 
Provincial Government Organization, which was enacted by Kuomintang government on July 1st, 
1927, approximately 20 years prior to the enactment of the 1947 constitution.  The Regulation of 
Taiwan Provincial Assembly Organization was enacted on September 26th, 1951 to regulate the 
organization of the provincial assembly.  The Regulation of Taipei City Government 
Organizations and Its Implementation on Local Self-Governance, enacted on June 22nd, 1967, 
and the Regulation of Kaohsiung City Government Organizations and Its Implementation on 
Local Self-Governance, enacted on June 22nd, 1979 provided general guidelines for establishing 
executive and legislative organizations of Taipei City and Kaohsiung City, respectively. 
The national government had control over how local programs were administered during 
this time (Gao, 2001).  Huang (Huang, Jin-Tang, 1995: 1-2) used the term “Guarded Self-
Governance” to highlight the fact that the national government often interfered with local affairs, 
and local governments only enjoyed very limited autonomy as local self-governance units.  He 
concluded that lack of personnel, lack of financial resources, lack of authority, and lack of 
mechanism to resolve disputes between levels of governments were the most critical problems 
during this early stage of implementing local self-governance in Taiwan.  The national 
government was the dominant player in making both national and local policies.  Although 
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called local self-governance units, Taiwan’s local governments during this period were not 
actively involved in the decision-making process and can be considered as de facto field offices 
of the national government, mainly in charge of implementing policies made by the center.  
Local elected executives and representatives were willing to accept their reduced role in local 
self-governance because they needed either nomination or the support of Kuomintang, the ruling 
party of the national government, to remain in the office and stay in power. 
Su (1999: 11-12) argued that although local governments in Taiwan during the time did 
not enjoy sufficient local autonomy, their authority and self-governing organizations were highly 
protected by the 1947 constitution, which was adopted in Nanking to be implemented in the 
whole of China.  In other words, there was a huge gap between the local self-governance system 
drawn by the 1947 constitution and the one implemented in practice.  The 1947 constitution 
devoted one chapter to ensure a balanced division of power between the national and local 
governments and another chapter to define the local self-governments system.  The national 
government could only make general principles to regulate the local governments system while 
provincial and county governments could make self-governing laws to define their authority and 
structure local government organizations.  Only the authority and organizations of special cities 
were not specified in the 1947 constitution, and they are subject to definition by national statutes.  
However, these constitutional provisions did not translate into self-governing laws because the 
legislative actions were seriously delayed while Taiwan was still in a state of martial law.  As a 
result, executive orders, such as Regulation of Local Self-Governance for Counties and 
Provincial Cities in Taiwan Province, were adopted to provide a legal framework for Taiwan’s 
local self-governance system, and as a further result, the national government gained complete 
control over local governments though its power to adopt, amend, and approve these executive 
orders.  Because these executive orders did not fully comply with the local self-governing 
principles set forth by the 1947 constitution, Chen (2001: 784) even claimed that these executive 
orders were unconstitutional. 
It should also be noted that the 1947 constitution did not specify urban township/rural 
township/county city governments as local self-governance units.  The self-governing status of 
urban township/rural township/county city governments was regulated in the Regulation of Local 
Self-Governance for Counties and Provincial Cities in Taiwan Province.  Although there were 
always ongoing discussions concerning whether the national government should make them field 
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offices of county governments and make their executives appointed by county governments, 
their status as local self-governance units remained unchanged throughout the period of guarded 
local self-governance. 
There were three levels of local self-governance units in Taiwan during this period.  They 
were provincial/special city governments, county/provincial city governments, and urban 
township/rural township/county city governments.  At the provincial/special city-level, the 
highest level of local self-governance, the governor of the Taiwan provincial government and 
mayors of the two special city governments were appointed by the national government, while 
provincial assembly representatives and city councilors were directly elected.  Both local 
executives and representatives were directly in the other two lower levels of the local self-
governing units.  Figure 3.1 depicts the structure of the local self-governance system in Taiwan 
during this period. 
 
Figure 3.1 Structure of local self-governance system during 1950-1982 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Special Cities Province 
National Government 
Provincial Cities Counties 
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Represents local self-governance status 
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As a part of democratization movements began in the late 1980s, pressure to grant local 
governments more autonomous power emerged.  A series of reforms took place in the 1990s to 
decentralize more power to local governments and to enact self-governance laws to better protect 
local governments from the national government’s interference.  These efforts will be presented 
in the following section. 
3.2 RECENT REFORMS 
There were two major reforms for the local governments system in the 1990s.  Reformers hoped 
to adopt a local governments system suitable for Taiwan’s current political circumstance, to 
address the concern that executive orders adopted to regulate the local governments system 
might not be constitutional, and to respond to growing pressure for greater local autonomy.  The 
first reform was completed in 1994 after separate local self-governance laws were passed to 
regulate the local governments system in Taiwan.  The second reform was accomplished with the 
passage of the Law on Local Governments System in 1999.  In the following sections, these two 
major reform events, constitutional interpretations, and constitutional amendments relating to the 
reforms will be presented. 
3.2.1 1994 Reform: the Passage of Two Laws on Local Self-Governance 
After martial law was lifted in 1987, the democratization movement gained momentum in 
Taiwan.  The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), founded in 1986 as the major opposition 
party during the time, became the leading party to provide vision and direction for 
democratization and other progressive reforms.  With growing support, DPP candidates were 
able to win six out of 21 races in the 1989 local executive election, allowing the DPP to gain 
control of six local governments with a combined population approaching half of Taiwan’s total 
population.  As a result, the stable relationships between the national government and local 
governments maintained during the period of guarded local self-governance started to collapse.  
These non-Kuomintang county magistrates and provincial city mayors often challenged policies 
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handed out by the national government and voiced the need for more local autonomy.  These 
confrontations highlighted many problems of the local governments system at the time. 
In 1990, the National Affairs Conference (NAC) was called by then-President Lee to 
discuss a wide range of issues concerning options for future political reforms.  Among other 
recommendations, the NAC made a recommendation to increase local autonomy by directly 
electing the governor of Taiwan Province and the mayors of two special cities, Taipei City and 
Kaohsiung City.  It was believed that local autonomy would be enhanced because directly 
elected local executives would be in a better position to defend local interests without worrying 
about being removed from office.  In the same year, the Constitution Court issued two rulings: 
Constitutional Interpretation No. 259 and Constitutional Interpretation No. 260.  In 
Constitutional Interpretation No. 259, the Constitution Court ruled (Judicial Yuan, 1990): 
 
The Constitution provides different systems of local government for the 
province, counties, and special municipalities in Chapter XI.  Article 118 of 
the Constitution has authorized the enactment of law for self-governance of 
special municipalities.  Although the local self-governance of special 
municipalities need not follow the same procedures as those of the province or 
counties, it still has to abide by the Constitution and enact the relevant laws. 
 
Six days later, in Constitutional Interpretation No. 260, the Constitution Court asserted 
(Judicial Yuan, 1990): 
 
According to the system of local government provisions in the Constitution, 
the Central Government has no authority to enact individual executive orders 
for specified provincial assemblies and the organization of the provincial 
government. 
 
In both Interpretations, the court also made it very clear that the existing system of local 
governments should remain in effect before the laws were enacted to replace those executive 
orders.  As we can see, although the constitutional court did not render the use of executive 
orders to regulate the local governments system unconstitutional in these two Constitutional 
Interpretations, they did explicitly require the enactment of laws to be the basis for establishing 
the executive and legislative organizations of local self-government.  In 1992, eight 
constitutional amendments were adopted.  The focal points of this constitutional revision 
concerning local governments system reform were that: (1) laws should be enacted to regulate 
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the provincial and county governments system; (2) the provincial governor (and special city 
mayors) should be popularly elected; (3) the supervisory agency of provincial self-government is 
the Executive Yuan and the supervisory agency of county self-governments is the provincial 
government.  The 1992 constitutional revision set the stage for the passage of two separate local 
self-governance laws by the Legislative Yuan. 
The Law of Local Self-Governance for Provincial and County Governments and the Law 
of Local Self-Governance for Special City Governments were enacted in July 1994 to end the 
44-year period of guarded local self-governance in Taiwan.  Based on the principles set forth by 
the 1992 constitutional revision, these two laws made direct popular election of the provincial 
governor and two special city mayors a reality.  Moreover, authority and organization of local 
governments were finally defined and protected by local self-governance laws.  It was widely 
believed at the time that these two laws had granted local governments additional autonomy to 
provide local services and that local elected executives would have power to challenge and 
confront the national government based on their respective local interests. 
Some scholars believed otherwise, however.  It was argued that authority and autonomy 
of local self-governments were actually weakened by this reform because of the addition of a 
constitutional provision, which also appeared in both laws, that the Executive Yuan was the 
supervisory agency of the provincial and special city governments and that the organization of 
local self-governance units had to be defined by the laws enacted by the Legislative Yuan (Su, 
1999: 12).  In other words, the costs of popularly electing the provincial and special city top 
executives, and enacting national laws to regulate the local governments system were that the 
national government could now constitutionally supervise local government operations and 
regulate the structure of local self-governing organizations, none of which was specified in the 
1947 constitution.  Chen (2001: 786) further claimed that one thing that the 1992 constitutional 
revision accomplished was to render the unconstitutional practices of regulating local self-
governments from 1950 to 1994 constitutional. 
In general, the 1994 reform did enhance local autonomy and its power to represent local 
interests in practice.  Although the national government obtained the constitutional authority and 
legal power to supervise local governments in the reform, it could also be argued that local 
governments did not lose anything in this regard because they were always supervised by the 
national government prior to the reform. 
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3.2.2 1999 Reform: the Passage of Law on Local Governments System 
On March 23, 1996, the first direct presidential election in Chinese history was held in Taiwan.  
The election represented a milestone for Taiwan’s democratization movement and provoked 
further discussion on issues of national development.  The National Development Conference 
was held from December 23 to December 28, 1996.  About 170 delegates from the major 
political parties were invited to deliberate issues pertaining to Taiwan’s continuing development.  
Among areas of consensus reached at the conference, the following four recommendations were 
made for reforming the local governments system (Ji, 1999: 38): 
1. Setting up a committee to formulate and implement a plan for streamlining the 
provincial government’s functions and organizations and suspending the election of 
the provincial governor starting the next term. 
2. Suspending local self-governance elections at the township level and making urban 
township/rural township/county city executives appointed instead of elected. 
3. In the county level government, adding deputy level positions to be politically 
appointed by county magistrates and provincial city mayors and increasing the 
authority of county and provincial city governments. 
4. In order to improve local fiscal health, enacting the General Law on Local Taxation 
should be enacted, and amending the Law on Allocation of Government Revenues 
and Expenditures. 
Based on these four recommendations, counties and provincial cities would become the 
primary administrative units of local self-governance, in addition to the two special cities, after 
streamlining the provincial government and suspending the township level elections.  In addition, 
the participants of the conference also paid attention to the problem of poor local fiscal health, 
and made recommendations to decentralize more financial resources to the local governments.  
Because the constitution stipulated self-governance status of the provincial government and the 
election of provincial governor and provincial assembly representatives, one of the eleven 
constitutional amendments adopted in 1997 was to transform the provincial government from a 
local self-governance unit to an administrative agency of the national government. 
In fact, during the second reform period, the main focus of reforming the local 
governments system was to streamline the provincial government for improving administrative 
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efficiency by eliminating costs derived due to redundant administrative layers.  In addition, by 
decentralizing more authority and power to county and provincial city governments, county level 
governments could better meet local needs and provide public services more efficiently.  After 
the constitution was amended, the Constitution Court issued Constitutional Interpretation No. 
467 in 1998 to clarify the status of the provincial government based on the 1997 constitutional 
revision. It asserted (Judicial Yuan, 1998): 
 
[T]he provincial government is still a local government.  However, as the 
Taiwan Province no longer has jurisdiction over matters of local self-
government and has been deprived of the organic right of self-government, it 
shall not be recognized as a legal public legal person of local self-government. 
 
Later in the same year, the Provisional Act of Adjusting Taiwan Provincial Government’s 
Functions, Operations, and Organizations was enacted to provide guidelines for reorganizing the 
provincial government.  The Taiwan provincial government was no longer considered as a local 
self-governance body, and it become merely a field office of the national government.  In 
January 1999, the Law on Local Governments System was passed in the congress to redefine the 
local governments system in Taiwan.  The current local governments system regulated by the 
Law on Local Governments System can be summarized in the following ways: (Ji, 1999: 18-22; 
Chen, Yang-De, 1999: 60-62): 
1. There are three levels of local self-governance units, including special cities, 
counties/provincial cities, and urban townships/rural townships/county cities. 
2. The provincial government executes orders of the Executive Yuan and supervises 
counties/provincial cities on matters of local self-governance. 
3. Special cities have completely independent autonomous power. 
4. The status of counties/provincial cities is elevated to make it more comparable to the 
status of special cities. 
5. The executive authority of county magistrates and provincial city mayors is 
strengthened. 
6. County and provincial city councils obtain more legislative power on local affairs. 
7. The status of urban townships/rural townships/county cities remains unchanged. 
It should be noted that the status of urban township/rural township/county city 
governments remains unchanged although the consensus reached at the National Development 
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Conference was to remove the self-governing status of township-level governments.  This issue 
will be discussed in more detail in the next section.  The current structure of local self-
governance based on the Law on Local Governments System is depicted in the Figure 3.2: 
 
Figure 3.2 Current structure of local self-governance system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two reforms completed in the 1990s have overhauled Taiwan’s local governments 
system.  Local executives are now elected with strong executive power to provide vision and 
leadership for local developments.  As local elected executives are granted necessary authority 
and autonomy for local self-governing, recent debates on future reforms begin to pay more 
attention to improving the management of local self-governments.  The following section will 
provide a brief discussion on selected issues of future reforms. 
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3.3 ISSUES FOR FUTURE REFORMS 
In the 1990s, the focus of reforming the local governments system was to decentralize more 
authority and autonomous power to the local governments.  As we turn to the 21st century, the 
focus begins to switch to how local governments can be equipped to function appropriately and 
efficiently in governing local affairs.  Several questions are frequently asked.  Should we further 
restructure the local governments system to improve efficiency of local service delivery and 
reduce corruption?  Should we adopt local initiatives and referenda to get local people more 
involved in the local policy making process and improve local accountability?  How can we 
encourage local government collaboration in order to address inter-local problems?  These issues 
will be discussed in this section. 
3.3.1 Debates on the Status of Township Level Governments 
One of the recommendations made by the National Development Conference was to suspend 
local self-governance elections at the township level, including urban townships, rural townships, 
and county cities.  Accordingly, top executives of township-level governments should be 
appointed instead of popularly elected by the local people, and township level governments will 
no longer be considered as local self-governance units.  However, this recommendation has not 
been adopted into law since it was made by the conference in 1996. 
In fact, the local self-governance status of township-level governments was never 
specified in the constitution, and debates concerning whether township level governments should 
be granted local self-governing status are not new.  During the process of drafting the Regulation 
of Local Self-Governance for Counties and Provincial Cities in Taiwan Province in 1950, the 
local self-governance status of township-level governments was heavily debated (Liu, 2002: 216-
217).  It was reasoned that by removing the township-level governments’ local self-governance 
status, a layer of government could be eliminated to improve efficiency and reduce 
administrative costs.  The discussion on the issue intensified in the 1990s when many local 
businessmen and gangsters were elected through vote buying in the township-level elections.  
People believed that township-level governments were corrupt, and suspending township-level 
elections, at least temporarily, was necessary to eliminate corruption at the township level. 
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Although a consensual recommendation was reached at the National Development 
Conference to suspend township-level elections and revoke self-governance status of township 
level governments, Kuomintang withdrew its support on the issue after the conference because 
Kuomintang retained control over most township level governments.  For example, in a 
township-level executive election held in 1998, Kuomintang won 233 out of 319 races, 
compared to DPP’s 28 seats, and independent candidates’ 58 seats (Liu, 2002: 219).  Soon after 
the DPP won the presidential election and obtained the control of the executive branch of the 
national government, the reform effort was resumed, and a bill was sent to the congress for 
consideration.  However, the bill was not passed because Kuomintang and its allied parties were 
able to maintain their control of the congress. 
Some scholars also voiced their support for maintaining township-level governments’ 
status as local self-governance units.  It was argued that township-level governments not only 
provide opportunities for local people to participate in a democratic political process, but they 
also provide local public services directly to local people for meeting different local needs 
(Chen, Li-Gang, 1999: 285).  The value of township-level governments to present better 
opportunities for citizen participation should not be overlooked.  As a result, attempts were made 
to search for a compromised proposal which could eliminate corruption while keeping local self-
governance status intact at the township level.  By studying America’s local governments system, 
Ji (2000: 107-171) pointed out that there are many different structures of organizing local 
government, including the mayor-council plan, manager plan, and commission form.  He argued 
that the question regarding township level government’s status as local self-governance units 
should not be an either/or question.  Although recommending the commission form to be 
adopted in Taiwan, he proposed that structures mentioned above or even a hybrid structure 
should all be considered before a proposal is finalized. 
Chen (1998) developed two proposals for township-level governments reform.  In his 
Plan A, he proposed to strengthen the leadership of elected township level executives by limiting 
the authority of the township-level council.  On the other hand, his Plan B proposed to adopt a 
Taiwan manager plan in which a manager is nominated by the county magistrate and consented 
to by the township council.  In this proposal, township-level managers are appointed to and 
accountable to elected township level councils in order to obtain a balance between democratic 
participation and administrative efficiency.  In addition, the possibility of granting each township 
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options to select their government structure among some predetermined forms was also 
discussed in the study. 
In fact, the challenges of dealing with local corruption and improving local service 
delivery encountered by Taiwan’s township-level governments today are very similar to the 
challenges faced by American local government in the early part of the 20th century (Miller, 
2002:33).  Based on the American experience, the manager plan, which separates the authority of 
making and implementing local policies, may be a viable option to be adopted in Taiwan.  
Township councils can maintain local self-governing authorities to make local policies while 
managers can concentrate on efficiently and effectively implementing these policies.  In order for 
the manager plan to be implemented successfully, the national government may have to maintain 
a list of eligible township managers to ensure the qualifications and experience of appointed 
managers. 
Although a number of options for addressing the problem of local corruption while 
maintaining township level governments’ self-governing status have begun to emerge in recent 
years, the dominant view of the reform movement still focuses on transforming township-level 
governments into field offices of county governments.  However, due to its dominance at 
township-level executive elections, it is not likely that Kuomintang will support any proposal of 
eliminating township level governments’ status as local self-governance bodies in the 
foreseeable future.  As a result, it is expected that the status quo will not be changed in the next 
few years while dialogue will continue to search for a compromised proposal in order to deal 
with local corruption and improve administrative efficiency. 
3.3.2 Debates on Elevating the Status of County Level Governments 
The role of county level governments in local self-governing has grown significantly in the past 
decade because of the revocation of the provincial government’s local self-governance status and 
the uncertain status of the township level governments.  Aiming at increasing the county-level 
government’s authority and financial freedom, the two recommendations made by the National 
Development Conference discussed earlier in this chapter also confirmed this trend.  After the 
process of reorganizing the provincial government was completed, county-level governments 
have assumed the majority of the provincial government’s responsibilities in local self-governing.  
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In order to obtain additional administrative and financial resources to fulfill county-level 
governments’ growing duties, county-level elected executives and many scholars have advocated 
elevating county-level governments’ status to equality with that of the special cities. 
Currently, special city mayors enjoy greater power to organize their governing structure 
and appoint heads of departments (Huang, 2000: 416-425).  For example, a mayor of a special 
city can politically appoint all heads of municipal departments except the heads of the 
Department of Government Ethics, Department of Personnel, Police Department, and 
Department of Accounting, Budgeting, and Statistics.  On the contrary, a county magistrate or a 
provincial city mayor can only politically appoint half of the departmental heads while the other 
half of the appointments have to comply with applied national civil service laws and regulations.  
Chen (2002: 160) further pointed out that county-level governments are unfairly treated in 
allocating national shared tax.  In a national shared tax pool consisting of 10% of the Income tax, 
40% of the Sales tax, and 10% of the Commodity tax, 43% of the collected revenue goes to the 
special city governments while only 39% goes to the county-level governments.  Proponents 
believe that by elevating county-level governments’ status, financial resources then can be 
equally distributed among all special city-level and county-level governments. 
Officials of special cities have warned that efforts of reallocating resources to county-
level governments from two special city governments have to stop.  They argue that special cities 
are granted more resources because they bear more responsibilities to provide public services.  
Chen (2002: 163) stated that during the process of streamlining the provincial government, most 
provincial agencies along with their functions were reassigned to the national government while 
special city governments continue to provide those services previously assigned to special city 
and provincial governments.  For example, the Ministry of Education directly funds high schools 
which were funded by the provincial government in the past, while Taipei City and Kaohsiung 
City governments continues to fund high schools located in their jurisdictions.  In addition, most 
provincial assets and resources were also transferred to the national government during the 
transition.  Therefore, the national government should make more resources available to local 
governments instead of reallocating existing resources among local governments.  Chen (2002: 
163-164) supported this view and proposed that the national government should meet with 
special city and county-level governments to discuss reassigning functions and resources 
previously owned by the provincial government. 
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Based on the discussion above, it is clear that whether county-level governments should 
be elevated to a status equal to the special city status is not an issue to be addressed.  Rather, the 
real concern in the debate is how to make more resources available to the county-level 
governments, either by reallocating resources currently owned by the special city governments or 
by decentralizing more resources from the national government.  As the role of county level 
governments continues to expand in the local self-governing system, the debate of whether to 
elevate the county-level governments’ status will continue.  With or without a status change, it is 
expected that more administrative authority and financial resources will gradually be assigned to 
county-level governments.  Where these additional resources will come from remains a question. 
3.3.3 Local Referendum and Local Accountability 
Local participation on local affairs was constrained during the period of guarded self-governance 
when the national government was a dominant player in both the national and local policy-
making process.  Although the democratization movement allowed people more opportunities to 
participate in the policy-making process through fair elections, lobbying, and demonstrations, 
people in Taiwan could not directly express their opinions on various national and local issues 
until the Referendum Act was enacted in 2003.  With the exception of legislation concerning 
budgets, taxes, investments, wages, and personnel, the act allows voters to call a referendum to 
repeal national or local legislation or to vote on a initiative concerning national or local issues.  It 
should be noted that a local referendum could only be held at special city and county level, and 
there is no provision for a township-level referendum. 
Although recognizing the importance for citizens to have a right to the referendum, 
scholars and policymakers continue to express their deep concerns regarding inappropriate use of 
the local referendum.  Right before the passage of the Referendum Act, an editorial article 
appeared in Zhongguo difang zizhi (the Journal of Chinese Local Self-Governance) (Gao, 2003: 
3) offering five suggestions for the implementation of the law: (1) jurisdictions to be included in 
the voting should be determined by the higher level government; (2) the higher level government 
should promptly address local issues subject to a referendum; (3) attempts should be made in the 
local councils to address local issues prior to holding a referendum; (4) local governments should 
establish formal channel to directly hear from people about their concerns; (5) people should 
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respect the decisions reached by the local councils as much as possible.  By reading these 
suggestions, it is not difficult to realize how skeptical Taiwanese scholars were about the local 
initiative and referendum. 
It is not surprising to see Taiwanese scholars’ limited support on the local initiative and 
referendum.  Under a system similar to the Japanese model described by Johnson (1982), the 
making of public policies was deeply influenced by competent and experienced career 
bureaucrats who rationally proposed the best proposal.  Citizens were informed rather than 
involved in the policy process and often portrayed as incapable of rationally selecting the best 
policy to promote the common good.  In addition, after the democratization movement began in 
the late 1980s, serious problems of vote buying and corruption at township level elections have 
made scholars worry about voters’ competence to participate in any form of direct democracy.  
This view is shared by many policy makers in both the executive and legislative branches of the 
national government.  Debates of suspending township level elections is still ongoing, and there 
is no provision of the township level referendum in the Referendum Act. 
The concern about voters’ competence is not new in debates concerning direct democracy.  
Many scholars, journalists, and opinion leaders in Western democracies “worry whether ordinary 
citizens have the attention span or competence required to decide complicated policy issues – 
and if they are not competent, if they can be manipulated into passing law harmful to the general 
public” (Matsusaka, 2005: 186).  Lupia and Matsusaka (2004: 468) argued that uninformed 
voters often could make their choices relying on information shortcuts, e.g. the identity of groups 
who supported or opposed the measures in question.  Commenting on the findings of Bowler and 
Donovan (1998: 168), Lupia and Matsusaka (2004: 468) further argued that voters “appear able 
to figure out what they are for and against in ways that make sense in terms of their underlying 
values and interests.”  In addition, by studying the availability of the initiatives at American 
cities from 1981, 1986, 1991, and 1996, Matsusaka (2003) found that approximately 61 to 71 
percent of citizens in the US have the initiative available in their cities.  He also found that in 
most cities, the petitioners have a free hand, although some cities, such as New York and Detroit, 
restrict the topics that can be addressed by the initiative.  Based on these findings, it is argued 
that voters are competent in making their choices, just like elected representatives who have to 
cast their votes based limited available information.  The fact that most Americans have access to 
either the initiative or referendum in their cities with little constraints on the topics not only 
  51
suggests the initiative and referendum’s increasing popularity in the US, but also shows that 
people are gaining confidence in direct democracy. 
Moreover, the study on the impact of the initiative on policy also showed that there were 
at least three “significant policy changes brought about by the initiative: (1) spending and tax 
cuts; (2) decentralization of spending from state to local governments; (3) a shift of revenue out 
of broad-based taxes and into user fees and charges for services” (Matsusaka, 2005: 200).  
Although there is no guarantee that the referendum or initiative will make similar impacts on 
local policies in Taiwan, they do represent potential solutions to eliminating local corruption, 
reducing overspending, and improving fiscal accountability.  Indeed, once a right to call a 
referendum or initiative is allowed, citizens are more likely to give more thoughts to various 
policy issues because voting on policy packages offered by candidates in the elections is no 
longer the only opportunity to participate in the policy process.  When people get more involved 
in the policy process, they are more likely to be cautious about the costs for the local public 
services they receive.  Accordingly, as American experiences suggest, either the level of 
spending will go down or the use of user fees will increase. 
More importantly, the initiative and referendum can become a policy means for local 
people to make their elected officials more accountable.  It is very hard to hold local elected 
officials accountable and remove them from public office in Taiwan.  Although the Election and 
Recall Act of Public Officials has provisions to recall a public office holder, at least 50% of the 
turnout rate in the recall election is required for a recall petition’s approval.  Accordingly, by 
asking supporters not to vote, a local elected official can often easily be confirmed in office and 
another recall petition cannot be filed against the same official during the reminder of the 
official’s term of office.  On the other hand, although all local governments are subject to the 
supervision of the national government, any disciplinary sanction or impeachment has to be 
reviewed by the Commission on the Disciplinary Sanctions of Public Functionaries of Judicial 
Yuan for final approval.  The process takes years to complete, and final decision often cannot be 
reached during elected official’s term of office.  Although the initiative and referendum process 
does not allow people to remove elected officials from office, the process allows people to 
address their neglected concerns or to overturn a policy decision not favored by the majority, and 
it ultimately gives their elected officials pressure to be more responsive and more responsible. 
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Although it is not realistic to suggest that direct democracy will immediately solve many 
local problems in Taiwan today, studies at least suggested that the local initiative and referendum 
should not be considered as a threat to representative democracy in Taiwan.  It is suggested that a 
provision of township level referendum should be added to the Referendum Act, and constraints 
on the topics should be removed gradually once people have more knowledge and experience 
about the initiative and referendum.  However, there has been no organized effort to call a local 
initiative or referendum since the passage of the Referendum Act, and people in Taiwan still 
have learn more about the initiative and referendum. 
3.3.4 Collaboration among Local Governments 
The study of local government collaboration has attracted more and more attention after the 
passage of the Law on Local Governments System in 1999.  During the period of guarded local 
self-governance, there was little need for intergovernmental collaboration because the national 
government as a dominant player in the policy process also acted as a coordinator for the local 
governments to ensure policies were appropriately carried out.  However, this relationship broke 
down when more power and authority were decentralized to local governments during the 1990s, 
and the need to establishing a mechanism for local governments to work together became urgent. 
Article 21 and Article 24 of the Law on Local Governments System define the 
mechanisms currently available for local governments to cooperatively deal with issues or 
problems across their boundaries.  As stated in Article 21, under the general guidance of the 
responsible ministry of the national government, local governments can collaboratively deal with 
local policy problems which require local joint address from governments.  In addition, the 
responsible ministry of the national government can coercively assign an appropriate local self-
governing body to address problems within a time limit.  Article 24 is a provision for local 
governments, with the consent of the local councils, to establish a joint venture for jointly 
providing local public services.  Three characteristics can be concluded for the current system (Ji, 
2003: 4-5): (1) local governments, not the national government, are responsible for dealing with 
local problems across local boundaries; (2) the national government plays a role of providing 
general guidance to coordinate the joint efforts; (3) if necessary, the national government can 
intervene by ordering a local government to take immediate actions.  Indeed, as Li and Zhan 
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(2004: 22) claimed, the law does not proactively facilitate local government collaboration.  The 
national government is only authorized to reactively coordinate the joint efforts and cannot 
utilize available national resources to stimulate local government collaboration. 
It is not easy for local governments to work together.  Local governments often compete 
for attracting business and obtaining limited resources while attempting to preserve local identity.  
However, many urban problems nowadays have forced local governments to collaborate for 
future growth and development.  Wheeler (2002: 267) indicated that there has been a dramatic 
resurgence of interest in regional approach as to planning and development in the US.  Miller 
(2002: 99) also observed that “[a]t the same time that those regions are becoming more diffuse, 
they are becoming more integrated in revolving problems at the metropolitan level.”  For local 
governments to work together, as Metcalfe (1978: 48) suggested, “an interorganizational 
learning process is required so that an agreed diagnosis of structural problems is arrived at and 
mutually acceptable proposals for concerned action worked out.”  An intergovernmental learning 
process starts from a joint effort to define problems.  Through the process of problem definition, 
a shared vision emerges, and acceptable proposals would be reached.  Accordingly, actions are 
taken to implement these mutually agreed proposals.  Metcalfe (1978: 49) further emphasized 
that “the problem of coordination is resolved by formulating general rules and understanding 
prior to action, rather than leaving all decisions to ad hoc bargaining among sub-groups.”  In 
addition, the national government should also play an essential and active role in promoting local 
government collaboration.  As Miller (2002: 102) described, the “pressures from the state and 
federal government exert an enormous influence on local governments to cooperate and are, 
indeed, instrumental drivers of regionalism.” 
Neither a mechanism to encourage interorganizational learning process nor policy 
incentives from the national government to stimulate local cooperation appears in the Law on 
Local Governments System.  Li and Zhan (2004: 22) confirmed by asserting that policies, such 
as police, health, economic development, and infrastructure, cannot be effectively addressed by 
local governments without coordination and funding of the national government.  As the Law 
does not require the national government to actively promote local government collaboration, it 
is not surprising to see that there were only few attempts for local governments to seek 
cooperative strategies in Taiwan.  Ji (2003: 13) further pointed out that the Law does not clearly 
define the condition and process for making inter-local agreements, as well as the legal 
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relationships between the parties to such agreements.  In addition, a general guideline for sharing 
the costs, a mechanism of accountability, and legal status of newly-established collaborative 
agencies all need to be specified in the Law in order to provide guidance for local government 
collaboration (Ji, 2003: 13-14). 
It is expected that local governments will continue to be granted more autonomy to 
perform many functions decentralized from the national government, and the need for local 
governments to cooperate will be stronger in the future.  However, it is also obvious that the 
current mechanism is inadequate to foster a voluntary bottom-up process in which local 
governments will seek collaborative strategies to address problems not confined within the 
boundaries of their respective jurisdictions.  Therefore, the national government should play a 
more active role in promoting local government collaboration by providing general guidance and 
financial incentives to stimulate the efforts.  It is recommended that the national government 
should add a new chapter to the Law on Local Governments System or draw up a new legislation 
to regulate and provide general principles for promoting local government collaboration (Ji, 2003: 
15-17).  In addition, other than the coercive-based approach provided in Article 21 of the Law on 
Local Governments System that the national government could assign a local government to 
address inter-local problems, an incentive-based approach should also be added to the current 
system in order to encourage voluntary participation in joint efforts. 
In sum, as we enter a new era of local self-governance in Taiwan, local governments will 
not be able to effectively and efficiently meet growing local needs without working together.  
Moreover, instead of guarding and guiding local governments, the national government must 
become a facilitator to promote local government collaboration and better local self-governance. 
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4.0  UNDERSTANDING TAIWAN’S LOCAL FISCAL SYSTEM 
After local elected officials obtained more autonomy in making local policy priorities, it became 
apparent that they had neither sufficient financial resources nor needed flexibility to allocate 
funds for meeting local spending needs.  As a result, the transformation of the local governments 
system also triggered the need of fiscal decentralization to give local governments sufficient 
financial resources for fulfilling their newly acquired duties.  The first wave of fiscal 
decentralization occurred in 1999 when the Law on Allocation of Government Revenues and 
Expenditures was amended.  The amendment decentralized more financial resources by 
expanding the national shared pool to make more tax revenues available to be transferred to local 
governments.  However, it was not until the passage of the General Law on Local Taxation and 
the Charges and Fees Act in 2002 that local governments were granted authority to levy new 
taxes, adjust tax rates, and charge user fees.  This chapter critically analyzes and evaluates 
Taiwan’s local fiscal system, and identifies directions for future reforms.  An overview of the 
local revenue-raising system will first be presented, followed by more detailed discussion of the 
three most important local revenue sources.  Then, by examining the relationships between the 
national transferred revenues and local spending, one of the most critical but often overlooked 
factors contributing to the lack of local fiscal accountability in Taiwan will be examined.  Finally, 
potential directions for future reforms of Taiwan’s local fiscal system will be suggested in the 
third section. 
4.1 AN OVERVIEW OF LOCAL REVENUE-RAISING SYSTEM 
Taiwan’s local revenue-raising system is highly centralized and unified, with the majority of 
revenue generated through local taxes, national shared tax, and intergovernmental aid.  This 
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section will to briefly summarize the current revenue-raising system.  It should be noted that the 
term “local governments” primarily refer to special city, county, and provincial city governments 
because their importance and fiscal power in Taiwan’s local fiscal system are much greater than 
township-level governments’ are3. 
The Law on Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures is the most important 
piece of legislation regulating the local revenue-raising system as well as the local spending 
system.  It divides taxes into national taxes and local taxes, which is called special city and 
county/provincial city taxes in the law.  National taxes include income tax, estate and gift tax, 
customs duties, sales tax (business tax), commodity tax, cigarette and alcohol tax, security 
transactions tax, futures transactions tax, and mining lot tax.  Local taxes include land taxes (i.e. 
land value tax, agricultural land tax, and land value increment tax), property tax (house tax), 
license tax, deeds tax, stamp tax, amusement tax, and special tax. 
The law further defines how national and local taxes should be retained, shared, or 
distributed among levels of government.  Generally speaking, national taxes are retained by the 
national government.  Similarly, local taxes are retained by the special city, county, or provincial 
city where the taxes are collected.  Some taxes, however, have to be shared or distributed.  
“Shared tax” is a tax in which all or a portion of the tax is contributed to a national or county 
pool to be distributed, based on a formula, by national government or county governments to 
special city/county/provincial city governments or to township level governments, respectively.  
“Distributed tax” is a national or local tax which all or a portion of the tax is distributed to a 
lower-level jurisdiction where the tax is collected.  It should be noticed here that no tax is 
defined as township-level tax in the law although township level governments are still 
considered as local self-governance bodies.  In order to ensure that township-level governments 
receive tax revenues for fulfilling their local self-governing duties, the law explicitly requires a 
portion of specified national and county taxes to be “distributed” to the township-level 
governments.  Table 4.1 summarizes how the national and local taxes are shared and distributed. 
                                                 
3 In FY 2004, special city, county, and provincial city expenditures accounted for 32.1% of overall general 
government expenditures, while township level governments only accounted for 5.5% (Yearbook of Financial 
Statistics, Republic of China, 2004: p. 36-37).  In addition, as discussed in chapter 3, there is an ongoing debate 
regarding whether to remove township-level governments’ self-governance status.  Before final decision is reached, 
it is expected that the role of township-level governments’ role in the local fiscal system will remain limited. 
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As we can see from Table 4.1, five out of nine taxes categorized as national taxes in the 
law are either shared by or distributed to local governments.  Only customs duties, security 
transactions tax, futures transactions tax, and mining lot tax are completely retained by the 
national government.  A portion of income tax, sales tax, and commodity tax is contributed to the 
national shared pool to be distributed based on a formula established by the national government, 
and a portion of cigarette and alcohol tax is distributed to special city/county/provincial city 
governments based on their population.  Finally, special city, provincial city, and township level 
governments can keep a portion of the estate and gift tax collected from their jurisdiction. 
 
Table 4.1 Assignments of the national and local taxes to local governments 
National Taxes 
Taxes Categories Tax Allocation 
Income tax Partially shared ? 10% to the national shared pool to be shared by local governments 
Estate and gift tax Partially distributed ? Special city governments keep 50% collected from the jurisdiction 
? Provincial city governments keep 80% collected from the 
jurisdiction 
? Township level governments keep 80% collected from the 
jurisdiction 
Sales tax Partially shared ? 40% to the national shared pool to be shared by local governments 
Commodity tax Partially shared ? 10% to the national shared pool to be shared by local governments 
Cigarette and 
alcohol tax 
Partially shared ? 18% of the total revenue is shared by special city/county/provincial 
city governments and distributed based on population 
? 2% of the total revenue is shared by Kinmen and Lienchiang county 
governments of Fukien province and distributed based on population
Special City and County/Provincial City Taxes 
Taxes Categories Tax Allocation 
Land value tax Partially shared and 
partially distributed 
? 20% shared by township level governments of a county 
? Township level governments keep 30% collected from the jurisdiction 
Agricultural land tax Distributed ? Township level governments keep 100% collected from the jurisdiction 
Land value 
increment tax 
Partially shared ? 20% collected from the county/provincial city should be contributed to a 
national shared pool to be shard by county/provincial city governments 
Property tax Partially shared and 
partially distributed 
? 20% shared by township level governments of a county 
? Township level governments keep 40% collected from the jurisdiction 
Deeds tax Partially shared and 
partially distributed 
? 20% shared by township level governments of a county 
? Township level governments keep 80% collected from the jurisdiction 
Amusement tax Distributed ? Township level governments keep 100% collected from the jurisdiction 
Source: the Law on Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures 
 
In terms of local taxes, special city governments can keep all local tax revenues collected 
in their jurisdictions.  Other than land value increment tax, of which 20% is contributed to the 
national shared pool to be distributed to provincial city and county governments based on a 
national shared tax formula, provincial city governments can keep all local tax revenues 
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collected in their jurisdictions.  County governments, on the other hand, can only keep 50% of 
the land value tax, 80% of the land value increment tax, 40% of the property tax, 100% of the 
license tax, and 100% of the stamp tax revenues because some of the revenues have to be 
distributed to township-level governments.  Table 4.2 summarizes the percentage of national and 
local taxes to be retained by special city, provincial city, and county governments.  Although 
most tax rates and bases are regulated in the national statutes, these retained tax revenues can be 
considered as “owned tax revenues” because the national government cannot increase or 
decrease the level of these tax revenues by national executive orders.  In other words, the 
national government does not have discretion to allocate these tax revenues without asking the 
congress to amend the laws.  Accordingly, it is noted that county governments receive less 
percentage of owned tax revenues compared to special city and provincial city governments 
because some of taxes are assigned to township level government by the law. 
 
Table 4.2 Percentage of owned tax revenues received by special city, county, and provincial city governments 
Taxes Special Cities Provincial Cities Counties 
National Taxes  
Estate and Gift tax 50% 80% 0% 
Local Taxes  
Land value tax 100% 100% 50% 
Agricultural land tax 100% 100% 0% 
Land value increment tax 100% 80% 80% 
Property tax 100% 100% 40% 
License tax 100% 100% 100% 
Deeds tax 100% 100% 0% 
Stamp tax 100% 100% 100% 
Amusement Tax 100% 100% 0% 
Source: the Law on Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures 
 
Although specifying rates and bases of local owned taxes in the national tax laws will 
guarantee a certain level of tax revenues to be received by local governments, it also leaves little 
or no flexibility for them to adjust this level.  In 2002, the General Law on Local Taxation and 
the Charges and Fee Acts were enacted to grant local governments power to increase local 
revenues.  The adoption of the General Law on Local Taxation represents the most dramatic 
change in reforming Taiwan’s local fiscal system because this is the first legislation to 
decentralize power to local governments to increase the level of local taxes.  Based on the law, 
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with local council’s consent and national government’s approval, a special city, county level, and 
township-level government can impose special tax, provisional tax, or added tax on items or 
activities except: (1) transactions outside its jurisdiction; (2) natural resources or mineral 
products that circulate outside its jurisdiction; (3) public utilities that operate in different areas of 
jurisdiction; (4) taxation items that harm overall national interests or other local public interests.  
In addition, the law further authorizes special city and county level governments to increase 
some specified national and local tax rates up to 30% of the prescribed rates.  However, local 
governments seem to be reluctant to utilize this new authority for raising local revenues. 
More than three years after the law was enacted, there are only four counties with 
national government’s approval to levy seven new special or provisional taxes (Wang, 2005).  As 
indicated by an interviewee, this is “because the costs of imposing new taxes or proposing a tax 
hike are high but the benefits are low” (20050615, personal communication, June 15, 2005).  In 
other words, by raising a small amount of tax revenue, local elected officials will face enormous 
political pressure from voters and local councils while facing the uncertainty that the national 
government might not approve the proposal during the process of proposing a tax increase.  In 
fact, an interviewee elaborated, “there is little financial incentive for local governments to 
impose a tax hike based on the General Law on Local Taxation.  It is just a way to show a local 
government’s fiscal efforts to the national government in order to get more intergovernmental 
aid” (20050501, personal communication, May 05, 2005).  In sum, the General Law on Local 
Taxation provides local governments flexibility to raise their very own revenues.  The learning 
process for local governments to raise local tax revenues is slow, but it is expected that the 
importance of locally-raised tax revenues will gradually increase in the future. 
Based on the Law on Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures, local 
government revenues can be categorized into taxes, special assessments, fines and indemnities, 
user fees, trust account income, sales of public property, public enterprise and public utilities, 
intergovernmental aid, contributions and donations, self-governance taxes, and others.  Generally 
speaking, special cities, counties, and provincial cities generate the majority of their revenue 
through taxes and intergovernmental aid.  Based on the certified final budgetary number of FY 
2004 as summarized in Table 4.3, tax revenues accounted for 51.89% of their combined revenue 
while intergovernmental aid accounted for 34.72%.  This means that the other revenue sources 
only generated 13.39% of total revenue in these three types of local governments.  In addition, it 
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is found that more than 80% of the revenue in all three types of local governments was generated 
from taxes and intergovernmental aid.  In special cities, tax revenues accounted for 67.35% of 
the revenue, while intergovernmental aid accounted for only 13.31%.  On the contrary, in 
counties, 42.48% of the revenue was generated from taxes, and 47.41% of the revenue was 
generated from intergovernmental aid.  This is because the formula for distributing national 
shared tax is in favor of special cities.  While special cities receive more national shared tax and 
are in better fiscal health, the national government provides additional financial assistance to 
counties and provincial cities through a general grant. 
 
Table 4.3 The composition of local revenues in different types of local government 
 Combined Special Cities Provincial 
Cities 
Counties 
Taxes* 51.89% 67.35% 54.86% 42.48% 
Fines and indemnities 3.16% 3.24% 2.85% 3.18% 
User fees 3.35% 5.55% 3.64% 2.05% 
Sales of public property 1.83% 2.71% 1.99% 1.29% 
Public enterprise and public 
utilities 
1.85% 5.13% 0.67% 0.25% 
Intergovernmental aid 34.72% 13.31% 32.21% 47.41% 
Others 3.20% 2.71% 3.79% 3.35% 
Source: Calculated by the author based on FY2004 certified revenues provided by the National Treasury Agency, 
Ministry of Finance 
*The term “taxes” refers to the sum of local taxes and national shared tax discussed in the following section, 4.2. 
 
Under the present local fiscal system, the national government sets the level of local 
revenue not only through its power to make national transfers, but also through its authority to 
regulate local tax assignments, rates, and bases in applied national statutes.  By breaking down 
“taxes” in the Table 4.3 into “local taxes” and “national shared tax” as shown in the Table 4.4, it 
is not difficult to see the importance of national transfers, which include national shared tax and 
intergovernmental aid, on local revenue.  In special cities and provincial cities, national transfers 
accounted for about 43% of the total revenue in FY 2004.  In counties, national transfers 
accounted for more than 60% of their revenue in the same fiscal year.  Moreover, the national 
government extends its influence on local revenue by setting the level of local tax revenues.  On 
the one hand, as Table 4.1 indicat, the assignment of national and local taxes is nationally 
regulated in the Law on Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures.  On the other 
hand, tax bases and rates of these assigned taxes are specified in the national tax laws.  In the 
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following section, more detailed information about local taxes, national shared tax, and 
intergovernmental aid will be provided to further demonstrate current fiscal relationships 
between the national government and local governments in Taiwan. 
 
Table 4.4 The national government’s impact on local revenue 
 Combined Special Cities Provincial 
Cities 
Counties 
By major categories 
Local taxes 32.42% 37.62% 43.42% 27.09% 
National shared tax 19.46% 29.73% 11.44% 15.39% 
Intergovernmental aid 34.72% 13.31% 32.21% 47.41% 
Others 13.39% 19.34% 12.93% 10.11% 
By characteristics 
National transfers* 54.19% 43.04% 43.65% 62.80% 
Local owned revenues 45.81% 56.96% 56.35% 38.20% 
Source: FY2004 certified final budgetary number provided by the National Treasury Agency, Ministry of Finance 
*National transfers = National shared tax + Intergovernmental aid 
4.2 THREE MAJOR LOCAL REVENUE SOURCES 
As discussed in the previous section, local taxes, national shared tax, and intergovernmental aid 
make up the majority of local revenue in Taiwan.  The national government sets the level of local 
revenue through its power to regulate these three local revenue sources.  In this section, the 
current system of these three major local revenue sources will be separately introduced, analyzed, 
and evaluated. 
4.2.1 Local Taxes 
Based on Table 4.4, local taxes generated 32.42% of overall special city, county, and provincial 
city revenue in FY 2004.  Among these three types of local governments, provincial cities have 
the highest percentage (43.42%) of their revenue generated from local taxes while the counties’ 
27.09% is the lowest.  As discussed earlier, Taiwan’s local taxation system is highly centralized.  
In addition to nationally regulated local tax assignments, rates and bases of most local taxes, 
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including estate and gift tax, land value tax, land value increment tax, license tax, deeds tax, and 
stamp tax, are nationally set in applied tax laws.  Property tax and amusement tax are the only 
exceptions.  The Amusement Tax Act sets the maximum rates that can be levied on the 
admission fees of specified entertainment events.  The Property Tax Act sets the ranges of tax 
rates for different types of property.  The tax rate of residential properties can be set ranging 
from 1.2% to 2% with an exception that the law sets the tax rate of owner-occupied residential 
properties at 1.2%, which is the lowest point in the range.  The tax rate of commercial properties 
can range between 3% to 5%, and the tax rate can be set ranging from 1.5% to 2.5% for a 
property used as a private hospital or clinic, a professional office, or the premises of nonprofit 
civic organization.  However, as Table 4.5 illustrate, tax revenues collected from these two taxes 
accounted for less than 15% of total special city, county, and provincial city tax revenues in FY 
2004, in which property tax revenue accounted for 14.54% and amusement tax revenue 
accounted for 0.33% 4 .  Accordingly, although special city, county, and provincial city 
governments are given some leeway to determine the rates of the property tax and amusement 
tax, their ability to determine the level of local tax revenues is still very limited. 
 
Table 4.5 The composition of local tax revenues  
 Combined Special Cities Provincial 
Cities 
Counties 
Land tax* 50.42% 55.95% 41.26% 49.24% 
Property tax 14.54% 16.84% 20.98% 10.50% 
Deeds tax 2.54% 4.11% 6.29% 0.00% 
License tax 22.18% 11.56% 18.34% 31.87% 
Stamp tax 3.44% 4.68% 2.75% 2.7% 
Amusement tax 0.33% 0.47% 0.97% 0.00% 
Estate and gift tax 2.73% 4.55% 6.46% 0.00% 
Cigarette and alcohol tax 3.82% 1.84% 2.94% 5.96% 
Source: FY2004 certified final budgetary number provided by the National Treasury Agency, Ministry of Finance 
*Land tax includes land value tax and land value increment tax 
 
In addition to their inability to determine the level of local tax revenues, local 
governments traditionally have been reluctant to increase local tax revenues by improving local 
tax administration because there are systematic incentives in Taiwan’s local fiscal system not to 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that all of the amusement tax revenue collected in a county is distributed to township-level 
governments of the county according to the Law on Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures.  As a 
result, amusement tax revenue is not considered as one of the county tax revenues. 
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do so.  For example, the assessment value of the land is always significantly lower than the 
market value is.  First, lower assessment reduces the tax burden on taxpayers within a 
jurisdiction, which is always welcomed by the voters.  Second, lower tax revenues caused by 
lower assessment would result in a poorer local fiscal health, and put a local government in a 
better position to request more national aids.  The Directorate General of Budget, Accounting, 
and Statistics (DGBAS), a cabinet-level office in charge of budgeting, accounting, and census, 
has made efforts to eliminate these incentives in the recent years by incorporating local 
governments’ practice of assessment, tax collection, fees and charges collection, and financial 
management into a formula for evaluating local governments’ overall fiscal efforts of increasing 
revenues and reducing costs.  Then fiscal efforts of local governments are taken into account 
when decisions of distributing intergovernmental aid are made.  It is hoped that local 
governments would make proactive efforts to increase local revenues by improving local tax 
administration. 
There are two implications that can be derived from the current centralized local taxation 
system.  First, in a centralized local taxation system, the national government designs a system to 
be applicable to the whole county.  As a result, the local taxation system is uniform, and local 
taxpayers’ tax burdens are the same regardless of their residence.  They neither have the power 
to determine the level of local revenue, nor do they have a choice to select the level of local 
revenue by moving to another locality.  In other words, there is almost no difference in terms of 
local tax burden on residents living in different localities.  No matter where they live or what 
level of local services they receive, local taxpayers will bear the same local tax burden.  Second, 
because the power to determine tax assignments, rates, and bases is centralized in the national 
government, there is nothing local governments can do to prevent their tax revenues from being 
cut by the national government.  For example, the Property Tax Act was amended in 2001 to cut 
the tax rate of residential properties and owner-occupied residential properties from 1.38% to 
1.2%, resulting in a loss to the local tax revenue of about NT $3.3 billion each year (Li, Zhen-
Zhen, 2000).  In 2002, in order to facilitate land transactions and stimulate economic 
development, the congress added a provision to the Land Tax Act to temporarily cut the rate of 
land value increment tax in half for two years, resulting in a loss to the local tax revenue of 
approximately NT $22 billion per year (Xie, 2002).  In these two examples, local taxes became a 
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policy tool of the national government to achieve national goals while local governments were 
the ones to bear the costs. 
In sum, Taiwan’s local taxation system is highly centralized.  The national government 
sets the level of local tax revenue, and it has the power to adjust this level in response to the 
national needs.  Local governments have very limited autonomy or discretion in deciding the 
level of local tax revenue. 
4.2.2 National Shared Tax 
Although national shared tax is listed as one of the tax revenues in the local budget, it is an 
intergovernmental transfer in nature.  The current national shared tax system, depicted in Figure 
4.1, is based on the 1999 amendment of the Law on Allocation of Government Revenues and 
Expenditures. 
As we can see in the Figure 4.15, there are two hypothetical national shared pools.  The 
first hypothetical national shared pool is made up by 10% of the income tax, 40% of the net sales 
tax6, and 10% of the commodity tax.  Six Percent of the revenue in the pool is called special 
shared tax revenue, which is distributed under the national government’s discretion for 
supporting local governments’ emergency or other major needs.  The remaining revenue is called 
general shared tax revenue, of which 43% is distributed to special cities, 39% is distributed to 
counties and provincial cities, and 12% is distributed to rural townships, urban townships, and 
county cities.  All of the revenue in the second hypothetical national shared pool is considered as 
general shared tax revenue, and it is distributed to counties and provincial cities.  After general 
shared tax revenue is divided and assigned to three different layers of local government as 
described above, the revenue is further assigned to local governments within each layer 
following different formulas. 
                                                 
5 Interests generated from the account of the national shared tax revenue can be considered as the third hypothetical 
national shared pool.  Based on the Regulation of Distributing National Shared Tax, 46% of the revenue in the pool 
is distributed to special cities, 41% of the revenue in the pool is distributed to counties and provincial cities, and 
13% of the revenue in the pool is distributed to rural townships, urban townships, and county cities.  The third pool 
is not drawn in the Figure 4.1 as the amount of funds to be distributed is not significant compared to the other two 
pools. 
6 Net sales tax = sales tax - uniform invoices award. 
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Figure 4.1 System of distributing national shared tax 
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According to the Regulation of Distributing National Shared Tax, for general shared tax 
revenue assigned to special cities, 50% is distributed based on the average corporate sales 
revenue in the past three years, 20% is distributed based on population, 20% is distributed based 
on land area, and remaining 10% is distributed based on the average fiscal capacity7 in the last 
three years.  For general shared tax revenue assigned to counties and provincial cities, 85% is 
distributed based on the average difference between standardized fiscal needs and standardized 
income in the past three years, and 15% is distributed based on corporate sales revenue in the 
previous year.  The standardized fiscal needs in the formula take into account factors such as 
personnel costs, administrative costs, overtime costs for police and fire personnel, mandated 
social welfare expenditures, and basic infrastructure expenditures.  The standardized income is 
overall local tax revenue minus national shared tax revenue and local special tax revenues 
collected based on the authority granted by the General Law on Local Taxation.  For general 
shared tax revenue assigned to rural townships, urban townships, and county cities, 50% is based 
on personnel costs and the other 50% is based on the need for basic infrastructure.  In order to 
determine the need for basic infrastructure, three factors are considered, including average 
expenditures in the past three years, population, and land area, while giving special consideration 
to poor townships and especially poor outlying island townships. 
As we can see in Figure 4.1, the current system is very complex and in favor of the two 
special cities because 43% of the revenue in the national shared pool I is distributed to them, 
while other 18 counties and five provincial cites only share 39% of the revenue from national 
shared pool I and all of the revenue from the second pool.  It is not very surprising to see that the 
national shared tax revenue represented 29.73% of the overall special city revenue, but only 
represented 11.44% of the overall provincial city revenue and 15.39% of the overall county 
revenue in FY 2004 as shown in Table 4.4.  Therefore, the system of distributing national shared 
tax has been the center of debate over the reform of the local fiscal system in recent years.  After 
the DPP won the presidential election in 2000, the Chen administration cut the percentage of 
revenue in the national shared pool I to be distributed to special cities from 47% to current 43% 
                                                 
7 Fiscal ability = A/B 
A = population * average per capita owned source revenue for all special cities / average per capita owned source 
revenue 
B = sum of A for every special cities 
Own source revenue is defined as total revenue minus national shared tax revenue and intergovernmental aid for 
the equation. 
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in 2001, and more cuts were expected.  In 2002, Taipei City Mayor Ma utilized his popularity 
and support in the congress to pass an amendment to the Law on Allocation of Government 
Revenues and Expenditures.  The amendment specifically set a fixed percentage of 15.5% of the 
revenue in the Pool I to be distributed to Taipei and 10% to be distributed to Kaohsiung, the 
other special city, while expanding the pool I by requiring 30% of the income tax, 30% of the 
commodity tax, and 50% of the net sales tax to be contributed to the pool.  It is obvious that the 
policy objective of the amendment was to prevent the special cities’ national shared tax revenue 
from continuously declining rather than improving the overall local fiscal system. 
Although the new amendment was vetoed two months later and the congress failed to 
override the veto, the discussion of improving the current national shared tax system continued 
and the current system remains intact as of the writing of this dissertation.  Based on the 
Executive Yuan’s latest proposed bill, the reform would aim at implementing decentralization, 
improving local fiscal autonomy, and establishing a better fiscal equalization system.  In the bill, 
the national shared pool is expanded and simplified so that there is only one pool in the proposed 
system.  The new pool will be made up of 100% of the net sales tax and 80% of the cigarette and 
alcohol tax, estimated to generate an additional NT $63.7 billion of overall national shared tax 
revenue to be distributed to local governments (Ye, 2003: 213).  In addition, the method of 
distributing the national shared tax will be specified in the law instead of being regulated by 
executive orders.  The congress is moving slowly in reviewing the bill, and it remains to be seen 
when the bill will attract enough attention of national policy makers to be reviewed and passed. 
The original goal of the national shared tax system is to equalize the difference of fiscal 
capacity among localities in order to meet local basic spending needs (Lai, 2005: 43).  However, 
as we can see, the current system favors special cities, and the national government is using 
general grants as an additional policy means to provide additional financial assistance to counties 
and provincial cities.  It is expected that any future reform proposal will encounter severe 
resistance from the special cities if their share or total amount of national shared tax revenue is 
drastically decreased.  As a result, general grants as part of the intergovernmental aid system are 
expected to continue playing an important role in equalizing the local fiscal condition.  The 
current design of the intergovernmental aid system will be introduced in the following subsection. 
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4.2.3 Intergovernmental Aid 
The current system of intergovernmental aid is regulated in the Law on Allocation of 
Government Revenues and Expenditures and the Law on Local Governments System.  Based on 
Article 69 of the Law on Local Governments System, the national government may provide 
grants to local governments with less financial resources in order to promote balanced local 
development.  In addition, eligible programs, eligible agencies, percentage of proposed 
expenditures funded, and principles of distributing funding should be specified.  Article 30 of the 
Law on Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures further clarifies the situations by 
stipulating that the national government may provide grants to local governments for equalizing 
economic development among localities, and it specifically points out that projects that are 
eligible to receive grants include those in which: 
1. Benefits cover a wide range of areas and can fit into overall development planning. 
2. Developments across boundaries of two or more special cities, counties, and 
provincial cities. 
3. Major developments can be a model for future developments. 
4. Local projects implement major national policies or developments. 
According to these two laws, the goal of granting intergovernmental aid is to provide 
financial assistance to specific projects in order to promote balanced local development.  In other 
words, the form of intergovernmental aid defined in the current laws should be categorical grants 
rather than general grants.  Although promoting balanced local development is an important 
policy objective of national grantmaking, it should be achieved by taking fiscal conditions into 
consideration in deciding whether a local project should be funded or a categorical grant should 
be made.  These two laws do not authorize the national government to distribute general grants 
to local governments without earmarking the usage of these transferred funds.  As a result, the 
majority of intergovernmental aid made by the national government was categorical grants 
before the year of 2001.  For example, categorical grants accounted for about 81% of the total 
intergovernmental aid in FY 2000 (Zhang and Wang, 2002: 7).  However, during this time, most 
categorical grants were made in order to promote national policy priorities while paying very 
little regard to local needs.  Moreover, decisions made by national ministries to fund local 
development projects and small construction projects were often based on political patronage 
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instead of benefits derived from the projects.  In 2001, the system of intergovernmental aid 
underwent a major change to address these problems. 
The DGBAS, a leading cabinet-level office in the reform effort, published the Method for 
Making Intergovernmental Aid to Special Cities and Counties/Provincial Cities to guide 
decisions of the national government on distributing intergovernmental aid, including a formula 
for making general grants and guidelines for distributing categorical grants.  In addition, the 
DGBAS reviewed and examined all intergovernmental grants made by national ministries.  The 
grants not falling into the four specified categories discussed above were integrated and 
consolidated into a general grant, which is distributed to counties and provincial cities for 
bridging the gap between local basic fiscal needs and income and also for providing funding for 
local basic development.  Similar to the formula for distributing national shared tax to counties 
and provincial cities, the basic fiscal needs take into account factors including personnel costs, 
overtime costs for police and fire personnel, mandated social welfare expenditures, and basic 
administrative costs.  The basic income is defined as overall local tax revenue minus national 
shared tax revenue and local special tax revenues collected based on the authority granted by the 
General Law on Local Taxation. 
Funding for local basic development is made up of three separate funding categories, 
including social welfare, education, and basic infrastructure (Li, 2005: 21-22; Zhang and Wang, 
2002: 8-9).  Factors such as fiscal capacity, handicapped population, low-income population, 
child population, female population, and elder population are taken into account for determining 
the funding of social welfare.  Factors like fiscal capacity, total population, number of students, 
and number of classes are used to calculate the funding for education.  Finally, funding for 
education is decided based on factors such as fiscal capacity, total population, land area, and road 
area.  The reforms are aimed not only at fulfilling local governments’ basic fiscal needs but also 
at providing sufficient revenue for educational facilities, social welfare, and basic local 
infrastructures (Li, Tai-Xing, 2000: 71). 
There are two important observations that can be made concerning the 2001 reforms.  
First, the role of the general grant in the intergovernmental aid system to equalize the fiscal 
conditions among localities has drastically increased.  As shown in Table 4.3, the importance of 
intergovernmental aid to local revenue was not the same in different types of local governments.  
In FY 2004, intergovernmental aid represented 47.41% of overall county revenue and 32.21% of 
  70
overall provincial city revenue, while only 13.31% of overall special city revenue was made up 
of intergovernmental aid.  In addition, during the same fiscal year, intergovernmental aid made 
up more than 50% of the annual budget in 10 counties and a provincial city, while Taipei city, 
the most affluent locality in Taiwan, only received 3.45%.  As we recall from the earlier 
discussion, only counties and provincial cities are eligible to receive general grants, which have 
made up the majority of intergovernmental aid after the reform.  Therefore, it can be concluded 
that intergovernmental aid currently serves as a policy tool to equalize local fiscal conditions. 
Second, the increased use of general grants may violate two existing laws regulating the 
system of intergovernmental aid.  As discussed earlier, the laws provide no authorization for the 
national government to make general grants, and the current system is established by an 
executive order, the Method for Making Intergovernmental Aid to Special Cities and 
Counties/Provincial Cities.  The Law on Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures 
says the aid should be used to achieve “balanced local development” in different localities 
instead of equalizing the “fiscal condition”.  Ts’eng (2001: 31) elaborated that the current 
intergovernmental aid system is designed to support major projects without attempting to 
equalize fiscal conditions.  However, because the national shared tax system is currently in favor 
of special cities and it cannot generate enough revenue especially for counties and provincial 
cities to fully meet their basic financial needs, the national government has no choice but to use 
intergovernmental aid as a policy tool to equalize fiscal conditions.  As a result, the current 
practice of using intergovernmental aid to equalize local fiscal conditions has blurred the 
functions of shared tax and intergovernmental aid (Ts’eng, 2001: 31). 
4.3 SETTING LOCAL SPENDING LEVEL AND PRIORITIES 
The centralized and uniformed local revenue-raising system introduced in the pervious two 
sections has made profound impacts on local spending in Taiwan.  First, the level of local 
spending is highly dependent upon the level of local revenue set by the national government.  
Second, local residents have little influence on setting the level and priorities of local spending.  
Third, there is no effective mechanism of fiscal accountability to ensure that local governments 
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spend their limited financial resources efficiently.  These three impacts will be analyzed in 
greater detail in this section. 
4.3.1 Limited Local Freedom on Setting the Level of Local Spending 
Huang (Huang, Jin-Tang, 1995: 99) once stated that “a county magistrate can only make routine, 
administrative, and local services related decisions.  He or she has to depend heavily on national 
government’s support in order to launch a major local development project because the national 
government is in control of most legislative authority and planning power.”  Although the two 
reforms of the local governments system in the 1990s have decentralized more authority to local 
governments, local elected officials continue to encounter constraints on allocating sufficient 
funds to meet local needs.  First, local governments do not have control over the level of local 
revenue, and, therefore, they cannot be certain the revenue would be sufficient to support the 
desired level of local spending.  Second, local elected officials only have little freedom to 
allocate funds based on local priorities because about half of the local spending is allocated to 
pay for personnel costs.  Third, the requirement of local matching funds for receiving categorical 
grants further limits local governments’ freedom to allocate local limited funds.  Finally, local 
payments mandated by national laws significantly reduce the availability of local funds that can 
be spent on meeting local needs. 
The majority of local revenue is made up of local taxes, national shared tax, and 
intergovernmental aid.  As shown in Table 4.4, the three major local revenue sources generated 
86.6% of special city, county, and provincial city overall revenues in FY 2004.  As demonstrated 
in the previous sections, local governments do not have the power to determine the level of local 
taxation (Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission, 2003: 14), and the power to 
distribute national shared tax and intergovernmental aid is held by the national government.  In 
other words, the national government is the one to set the level of local revenue and, therefore, to 
determine the level of local spending.  Local elected officials can do little to adjust the level of 
local revenue and can only prepare their budgets accordingly.  If this nationally predetermined 
level is higher than the desired level of local spending, local governments will overspend, 
resulting in efficiency loss.  On the other hand, if the level is lower than the desired level of local 
spending, local elected officials will have to cut local spending or to issue debts.  Because of 
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political pressure from voters and local representatives, local elected officials tend to finance 
various development projects by issuing debts.  It is observed that both short-term and long-term 
debts have hit historical high in recent years because local governments do not have sufficient 
and adequate financial resources to support growing local spending (Lai, 2005: 48).  Without 
power to set the level of revenue, local governments will not be able to efficiently meet local 
spending needs. 
In addition to the lack of power to set the level of local revenue, local governments’ 
ability to meet local spending needs is also constrained by the high percentage of personnel 
expenditure in overall local spending.  Based on the certified final budgetary data provided by 
the National Treasury Agency, approximately 45% of special city, county, and provincial city 
overall spending was used to pay for the personnel costs in FY 2004.  If the two special cities are 
not included in this calculation, the number is more stunning: almost 55% of the county and 
provincial city’s overall spending was personnel expenditure in FY 2004.  Although it has been 
pointed out that the high percentage of personnel expenditure in local spending has made local 
governments incapable of meeting other spending needs (Ye, 2001: 6; Lu, 2005: 27; Lai, 2005: 
48), local governments can do little to cut personnel expenditure because the civil services 
system is nationally regulated.  The rights of local public employees are highly protected by the 
national civil services laws, which also specifies their pay scale and benefits.  As a result, it 
would be very difficult to reduce the proportion of local budget spent on personnel unless local 
revenue is drastically increased. 
Moreover, local freedom to allocate local funds is hurt by matching requirements of 
categorical grants.  The DGBAS set the ceiling for various ministries to fund local projects 
through categorical grants in the Method for Making Intergovernmental Aid to Special Cities and 
Counties/Provincial Cities.  As a result, approved funding of a categorical grant is contingent on 
local governments raising a certain percentage of needed funding for a local project depending 
on the type of local project, the type of local governments, and fiscal capacity of the local 
governments.  In theory, the requirement for local matching funds seems reasonable and 
necessary in order to ensure that appropriate local fiscal efforts are made before seeking financial 
assistance from the national government.  In practice, however, the matching requirement creates 
a dilemma for local governments and forces them into a choice of obtaining more national 
financial resources or preserving already restricted and limited local funds for other prioritized 
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local needs.  Considering that most local governments in Taiwan are facing financial hardship, 
and local elected officials desperately need financial resources for providing local services and 
pursuing local development, the choice is often to meet the matching requirement to get the 
earmarked national funding.  The more categorical grants local governments receive, the less 
freedom they will have to allocate the limited available local funds. 
Finally, mandatory expenditures required by the national laws can also significantly 
reduce local governments’ available financial resources for meeting local priorities.  The national 
government can require local governments to share the costs of certain public services or to shift 
the funding responsibility from the national government to local governments by enacting or 
amending applied national laws.  A saying that “the national government treats, but local 
governments pay the bill” is often used to describe this practice in Taiwan (Ye, 2003: 226; Lai, 
2005: 50).  For example, when the national government established the National Health 
Insurance Program in 1995, the National Health Insurance Act requires local governments to pay 
a portion of the premium for people residing within their boundaries.  In addition, when the 
national government decided to streamline Taiwan provincial government in the late 1990s, the 
responsibility to pay for personnel expenses of teachers and policemen was shifted from the 
provincial government to local governments, not transferred to the national government.  These 
national policy changes drastically increase the local financial burden and further reduce local 
funds available for meeting local spending priorities. 
4.3.2 Voters’ Preference and Local Spending  
In the United States, as Tiebout (1956) theorized in his model of local government expenditures, 
there is a strong linkage between voter preferences and the level of local spending.  Based on 
their willingness to pay, local voters select a local tax bundle to generate revenue for paying 
local services.  Ultimately, they are also the ones who have to bear the burden of a selected local 
tax bundle.  In addition, co-existence of many local governments creates opportunity for voters 
to search for and move to a community which best satisfies their preferences.  As a result, people 
who live in different communities will bear different levels of local tax burden while receiving 
different levels of local services to reflect their preferences.  Although Tiebout (1956: 421) made 
it clear that his model “is not even a first approximation of reality”, he nonetheless developed a 
  74
conceptual framework to better understand the characteristics of US local government 
expenditures. 
Taiwan’s current model is the opposite of the US model.  Taiwan’s centralized local 
fiscal system leaves local governments little power to determine the level and sources of local 
revenue.  Ts’eng (2001: 12) argued that this has been the main reason for local governments’ 
inability to collect enough local tax revenue for meeting increased local expenditures.  Most 
local tax rates and bases are uniform and specified in the national statutes.  Therefore, the level 
of local tax revenue is the same for all communities and set by the national government instead 
of local voters.  Furthermore, the majority of the local revenue is received in a form either as 
national shared tax or as intergovernmental aid.  In either case, the national government has the 
power to decide how these revenues should be allocated while local voters have no control over 
how much funds they can get from the national government.  In sum, the level of local spending 
is determined by the national government, not by the local voters.  Local voters’ preferences do 
not play an important role in setting the level of local spending in Taiwan. 
Moreover, because local governments have little power to adjust the nationally uniformed 
level of local taxation set by the national government, the local tax burden is the same for 
taxpayers living in different localities.  In other words, the same local tax burden falls on every 
taxpayer living in Taiwan, just as the national tax burden does.  On the one hand, local taxpayers 
pay the same amount of local taxes no matter where they live and no matter what level of local 
services they receive.  On the other hand, local taxpayers no longer seek a community which best 
satisfies their preferred level of local spending based on their willingness to pay as Tiebout 
theorized.  Rather, they move to a community with a higher level of local spending because they 
will not have to pay the additional costs for it.  That is to say that logging decisions will be based 
on the level of local public services provided.  What differs from one jurisdiction to another is 
per capita tax dollars spent.  This results in communities competing for a higher level of local 
spending instead of competing for providing local public services at a level preferred by local 
voters.  Accordingly, local taxpayers’ mobility may become a source of distortion of efficiency 
in Taiwan. 
Whether additional local services are financed through additional national transfers or 
borrowing, their costs can eventually be externalized to the whole population in Taiwan because 
the national government ultimately will have to provide additional national transfers to pay for 
  75
the services or debts.  Local taxpayers are not going to bear additional local tax burdens 
occurring because of the increase of local spending.  On the other hand, the local taxpayers’ local 
tax burden is not going to decrease as well when the level of local spending is decreased.  This 
creates a systematic incentive for local taxpayers to demand more local services, and it 
encourage local governments to overspend.  Courchene, Martinez-Vazquez, McLure Jr., and 
Webb (2000: 97) have argued that “the imposition of uniform rates by a higher level of 
government represent[s] a form of centralization that encourages overexpansion of the public 
sector and inefficiency.”  In such a local fiscal system, local elected officials are evaluated not 
based on their performance to efficiently provide local services with locally set budgetary 
constraint, but on their efforts to obtain more national financial resources in order to provide a 
higher level of local services.  This makes local elected officials always have to increase local 
spending or even overspend and try very hard to bring in more national aid to support their 
expenditures.  Local residents do not pay attention to the true costs of local services they receive, 
and they look around at nearby communities to see what else their local governments can do for 
them.  In the end, the level of local spending will not reflect voters’ preferences if they have to 
pay for it.  It is argued that price mechanism between local taxation and local expenditures 
breaks down in Taiwan because the level of local spending is irrelevant to how much local taxes 
local taxpayers have to pay. 
4.3.3 Local Fiscal Accountability 
King (King, David, 1988: 16) advocated to “[devise] a financial framework where local electors 
are fully aware of the costs of increase in local services – or, to put it another way, where local 
authorities are fully accountable to their citizens for such increases.”  The assumption of this 
claim is that local residents pay for the additional costs of the increased local services, and local 
elected officials are held accountable based on how efficiently and effectively they spend on 
these additional local services.  Unfortunately, such a financial framework does not exist in 
Taiwan to ensure local fiscal accountability.  As discussed earlier in this section, local residents 
in Taiwan are not going to bear additional local tax burdens if the level of local services are 
increased.  As a result, even if local residents are fully aware of the costs, local elected officials 
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are not going to be held accountable because local residents are not responsible to pay for these 
additional costs. 
In addition, local elected officials in Taiwan have been very reluctant to levy local taxes 
or collect user fees authorized by the General Law on Local Taxation and the Charges and Fees 
Act.  It is argued that the political costs of increasing local taxes or user fees are much higher 
than the political costs of asking for more national grants in the current local fiscal system (Cai 
and Lin, 2005: 151).  Because local governments traditionally have been financially dependent 
on the national government in the past 50 years, a shared belief has developed among local 
officials that the national government will have no choice but to provide financial assistance 
through intergovernmental transfers when one or more local governments face financial crisis 
(Cai and Lin, 2005: 151).  In other words, when there is a need to raise more local revenue for 
increased local services, local elected officials will first seek more national grants because they 
do not want to bear the political risk of imposing local taxes or user fees.  If local elected 
officials cannot get enough financial help from the national government, for the same reason, 
they will borrow because they believe that the national government will be forced to help in 
order to avoid national political crisis caused by local governments going bankrupt.  As long as 
the financial crisis does not occur during their terms, there is no mechanism to hold local elected 
officials accountable for this kind of financial misconduct. 
The national government has recognized the potential problem resulting from the lack of 
local fiscal accountability.  There have been several attempts to improve local fiscal 
accountability, mainly by taking local fiscal efforts into account in the formulae for distributing 
the national shared tax and intergovernmental aid.  For example, the national government is 
authorized to adjust the amount of the general grant or the matching ratio of categorical grants 
based on factors including local governments’ fiscal efforts.  The formula of distributing the 
national shared tax to special cities and counties/provincial cities uses “corporate sales tax 
revenue” as an indicator to measure local fiscal efforts, and a bill was drafted by the Department 
of Finance to put more weight on the indicators of local fiscal efforts in the formula of 
distributing the national shared tax.  The goal is for local governments to make more efforts to 
raise local funds and gradually decrease their financial dependence on the national government.  
When the majority of local revenue is raised locally, local fiscal accountability will be improved 
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because local elected officials will have to seek support from local residents to pay for new 
spending plans. 
It should be noted that local residents do not actively join the efforts of the national 
government to call for improving local fiscal accountability.  Because there is no relationship 
between local residents’ tax payments and local spending, local residents always welcome the 
increase of local spending and constantly ask their local elected officials to provide more local 
services regardless of the costs of these increased services.  Rather than asking their local elected 
officials to provide local services at a level they are willing to pay, local residents become a 
source of distortion for local resource allocation when they constantly ask for a higher level of 
local services.  As a result, without making local residents realize the potential harm caused by 
the lack of fiscal accountability and join the national government’s effort for improvement, it is 
hard to imagine that local elected officials can resist local residents’ requests for more and better 
local services as long as they need to please their voters for winning elections. 
Following this line of thinking, the question becomes whether the national government 
can provide enough incentives for or pressure on local residents to support the efforts of 
improving local fiscal accountability and to agree to share more financial responsibility to pay 
for the local services.  The current formulae for distributing the national shared tax and 
intergovernmental aid are generated mostly based on fiscal needs, although more attention has 
been paid to fiscal efforts in the recent years.  Even in the new drafted formula for distributing 
the national shared tax mentioned earlier, 75% of the formula is based on fiscal needs while only 
25% is based on fiscal efforts (Lin and Cai, 2003: 9).  That is to say that the incentives currently 
embedded in the intergovernmental transfer system may not be enough local residents to accept a 
financial burden increase.  More incentives need to be set forth by the national government, and 
it should be very clear to local residents what they could get if the local tax burden is increased.  
For example, a new national matching grant can be established so that local elected officials can 
explicitly tell local residents the amount of additional national funds that may be brought in if 
they pay more local taxes or fees. 
In sum, it is obvious that the national government in Taiwan is aware of the potential 
problem caused by the lack of local fiscal accountability, and actions have been taken to improve 
local fiscal efforts.  It is argued that current policy incentives provided by the national 
government may not be enough for local residents to agree to pay for more local taxes and fees.  
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Without local residents’ consent, local fiscal efforts will not be significantly improved because of 
the high political risk that local elected officials face in collecting more local taxes and fees.  As 
a result, the national government has to provide more incentives for local residents to agree to a 
local tax burden increase before any significant improvement can be made to local fiscal efforts 
and fiscal accountability. 
4.4 REFORMING LOCAL FISCAL SYSTEM 
As discussed earlier, Taiwan’s local revenue raising system is centralized and uniform.  Little 
autonomy is left for local governments to adjust the level of local revenue.  Therefore, when a 
local government projects to spend more than the level of revenue set by the national 
government, a mismatch between local revenue and local spending is created.  Rather than 
collect additional local revenue from local residents, local elected officials in Taiwan tend to 
seek more national grants or to borrow from the financial market, and poor local fiscal health is a 
result of this practice.  Literature on dealing with local governments’ financial difficulties in 
Taiwan has focused more on how shared taxes and the intergovernmental aid distribution system 
can be reformed to equalize local differences of fiscal capacity and to ensure more local revenues 
available for local public services (Wang, 1991: 94; Liang, 1995: 148-149; Zhu, 1993: 21-22; 
and Chen, 1996: 170-171).  Although policy recommendations from this perspective can be a 
solution in the short run, the same problem is sure to emerge shortly after reform.  This is 
because, first, no matter how intergovernmental transfer system is reformed, the cause of the 
mismatch between local revenue and local spending will continue to exist.  In addition, any 
distribution formula will be a product of political negotiation and compromise.  The concern of 
stakeholders is to protect their self-interest instead of achieving policy objectives such as 
efficiency, autonomy, accountability, development, and equity.  Reforms focusing on only 
changing the distributing formulae of national transfers certainly cannot cure the current local 
fiscal problems. 
In order to effectively improve local fiscal health and improve the local fiscal system in 
Taiwan, more needs to be done than simply distributing more national revenue to local 
governments.  A more decentralized local fiscal system may be needed to give local 
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governments more autonomy to determine the level of local taxation and to choose where local 
revenue should be collected.  Drawing from Mexico’s experience, Giugale, Nguyen, Rojas, and 
Webb (2000: 11) have argued that the benefits of decentralization will “depend on strengthening 
the link between subnational spending choices and self-taxing decision.”  Courchene, Martinez-
Vazquez, McLure Jr., and Webb (2000: 95) also argued that “[d]ecentralization works best when 
taxes and the benefits of public spending are closely related.”  The passage of the Law on Local 
Taxation in 2002 is the first step toward such a decentralized local fiscal system.  Although local 
governments have been slow to make use of their new authority and financial freedom, it is 
hoped that the law will increase policy knowledge and public awareness of fiscal 
decentralization and will make a more comprehensive reform possible in the future. 
In the reform process, the national government has to play an important role by “creating 
an environment that gives states and municipalities more incentive to take responsibility for their 
own programs and finances” (Giugale, Nguyen, Rojas, and Webb, 2000:11).  As Giugale, 
Nguyen, Rojas, and Webb (2000: 11) argued, fiscal decentralization “is not a matter of just 
changing rules but also of creating a culture of devolution.”  In Taiwan’s case, national transfers, 
both from the national shared tax and intergovernmental aid, should be restructured to reduce 
their importance for local revenues and thereby to encourage local governments to take 
responsibility for their own expenses.  The national shared tax should mainly be used for 
equalizing local fiscal capacity, and intergovernmental aid should be limited to encourage 
developments across local boundaries or with national significance, as specified in the Law on 
Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures.  Current efforts made by the national 
government to promote local fiscal efforts should be continued and expanded.  More incentives 
should be provided for local elected officials and local residents to accept an increased role in 
paying for local services.  The goal is to have local governments use locally generated revenues 
to support locally initiated programs. 
Based on the Latin American decentralization experience, Giugale, Nguyen, Rojas, and 
Webb (2000: 2) advocated an incremental approach as they observed that “abrupt, across-the-
board efforts have generally failed.”  Indeed, like many other policy domains, decentralization is 
a complex process occurring within a country’s specific institutional, political, and economic 
context (Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998: 2).  Especially in countries with a centralized culture, the 
process will begin with a policy learning process in which all stakeholders would have to 
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recognize the benefits of decentralization, work together to formulate a mutually accepted reform 
proposal, and eventually develop a decentralized culture.  Taking an incremental approach makes 
this policy learning process happen with the least possible resistance because stakeholders in the 
process will be more willing to try, and they can, therefore, gradually adopt themselves to the 
new system.  In such a policy learning process, stakeholders define and redefine the meaning and 
strategies of decentralization to develop policy means for their particular country.  Taiwanese 
officials’ perception on fiscal decentralization will be analyzed in the following chapters.  It is 
hoped that this analysis will facilitate policy learning by helping to better understanding how 
fiscal decentralization is perceived in Taiwan’s specific institutional, political, and economic 
context.  Policy consensus and differences will be revealed during the course of conducting this 
analysis to be the basis for developing the potential reform proposal. 
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5.0  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Research questions, hypotheses, and research design of this study are presented in this chapter.  
In addition, the selection of Q statements is discussed at the end of the chapter.  Generally 
speaking, this research concerns how Taiwanese officials both at the national and local level 
perceive the concept of fiscal decentralization and how their views are affected by the 
characteristics of agencies they serve.  In the first section of this chapter, research questions are 
developed according to this line of inquiry, and hypotheses are formed for each research question.  
Research design of this study is discussed in the second section.  The procedure of employing Q 
methodology to reveal different patterns of attitudes is described, and how to analyze the results 
obtained through Q methodology is explained.  Finally, the process of selecting Q statements, 
and Q statements selected for this study are briefly discussed in the third section. 
5.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Research questions proposed for this research generally concern the perception or attitude that 
Taiwanese officials possess toward fiscal decentralization.  As indicated in Chapter Two, there 
are two general approaches to pursue fiscal decentralization.  These two approaches should be 
viewed as two ends of a continuum on which different proposals for pursuing fiscal 
decentralization would fall.  Before we go further, we should first examine whether Taiwanese 
officials share the same pattern of attitudes toward fiscal decentralization.  The first research 
question asked and hypothesis formed are presented in the following: 
 
Research Question 1: Do officials in Taiwan share the same pattern of attitudes toward fiscal 
decentralization? 
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H1:  Taiwanese officials involved in the policy process of fiscal decentralization 
demonstrate a single pattern of attitudes toward fiscal decentralization. 
 
It is expected that the results obtained through Q methodology would reveal more than 
one pattern of officials’ attitudes to reject H1.  Since more than one pattern is revealed, is there 
any factor that might play a role in shaping these different viewpoints?  To be more specific, as 
literature reviewed in the section 2.2 implicitly implied, there seems to be a difference in views 
regarding fiscal decentralization between national-level and local-level officials.  Therefore, the 
second research question is proposed and hypothesis is formed to investigate the national-local 
dichotomy. 
 
Research Question 2: Do officials working at different levels of government in Taiwan possess 
different patterns of attitudes toward fiscal decentralization? 
H2:  Taiwanese officials working at different levels of government possess different 
patterns of attitudes toward fiscal decentralization. 
 
It is expected that the analysis on the revealed patterns of officials’ attitudes would 
conclude that officials working at different levels of government would perceive the concept of 
fiscal decentralization differently to accept H2.  However, this is not to say that officials working 
at the same level of government would develop a shared view of fiscal decentralization.  What 
are the factors that might contribute to the fact that officials working at the same level of 
government might not possess a shared view toward fiscal decentralization?  Several research 
questions and hypotheses are developed based on this line of inquiry.  The national officials’ 
perceptions are first examined.  Because national officials working for different ministries often 
have different organizational and policy priorities to accomplish, they often have different 
opinions on how a policy ought to be carried out.  Accordingly, it is expected that more than one 
pattern of officials’ attitudes would be revealed for national officials. 
 
Research Question 3: Do national officials in Taiwan share a single pattern of attitudes toward 
fiscal decentralization? 
  83
H3:  Taiwanese officials working at the national government-level share a single pattern 
of attitudes toward fiscal decentralization. 
 
It is expected that national officials working at different ministries would perceive the 
concept of fiscal decentralization differently.  Although some of them might share similar views 
to be included in the same pattern, more than one pattern should be revealed to reject H3.  Then 
the focus of discussion should be switched to local officials’ perceptions.  Local officials 
discussed here only include officials working for special city, county, or provincial city 
government because they are the ones who were invited to discuss reform proposals with 
national officials and they have opportunities to participate in the policy process. 
 
Research Question 4: Do local officials working at special city, county, and provincial city 
government in Taiwan share a single pattern of attitudes toward fiscal 
decentralization? 
H4:  Taiwanese local officials working at special city, county, and provincial city 
government possess a single pattern of attitudes toward fiscal decentralization. 
 
Local officials serving in different local governments often encounter different problems 
and challenges in dealing with issues of local public finance.  It is likely that local officials from 
different localities would have different patterns of attitudes toward fiscal decentralization.  As a 
result, it is expected that more than one pattern would be revealed among local officials to reject 
H4.  The next question focuses on factors shaping these different patterns.  Factors examined 
include duties performed by local officials, types of local government served, and their local 
governments’ reliance on national transfers.  It is assumed that local officials in charge of the 
same duties would share similar views toward fiscal decentralization.  A research question and 
hypothesis are presented below: 
 
Research Question 5: Do local officials in charge of different duties of local finance in Taiwan’s 
local governments perceive the concept of fiscal decentralization 
differently? 
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H5:  Taiwanese local officials in charge of different duties of local finance in local 
governments perceive the concept of fiscal decentralization differently. 
 
It is expected that the analysis of revealed patterns of attitudes would suggest that the 
local officials in charge of different duties of local finance in local governments perceive the 
concept of fiscal decentralization differently to accept H5.  The next factor to be examined is the 
types of local government in which local officials serve.  These types include special city, county, 
and provincial city governments.  In fact, different types of local governments possess different 
socioeconomic characteristics, economic patterns, and population characteristics that might have 
affected officials’ views on fiscal decentralization. 
 
Research Question 6: Do local officials working in different types of local government in Taiwan 
perceive the concept of fiscal decentralization differently? 
H6:  Taiwanese local officials working in different types of local government perceive 
the concept of fiscal decentralization differently. 
 
It is expected that officials serving in different types of local government would perceive 
the concept of fiscal decentralization differently to accept H6.  The final factor to be examined is 
the degree of reliance on national transfers.  It is assumed that different degrees of reliance on 
national transfers create different fiscal needs for a local government to pursue in the reform 
process and that this difference in fiscal needs would reflect on officials’ perception on fiscal 
decentralization. 
 
Research Question 7: Do local officials serving in local governments with different degrees of 
reliance on national transfers possess different patterns of attitudes 
toward fiscal decentralization? 
H7:  Taiwanese local officials serving in local governments with different degrees of 
reliance on national transfers would possess different patterns of attitudes toward 
fiscal decentralization. 
 
  85
It is expected that local officials would perceive fiscal decentralization differently if they 
work for local governments with different degrees of reliance on national transfers to accept H7.  
It is hoped that these analyses would become a basis to better understand the issues at stake in 
the policy process of fiscal decentralization.  In addition, each pattern’s views and policy 
priorities can be obtained through further examining, characterizing, interpreting, and comparing 
of each revealed pattern.  The knowledge about each pattern’ s views and policy priorities can 
add to our understanding about what factors might play a role in shaping these patterns.  Then it 
becomes possible to gain a more complete picture about the position of stakeholders in the policy 
process of fiscal decentralization and why they hold such positions.  Based on the results, efforts 
can be made to facilitate reform the process by bridging gaps and searching for policy consensus. 
5.2 RESEARCH DESIGH 
This research can be divided into two parts.  By employing Q methodology, the first part of this 
research intends to reveal patterns of officials’ attitudes toward fiscal decentralization in Taiwan.  
Each pattern of officials’ attitudes is further interpreted, analyzed, and compared to gain a more 
complete picture of how fiscal decentralization is perceived by national and local officials in 
Taiwan.  After these patterns are obtained, the second part of this research intends to examine 
what factors may have played a role in shaping these patterns in order to test hypotheses 
developed earlier in this chapter.  Specifically, it aims to examine whether there is a national-
local dichotomy in Taiwan, whether officials working at the same level of governments have 
developed a shared view on fiscal decentralization, and whether local officials’ perception on 
fiscal decentralization is affected by characteristics of the local government in which he or she 
serves.  These two portions of research are discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
5.2.1 Revealing the Patterns of Officials’ Attitudes 
This portion of research uses Q methodology to explore the patterns of Taiwanese officials' 
attitudes toward fiscal decentralization and to reveal hypothetical value structures for each 
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identified pattern.  These patterns are further interpreted, analyzed, and compared to provide a 
better understanding of how Taiwan’s officials perceive the concept of fiscal decentralization 
and to highlight agreements and disagreements among these different patterns. 
First introduced by William Stephenson in 1935, “Q methodology provides a foundation 
for the systematic study of subjectivity” (Brown, 1991).  Kerlinger (1986: 517) argued that Q 
methodology’s main strength is “its affinity to theory.”  “It means that if a theory, or aspects of a 
theory, can be expressed in categories and if items that express the categories can be produced, 
then Q can be a powerful approach to testing theory” (Kerlinger, 1986: 517).  This study first 
utilizes Q methodology to explore the patterns of officials' attitudes toward fiscal 
decentralization in Taiwan.  After these patterns are revealed, each pattern’s hypothetical value 
structure can be obtained for further analysis. 
Several steps are followed to conduct this analysis.  First, statements concerning fiscal 
decentralization in Taiwan were collected from literature published in Taiwan from 1990 to 2002 
to form the “concourse”, the flow of communicability surrounding the studied topic in the Q 
methodology (Brown, 1991).  Second, 40 Q statements were selected from the concourse to form 
the Q sample, and Q distribution is set as 3-4-5-5-6-5-5-4-3.  Officials who are involved in the 
policy process of fiscal decentralization were selected to participate in this research and asked to 
perform Q sorting.  Results of each Q sort were analyzed by using PQMethod, statistical 
software specially designed to perform Q analysis.  After officials’ patterns of attitudes were 
revealed, these patterns were interpreted, analyzed, and compared to gain insights on how each 
pattern of attitudes perceive the concept of fiscal decentralization.  These steps are specified in 
greater detail in the following sections. 
5.2.1.1 Concourse, Q sample, Q distribution, and pre-test 
In the Q study, the concourse consists of statements being made to express the concept, 
ideas, or meaning of a subject being studied.  A concourse can be gotten in a number of ways, 
including interviews, commentaries from newspapers, talk shows, or essays (Brown, 1991).  In 
this research, 160 statements were collected from literature published by Taiwanese scholars 
from 1990 to 2002 to form a concourse.  At the same time, a factorial design was formulated for 
this research based on the degree of decentralization and selective policy objectives.  In fact, any 
effort of pursuing decentralization will inevitably begin by considering the degree of 
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decentralization.  In other words, officials involved in the policy making process have to decide 
the degree of central control vs. the degree of local freedom before any policy alternatives can be 
formulated.  In addition, five policy objectives often discussed in the literature of fiscal 
decentralization were subjectively selected based on their relevance to this study.  They include 
efficiency, autonomy, accountability, development, and equity.  It is acknowledged that by no 
means is this a complete list of policy objectives for pursuing fiscal decentralization.  Table 5.1 
summarizes the factorial design based on above two dimensions: 
 
Table 5.1 Factorial design of this Q study 
Main Effect Categories 
Emphasis (A) (a) Central Control (b) Local Freedom  
Objectives (B) (c) Efficiency (d) Autonomy (e) Accountability 
 (f) Development (g) Equity  
 
The statements in the concourse were further selected to make up the Q sample.  Based 
on the factorial design above, there will be AB = (2)(5) = 10 combinations.  In order to capture 
as many different ideas as possible from each combined category, while keeping the total 
number of Q statements manageable to the Q sorters, each combined category was replicated m 
= 4 times for a Q sample size of N = mAB = 40.  After the Q sample size was determined, the 
statements in the concourse were categorized into these ten combined categories.  Within each 
category, statements with similar ideas or meaning were grouped together.  Grouped statements 
were further examined based on their representativeness to the group and category based on my 
own judgment.  Statements considered less representative were eliminated, and this process did 
not stop until there were four statements remaining within each combined category.  The 
remaining forty Q statements from the above process were selected from the concourse to make 
up a Q sample.  Each selected statement was numbered and printed on a small blank business 
card to be used in the Q sorting process.  Section 3.4 examines these Q statements in greater 
detail. 
Setting up Q distributions was the next step.  After a scale from 4 to -4 was determined, 
Q distributions of 3-4-5-5-6-5-5-4-3 was adopted by this study in order to make the distribution 
quasi-normal.  As Kerlinger (1986: 554-516) noted, “Q distributions are an arbitrary matter. …  
The normal or quasi-normal distribution has advantages, mainly statistical, that make its use 
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desirable.”  After the Q distribution was set up, four people with a public administration degree 
or currently working in the public sector were asked to conduct Q sorting as pre-tests and to 
provide feedback to improve the process.  The goal of pre-tests was to: (1) examine whether the 
wording of each statement is clear and convey the exact idea the researcher wants to convey; (2) 
identify flows of instructions of administering Q sorting; (3) get the researcher more familiar 
with the process of instructing Q sorters and conducting interviews after each sorting process; (4) 
make sure each face-to-face interview, including the Q sorting process and follow-up interview, 
can be concluded within a hour.  Changes in the wording of Q statements as well as 
modifications on the procedure of conducting Q sorting and follow-up interview were made as a 
result of conducting these pre-tests. 
5.2.1.2 Selection of participants and administering Q sorting 
The unit of analysis of this study is the individual official.  Officials are considered as 
actors participating in the policy process of fiscal decentralization.  Each official has his or her 
own priorities to be achieved in the process.  The population of this study is defined as Taiwan's 
national and local officials who conduct local finance related tasks.  At the national level, ten 
officials who are in charge of making local public finance related policies and decisions were 
contacted for participation.  They are directly involved in making policy decisions and 
administration of local governance, local taxes, national shared tax, or intergovernmental aid.  
Their titles include Deputy Minister, Comptroller, Deputy Director, Senior Executive Officer, 
and Division Chief.  At the local level, 28 officials from either Finance Bureau or Accounting 
and Statistics Office agreed to participate in the study.  Their titles include Director-general, 
Deputy Director-general, and Section Chief.  The interviews were conducted from April 2005 
through September 2005.  A total number of 38 national and local officials completed the 
interview process by conducting the Q sort and answering follow-up questions.  All but four 
interviews were face-to-face interviews that allowed the researcher to personally interact with, 
observe, and guide interviewees through interviews. 
It was planned to select interviewees by employing a non-probability sampling method, 
which “uses a process of chain referral: when members of the target population are located, they 
are ask to provide names and addresses of other members of the target population, who are then 
contacted and asked to name others, and so on” (Singleton, Straits, and Straits, 1993: 165-166).  
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In this method, a few interviewees will first be identified and interviewed.  Then they will be 
asked to refer other possible interviewees to be interviewed.  There are at least two advantages of 
applying this sampling method in this study: (1) the referral process will improve the researcher's 
access to targeted officials, especially officials in higher positions; (2) it enhances the 
researcher's ability to ensure proper representation of cases, e.g. at least one interviewee from 
each local government. 
The actual selection process went a little differently.  After a few initial contacts, two 
points of contact quickly emerged to provide assistance for identifying and contacting potential 
interviewees.  At national level, enormous help was received from a congressional office.  Either 
referral letters were sent or phone calls were made to targeting ministries’ congressional relations 
offices to identify and arrange appointments with potential interviewees working in the national 
government.  Nine out of ten interviews at the national level were the direct results of this 
assistance.  At the local level, a high rank local official sent referral letters to officials who hold 
similar positions in other local governments to ask for their participation in the study and referral 
to other potential interview candidates.  27 out of 28 interviews made at 17 out of 22 special 
city/county/provincial city local governments8 located in the Island of Taiwan were the direct 
results of the help from this Director-general.  The remaining two interviews were made through 
other points of contact. 
All interviews were conducted in Mandarin.  Typically, each interview began with a brief 
introduction about the researcher, the project, and the proceedings of the interview.  In addition, 
anonymity and confidentiality were also assured.  Then each of interviewees was instructed to 
rank Q statements based on the degree that he or she agrees with the statements and place these 
statements accordingly on the score sheet.  During the Q sorting process, most interviewees 
voluntarily elaborated their views on some of the Q statements to be recorded by the researcher.  
Figure 5.1 is the consent and instruction sheet used in the interviews, and it is provided to 
demonstrate the steps interviewees followed to conduct Q sorting.  After interviewees completed 
Q sorting, three follow-up questions were asked in order to obtained more in-depth information 
about interviewees’ points of view on these statements.  Figure 5.2 is a sample of score sheet 
used in the interviews.  The total of 38 Q sorts were completed for this study. 
                                                 
8 There are 25 special city/county/provincial city level local governments in Taiwan.  Three of them are located on 
outlaying islands and 22 of them are located on the Island of Taiwan. 
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Figure 5.1 Consent and instruction sheet for Q sorting 
 
Taiwan’s Officials’ Perceptions of Fiscal Decentralization 
 
This study seeks to better understand how officials in Taiwan perceive the 
concept of fiscal decentralization in order to search for consensus in reforming 
Taiwan’s local fiscal system.  By completing the tasks guided by the interviewer 
based on these instructions and answering the supplementary questions, you will 
consent to participate and agree that data gathered are to be used and analyzed in this 
study.  Participation is voluntary.  You may choose to withdraw at any time or request 
that information given not be included in the study.  All of the information obtained 
from you will remain strictly confidential.  Neither you nor your organization will be 
identified in any report produced based on this survey. 
 
Q Sorting Instructions 
 
? Read through the 40 Q statements in order to have a sense of the range of 
meanings they contain. 
? Divide the statements into three piles.  Put those with which you generally agree 
to the left.  Put those with which you generally disagree to the right.  Then put 
the remaining statements in the middle. 
? If one of the piles contains more than 20 statements, further divide these 
statements into two piles based on the degree of your agreement or disagreement. 
? Spread out the statements in the pile with which you agree most.  Select three 
statements with which you agree most and place them below the +4 scoring label.  
Select four statements that you agree most among the remaining statements in the 
pile and put them below the +3 scoring label.  Repeat this procedure to select 5 
statements for the +2 scoring label and 5 statements for the +1 scoring label.  
This procedure stops when you place all of the statements in the pile under 
appropriate scoring labels. 
? Then move to the disagree side. Spread out the statements in the pile with which 
you disagree most.  First select three statements with which you disagree most 
and place them below the -4 scoring label.  Repeat this procedure as you did for 
the most agreeable pile and stop when you place all of the statements in this pile. 
? Return to the agree side and repeat the same procedure.  Continue in this back-
and- forth fashion, working your way toward the middle.  Once you have run out 
of agreeable and disagreeable statements, continue the sorting using those 
statements in the remainder pile. 
? Adjust the placements of any statement as you wish, and eventually all 40 
statements should be rank-ordered in front of you. 
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Figure 5.2 Score sheet 
 
Taiwan’s Officials’ Perceptions of Fiscal Decentralization 
 
Date:  
Agency:  
Current position:  
 
 
Most Agree      Most Disagree 
4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 
         
         
         
(3)        (3) 
 (4)      (4)  
  (5) (5)  (5) (5)   
    (6)     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. Why do you agree with statements placed at +4/+3 most? 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Why do you disagree with statement placed at –4/-3 most?  
 
 
 
 
 
3. Why do you sort these statements as you did? 
  
  
 
5.2.1.3 Data analysis by using PQMethod 
Each Q sort was entered into PQMethod9 for analysis.  PQMethod is a software program 
specially designed to perform Q analysis.  First, correlations of 38 Q sorts were computed by 
PQMethod to provide a preliminary assessment of how each Q sort correlates with one another.  
Next, as suggested by Brown (1980: 235-238; 208-224), Centorid factor analysis was performed 
to obtain unrotated factors.  Varimax rotation was then performed to reveal rotated factors.  
                                                 
9 For more information on the software, see http://www.lrz-muenchen.de/~schmolck/qmethod/ 
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Factor loadings of these rotated factors were examined, and the factors were further manually 
rotated to better reflect the interrelationship of 38 Q sorts based on their correlations. 
Automatic pre-flagging was performed using PQMethod to highlight each Q sort’s 
association with identified patterns.  The procedure of flagging is conducted by examining Q 
sorts’ factor loadings to determine which revealed factors they are associated with.  Each factor 
loading indicates the extent of a Q sort’s association with these five factors.  A factor loading is 
significant at .01 level if its value is greater than .41 or less than -.41.  This value was obtained 
by the formula (1/√n)*2.58 or (1/√n)*(-2.58), where n is the number of Q statements.  In this 
case, n equals 40.  A Q sort with a significant loading would be considered significantly loaded 
with the factor.  For example, if a Q sort has factor loadings of .6690, .0974, -.1499, -.0091, 
and .2062 for the five factors, it is said that Q sort is significantly associated with Factor I 
because only factor loading between the Q sort and the Factor I (.6690) is greater than .41. 
Some Q sorts’ associations, however, are more difficult to determine because they are 
significantly loaded with two factors.  When a Q sort has two significant factor loadings, it 
means that the Q sort, to a certain degree, represents the views of two factors.  In order to 
determine the association of these Q sorts, their two significant loadings were compared to see if 
one factor loading is much higher than the other one is in making subjective decisions.  For 
example, if two significant factor loadings of a Q sort are .6242 for Factor III, and .4106 for 
Factor V, the Q sort is assigned to represent the views of Factor III because its factor loading for 
Factor III is much higher than its factor loading for Factor V is.  For Q sorts in which the 
difference is not large enough to determine which factor they should be assigned to, they will not 
be assigned to any one of the factors.  Based on this procedure, the membership of each Q sort 
can be determined, and each revealed factor represents a pattern of officials’ attitude toward 
fiscal decentralization in this study. 
5.2.2 Analyzing Revealed Patters of Officials Attitudes 
After patterns of officials’ attitudes toward fiscal decentralization were revealed, the revealed 
patterns were analyzed.  Factor arrays representing these patterns were examined to see how 
each pattern perceives fiscal decentralization.  Then hypotheses developed earlier in this chapter 
were examined.  The knowledge obtained through the previous two analyses was used to develop 
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the theories of fiscal decentralization.  Finally, factor arrays of the uncovered patterns were 
further compared to identify their differences and similarities in order to see if policy consensus 
can be reached.  It is hoped that these analyses can yield policy relevant knowledge of how fiscal 
decentralization is perceived by Taiwanese officials, on what issues officials of each pattern care 
most, what factors contribute to shaping these views, and whether reaching a policy consensus is 
possible in Taiwan. 
5.2.2.1 Analyzing factor arrays of uncovered patterns 
Factor arrays are hypothetical Q sorts that can be understood as Q sorts representing these 
uncovered patterns.  Brown (1980: 240) stated that “[t]he estimation of a factor is achieved by 
merging together those Q sorts associated with it.”  Based on Brown (1980: 239-247), there are 
five steps to obtain these hypothetical Q sorts.  First, a factor weight is assigned to each Q sort 
associated with a pattern based on the Q sort’s factor loading.  Factor weight is calculated based 
on the formula: W = FL / (1 - FL2 ) where W = factor weight and FL = factor loading.  After 
factor weight of each Q sort associated with a pattern is calculated, the factor scores of the Q sort 
are converted to computational values.  Based on the scale of factor scores, ranging from 4 to - 4, 
applied in this study, computational values (CV) from 9 to 1 are assigned to Q statements.  For 
statements with a factor score of 4, a computational value of 9 is assigned.  For statements with a 
factor score of 3, a computational value of 8 is assigned.  The same logic is applied for Q 
statements with a factor score of 2, 1, 0, -1, -2, -3, and -4, and these factor scores are converted 
to computational value of 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively.  After the computational value of 
each Q statement is obtained, a total score can be calculated for each statement.  For example, if 
Pattern IV consists of officials A and B, the total score of Q statement 01 for Pattern V can be 
calculated with the following formula:  
 
Total01 = CV01,A * WA + CV01, B * WB
 
After total scores of 40 Q statements are obtained, these scores are normalized based on 
the formula: Z = (Total – XTotal) / STotal.  Each statement’s normalized factor scores of revealed 
patterns are obtained to see how each pattern ranks these Q statements.  Appendixes A6 to A10 
present these normalized scores for each pattern.  Finally, these normalized scores are 
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transformed to factor scores, ranging form 4 to -4, based on the Q distribution of 3-4-5-5-6-5-5-
4-3 defined in this study.  For example, for each pattern, the top three ranked Q statements are 
assigned a factor score of 4, and the remaining top four ranked Q statements are assigned a factor 
score of 3.  The same procedure is applied to the remaining Q statements to obtain a hypothetical 
Q sort representing the pattern.  Appendix B.1 presents factor arrays of five revealed patterns. 
Based on the factor array of each pattern, an analysis can be conducted to understand 
each pattern’s views on fiscal decentralization.  As we can recall from our earlier discussion on 
factorial design, four statements were selected from each of the ten categories made up of the 
two approaches and five policy objectives of fiscal decentralization.  Factor scores of the four Q 
statements within each category were added up to measure how each pattern agrees or disagrees 
with statements within each category.  Moreover, factor scores of Q statements representing the 
thinking of a centralist approach or a localist approach were added up separately to measure how 
each pattern agrees or disagrees with these two approaches.  Finally, factor scores of Q 
statements representing five policy objectives of fiscal decentralization were also added up to 
measure each pattern’s emphasis on these objectives.  It is hoped that a general understanding 
about each pattern can be obtained to provide a basis for more detailed, in-depth analyses. 
5.2.2.2 Understanding and defining revealed patterns 
After a general understanding about revealed patterns were obtained, these patterns were 
further examined through their factor arrays to see each pattern’s underlining value, which Q 
statements make each pattern distinct, and how each pattern prioritizes Q statements.  Factor 
arrays of each pattern obtained earlier were used to show how an individual exactly representing 
a pattern would order the Q statements (Dryzek and Berejikian, 1993).  These factor arrays were 
analyzed to describe, characterize, and interpret each pattern’s views based on the factor scores 
of each Q statement. 
First, factor scores of each Q statement were examined to identify Q statements that 
distinguish one pattern from the other.  For example, a statement might be ranked by officials of 
Pattern I, II, III, IV, and V at -2, +4, -3, -4, and 0, respectively.  As we can see, officials of 
Pattern II strongly agreed with the statement while officials of other patterns did not.  Therefore, 
it can be concluded that the statement, a distinguishing statement of Pattern II, distinguishes 
Pattern II from all of other patterns.  This information can be used to see how perception of one 
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pattern is different from that of the other patterns.  It should be noted that distinguishing 
statements might not be ranked strongly by officials of a pattern.  For example, a statement might 
be ranked at -1 and still be considered as a distinguishing statement if no other patterns ranked 
the statement negatively.  In addition, a statement can be a distinguishing statement for two 
patterns, one pattern that solely ranked the statement strongly positive, and the other pattern that 
solely ranked the statement strongly negative.  Distinguishing statements identified were first 
examined to define each revealed pattern.  They were made bold to highlight their importance in 
showing how a pattern’s views are different from the other patterns. 
The emphasis was then placed on Q statements that each pattern strongly agrees or 
disagrees with.  In other words, by identifying statements with a factor score of 4, 3, -3, and –4, 
issues that each uncovered pattern emphasized could be understood.  In addition to the distinct 
characteristics of each pattern identified through distinguishing statements, these statements were 
analyzed to further our understanding about each revealed pattern’s view on issues of fiscal 
decentralization. 
5.2.2.3 Examining factors shaping these patterns’ views 
With a understanding about each pattern’s views on fiscal decentralization, the focus was 
switched to see whether hypotheses developed earlier in this chapter should be accepted or 
rejected by examining whether these patterns associate with factors such as levels of government, 
duties performed within each level of government, types of local government, and local 
governments’ reliance on national transfers.  Ideally, analysis of frequencies (Chi-square test) 
can be performed to examine association between two categorical variables.  Unfortunately, for 
this Q study, as well as many other Q studies, the number of people invited to conduct Q sorting 
is relatively small.  As a result, the validity of the analysis is in question because the general rule 
that the expected value for each cell should be greater than five is not satisfied.  Due to this 
reason, analysis of frequencies cannot be used here.  Instead, multiple line charts are employed, 
when applicable, to depict the relationship between revealed patterns and factors introduced for 
examining.  The goal is to identify the underlying relationship between revealed patterns and 
factors. 
Q sorters were categorized into a pattern with which their Q sorts were significantly 
loaded with.  They were also categorized based on the characteristics and duties of their affiliated 
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organization.  For example, Q sorters were categorized as either national level officials or local 
level officials based on whether they are working in a national agency or local government 
agency.  Similarly, national level officials can be further categorized into officials in charge of 
local taxes, officials in charge of national shared tax, officials in charge of general grants, 
officials in charge of categorical grants, and officials in charge of other areas of local 
government administration, while local level officials can be categorized into officials in charge 
of finance and officials in charge of accounting and statistics according to the duties of their 
agencies. 
Local level officials can also be categorized based on the types of local government they 
serve and their local governments’ reliance on national transfers.  Types of local government in 
this study include special cities, counties, and provincial cities.  Classifications of local 
governments based on their reliance on national transfers were developed according to the 
following methods.  First, percentage of total local revenues received from national transfers, 
including the national shared tax and intergovernmental aid, was calculated to see the importance 
of national transfers to each local government.  Then K-Means cluster analysis was performed to 
reveal three or four clusters.  Finally, the results of these two different classifications were 
examined to select the solution best reflecting and describing each local government’s reliance 
on national transfers.  The results of these analyses provide insights on whether officials’ 
backgrounds play a role in shaping their views toward fiscal decentralization. 
5.2.2.4 Developing theories of fiscal decentralization 
With the understanding of Taiwan’s officials’ perceptions of fiscal decentralization 
revealed in this study and background factors shaping these different perceptions, theories of 
fiscal decentralization were developed to capture these different perceptions.  It is hoped to 
conceptualize national-local relationships defined in the reform of fiscal decentralization as well 
as policies proposed according to these different perceived relationships.  These theories can be 
examined in the context of national-local dichotomy of fiscal decentralization to see whether 
national and local officials’ beliefs, attitudes, and values described in the literature can be applied 
to Taiwanese officials.  Conversely, theories found in the Taiwanese case can also contribute to 
the existing literature and deepen our understanding about officials’ motives and thinking when 
they participate in the policymaking of fiscal decentralization. 
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5.2.2.5 Comparing revealed patterns 
Finally, these patterns and their hypothetical Q sorts were further examined to see the 
differences, as well as similarities, in their opinions toward issues of fiscal decentralization.  Two 
Questions were addressed:  What are main differences among patterns?  Do these patterns share 
any similarities?  The goal was to identify issues that policy consensus might be reached.  A set 
of criteria was developed to select statements showing difference or consensus in the patterns’ 
views.  In addition, the definiteness of each selected statement was also identified in order to 
interpret the policy meanings embedded in these statements and to make policy 
recommendations. 
Based on the Q distribution defined in this study, statements ranked +4 and +3 are 
considered most agreed by the participants, and statements ranked -4 and -3 are considered most 
disagreed.  Accordingly, if statements were ranked at +4 or +3 by at least one pattern while 
ranked at -4 or -3 by at least one other pattern, we can say that at least two patterns do not share 
the similar view to either agree or disagree with the statements.  By identifying and analyzing 
these statements, I hoped to highlight differences among officials of different patterns.  Then the 
focus was switched to find shared views among these patterns.  When statements were ranked 
zero or negatively by all patterns, it is said that each of five revealed patterns is either neutral or 
disagreeing with the statements.  From a policymaking standpoint, these are issues that officials 
of all patterns would agree to not pursuing.  On the contrary, when statements were ranked zero 
or positively by all patterns, we can conclude that each of the five patterns is either neutral or 
agreeing with the statements.  Since none of the patterns is opposing these statements, they are 
more likely to become the starting point for reaching policy consensus.  The criteria discussed 
above were used to select statements to be analyzed in Chapter Seven. 
The degree of definiteness was incorporated into our discussion to evaluate and interpret 
selected Q statements and embedded issues these statements represent.  According to Brown 
(1980: 60-61), political viewpoints can be developed around differing interpretations and 
preferences for facts, ends, and means.  When a statement reflects a general preference based on 
a particular interpretation of facts, it is a bias statement.  When a statement reflects a general 
preference based on a desire for a particular end or course of action, it is wish statement.  When a 
statement reflects a general preference based on a belief as to the best means for achieving 
desired ends, it is a policy statement.  Wilf (1997: 86) elaborated that statements with different 
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degrees of definiteness represent different levels of intensity in policy discussion.  For example, 
a wish implies a bias, but it further points out a desired end.  “A policy implies a wish, but it 
represents a more thought-out position; it is more intense, and hence more definite (Wilf, 
1997:86).  It is hoped to better interpret the statements and make policy recommendations by 
incorporating a degree of definiteness into the analysis. 
5.3 SELECTION OF Q STATEMENTS 
This section discusses how Q statements used in this study were selected.  Literature concerning 
fiscal decentralization in Taiwan was reviewed, and statements were collected to form concourse 
of this research.  The third section of Chapter Two provides a summary of what has been 
discussed by scholars in Taiwan regarding issues of fiscal decentralization.  160 statements were 
collected from these literatures to form the concourse of this research.  Then these statements 
were assigned to various categories based on the factorial design showed in the Table 5.1.  
Within each category, four statements were selected to best reflect ongoing policy debates in 
Taiwan. 
5.3.1 Efficiency – Central Control 
The centralist approach to pursue efficiency emphasizes the importance of the role a national 
government should play in the process.  It argues that a national government should utilize 
intergovernmental transfers to address issues such as spillover effect, irrational local spending, 
fiscal imbalance among localities, and dysfunctional competition.  The following were Q 
statements selected to reflect this thinking: 
 
39. The main purpose of granting intergovernmental aid is to offset 
inefficiency caused by the spillover effect, which means benefits of local 
services can be enjoyed by residents in other jurisdictions. 
 
06. Due to local politics, interests lobbying, and pressure groups, local 
spending keeps growing and becomes inefficient. 
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25. Once local government officials obtain authority to determine local tax 
bases and rates, it is easy for them to engage in a competition for tax 
reduction. 
 
35. Over decentralization will make a consistent nation-wide fiscal policy 
impossible, resulting in an even more severe fiscal imbalance among 
localities. 
5.3.2 Efficiency – Local Freedom 
The localist approach to achieve efficiency highlights the importance of local freedom to meet 
different local preferences.  Proponents of this approach argue that tax competition may enhance 
efficiency of economic resources allocation and that competition among localities will force 
local officials to improve administrative efficiency.  They also point out that reliance on 
intergovernmental transfers might result in local overspending.  The following Q statements 
were selected to represent these ideas: 
 
03. It would be far more efficient to allow local governments to provide local 
public services at different levels than to regulate them under a uniform level 
set by the national government. 
 
19. Tax competition will enhance the efficiency of economic resource 
allocation. 
 
23. Decentralization will facilitate local governments’ creativity to 
differentiate service provisions for meeting different needs. 
 
21. Intergovernmental grants from the national government will foster local 
overspending. 
5.3.3 Autonomy – Central Control 
It seems contradictory to pursue local autonomy through a centralist approach.  However, in a 
unitary country like Taiwan, some people would argue that an incremental process of 
decentralization would be most appropriate.  The emphasis of this approach is to limit 
discretionary authority of the national government by substituting conditional grants with general 
grants, and by regulating standards, formula, and procedure of distributing national funds by 
laws.  The following Q statements reflect the view of a centralist to increase local autonomy: 
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 07. The establishment of self-governance and local fiscal systems should be 
enacted into law. 
 
18. The Law of Shared Tax should be enacted to regulate standards, formulas, 
and procedures of shared tax distribution. 
 
20. A law should be enacted to regulate the system of intergovernmental 
transfer in order to minimize the possibility that national government would 
use intergovernmental transfers as a policy tool to intervene in local affairs. 
 
12. The national government should reduce the amount of conditional grants 
year by year to allow local governments more flexibility for resource 
allocation. 
5.3.4 Autonomy – Local Freedom 
The localist approach to pursue autonomy asks for complete local control for setting the level of 
local spending and policy priorities.  Proponents advocate that the national government should 
only regulate and control what local governments are prohibited to do in order to reduce its role 
in local policymaking.  Greater involvement of local residents in the local decision making 
process is also emphasized to ensure less intervention from the center.  The following Q 
statements reflect this thinking: 
 
09. The principle of regulating local governments is to itemize what they are 
prohibited to do. 
 
28. The national government should revoke control of local revenue 
collection. 
 
13. Following certain administrative procedures, local residents should be able 
to vote on proposals for local revenue collection. 
 
26. Local government should have complete independent autonomy to set 
policy priorities for its administrative activities. 
5.3.5 Accountability – Central Control 
Scholars who believe in a centralist approach to ensure local accountability emphasize the role of 
the national government in monitoring and evaluating local financial behavior.  They also argue 
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that the national government should be given the policy tools necessary for rewarding or 
punishing local governments for their behavior.  The following Q statements reflect these 
thoughts: 
 
11. In order to ensure a link between local public service provision and local 
tax collection, the national government should establish a mechanism to 
reward or punish local governments. 
 
29. The national government should establish a set of objective indicators to 
evaluate local fiscal efforts and take them into account in the mechanism of 
distributing national shared tax revenue and intergovernmental transfers. 
 
02. The national government should have the authority to monitor and control 
local governments’ practices in raising debts, budgeting, taxing, and collecting 
other local revenues. 
 
32. The Law on Local Budgeting, which includes penalties for unlawful 
practices, should be enacted to strengthen the ability of the Ministry of 
Finance and Directorate General of Budget Accounting and Statistics in the 
national government to monitor local budgeting processes and 
implementation. 
5.3.6 Accountability – Local Freedom 
Participation of local residents in the local policy making process is deemed the key to ensure 
local accountability by proponents of a localist approach.  They argue that when local residents 
are engaged in the policy deliberation process to determine the level of local spending and when 
they pay local taxes to support local services, they will realize the true costs of these local 
services and keep an close eye on whether local officials spend money efficiently.  The following 
Q statements reflect these views: 
 
36. Local people should be encouraged to get involved in the local policy 
making process to realize the costs and benefits of local services, and to better 
hold local officials accountable for local spending. 
 
34. Local government officials should recognize the essence of local self-
governance, establish the notion of paying local services by local revenues, 
and aggressively collect own-source revenue based on the law. 
 
22. In order to better hold local government officials accountable, a system of 
referenda on local fiscal issues should be established. 
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08. Only after local people feel the pain of paying taxes, will they actively ask 
local government officials for more cost reduction and effectiveness 
improvement. 
5.3.7 Development – Central Control 
In order to promote local development, scholars with a centralist mind believe that the national 
government has better knowledge and more financial resources to promote and ensure local 
development.  Therefore, They argue that the national government should get involved in the 
local development planning process through its power to fund local development projects and 
stimulate private investments.  The national government should also provide technical assistance 
to ensure the success of these projects.  The following Q statements were selected to reflect these 
points of view: 
 
40. When sufficient financial resources are retained, the national government 
will be better able to push development projects with national significance in 
order to promote balanced growth among localities. 
 
31. Grants from the national government can stimulate local private 
investments. 
 
33. The national government should guarantee local governments sufficient 
financial resources to support their basic public programs. 
 
37. The national government should organize a technical assistance team to 
help each local government develop a financial plan based on their unique 
economic activities to ensure sufficient financial resources for local 
development. 
5.3.8 Development – Local Freedom 
The localist approach to pursue development asks for a complete control over local planning and 
development by local governments.  The key to a complete local control is for local governments 
to raise their own money through local taxes to fund these projects by themselves.  Proponents of 
this approach argue that reliance on national transfers to fund local development projects will 
lead local governments only to focus on projects with the ability to attract national funds 
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regardless these projects’ abilities to meet local needs.  The following Q statements were 
selected to represent these thoughts: 
 
16. Reliance on national grants will lead local governments to ignore projects 
not funded by the central government, resulting in an imbalance of local 
development. 
 
24. Money and power are centralized to make local governments unable to 
actively design and implement local development projects. 
 
30. Local governments’ decisions on resource allocation will better reflect 
local interests because they are closer to local people. 
 
01. Local governments continually and chronically rely on national grants to 
support local spending needs, rendering comprehensive local development 
planning impossible. 
5.3.9 Equity – Central Control 
The conventional wisdom in Taiwan has suggested that equity is a national function, not one to 
be left to local governments.  Proponents of this approach believe that equity and income 
redistribution should be achieved through the collection of progressive taxes by the national 
government.  If a local government levies a progressive tax, its rich residents will move out and 
the poor will move in.  The following Q statements were selected based on this thinking: 
 
15. Local governments are incapable of dealing with unemployment, inflation, 
and income redistribution successfully. 
 
14. If local governments get involved in the policies to promote equity, local 
economic resources will be drained. 
 
38. If revenues collected from the progressive income tax can be the source for 
intergovernmental grants, income distribution will be better equalized. 
 
10. If a local government performs redistribution functions, such as social 
welfare policies, rich residents will move out and the poor will move in. 
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5.3.10 Equity – Local Freedom 
A few scholars in Taiwan have observed that local governments do perform redistributive 
function in selected policy areas, such as education, medical care, and housing assistance. They 
argue that local governments can design welfare programs more creatively to better meet local 
needs.  The following Q statements reflect these thoughts: 
 
04. Generally speaking, local governments can achieve distributional 
objectives by getting involved in policy areas such as education, medical care, 
or housing assistance. 
 
17. Local governments are expected to respond creatively and effectively if 
given increased responsibility for welfare policy. 
 
27. Locating more responsibility for redistributive policy with local 
governments allows them to design welfare programs that are more 
appropriate to their own needs and better reflect the preferences of their 
residents. 
 
05. Redistributive policies can also be a local public good implemented by 
local governments. 
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6.0  ANALYZING THE REVEALED PATTERNS 
The purpose of this chapter is to present officials’ patterns of attitudes toward fiscal 
decentralization uncovered by using Q methodology and conduct its analyses to better 
understand these revealed patterns.  The results obtained from using Q methodology and a 
preliminary analysis of these revealed patterns are provided in the first section.  Through each 
pattern’s factor arrays, we explore which approach and which policy objectives of fiscal 
decentralization these patterns tend to be in favor of.  The second section of this chapter defines 
each pattern by identifying distinguishing statements and statements they feel very strongly 
about.  The third section of this chapter examines hypotheses formulated in the beginning of 
Chapter Five to see whether the organizations or positions officials served have impacts on their 
perception and attitudes toward fiscal decentralization.  In the final section, theories of fiscal 
decentralization are developed to conceptualize national-local relationships and policy actions of 
each revealed pattern in Taiwan.  It is hoped that at the end of this chapter, an in-depth 
understanding about these revealed patterns can be obtained. 
6.1 INTRODUCING FIVE REVEALED PATTERNS 
Based on the procedure described in Chapter Five, seven unrotated factors were obtained through 
Centorid factor analysis as shown in Appendix A.2.  Varimax rotation was then performed to 
reveal seven rotated factors.  The factor loadings of these seven rotated factors were examined, 
and the factors were further manually rotated to better reflect the interrelationship of 38 Q sorts 
based on their correlations.  Appendix A.3 shows the sequence according to which seven rotated 
factors were further rotated through PQMethod.  A five-factor solution was obtained through this 
process, and the result is presented in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1 Factor matrix table 
 QSORT Factor I Factor II Factor III Factor IV Factor V 
     1 05040801  0.6690X  0.0974 -0.1499 -0.0091  0.2062 
     2 05041801  0.4882X  0.1541  0.1787  0.2577  0.0263 
     3 05042601  0.2135  0.0963 -0.1133  0.4672X  0.1742 
     4 05042801  0.0744  0.1943  0.5912X  0.2422 -0.0099 
     5 05050501  0.1709  0.3234  0.2997 -0.0121  0.5483X 
     6 05050502 -0.0079  0.0886  0.6242X  0.2245  0.4106 
     7 05051301  0.2624   0.6923X  0.1404  0.0870 -0.2274 
     8 05052001  0.4342   0.0611  0.6214X -0.1825  0.0810 
     9 05052401  0.4294   0.5800X  0.2344  0.0448  0.0104 
   10 05052501  0.0142   0.6475X  0.2104  0.2686  0.0738 
   11 05052502  0.1565  0.3202  0.4933X -0.2035  0.1775 
   12 05052701  0.0753  0.5232 -0.0286 -0.0407  0.6787X 
   13 05053001  0.1778  0.4733X  0.2866  0.0503 -0.1354 
   14 05053002  0.5464X  0.1327  0.0906 -0.1488  0.0163 
   15 05060701  0.0603  0.4089  0.1219  0.3491  0.3185 
   16 05060801 -0.0735  0.6283X  0.1559  0.0180  0.0242 
   17 05060802  0.1464  0.5044  0.1788 -0.1891  0.4181 
   18 05060901  0.4796  0.4179  0.0847  0.0061  0.1586 
   19 05061001  0.0257  0.6704X -0.0874  0.1178  0.1134 
   20 05061002  0.2736  0.4938X -0.1982  0.1835  0.2148 
   21 05061501  0.2081  0.1462 -0.0963  0.4229  0.6216X 
   22 05061502  0.1283  0.0750 -0.0630  0.1111  0.4885X 
   23 05062101  0.0551  0.5918X -0.0388 -0.1218 -0.0049 
   24 05062102  0.6015X  0.1319  0.3459 -0.2716  0.1405 
   25 05062301  0.2932  0.0819  0.2794  0.0289  0.4534X 
   26 05062302  0.4166  0.4750  0.2349  0.1324  0.2439 
   27 05070501  0.2344  0.4899  0.2682 -0.0429  0.4290 
   28 05070701  0.0998  0.4317X  0.2908  0.1973  0.1644 
   29 05070702  0.4320  0.3752  0.1946 -0.1153  0.4135 
   30 05071501  0.3503  0.5370X  0.2276 -0.2095  0.1960 
   31 05072101  0.1475  0.5990X  0.2727 -0.1033  0.1750 
   32 05080201  0.0637  0.1799  0.5505X -0.0054  0.1329 
   33 05081701  0.3590  0.2428  0.2694  0.3430  0.4809 
   34 05082201  0.4727X  0.2808  0.0210 -0.0742  0.2612 
   35 05082401  0.4100  0.4296  0.3521  0.3141  0.2174 
   36 05083101 -0.0859 -0.0089  0.1528  0.5978X  0.0828 
   37 05090501  0.6219X -0.2576 -0.0491  0.0394  0.3532 
   38 05091201  0.5795X -0.0716  0.4377 -0.1146  0.3281 
   % expl.Var 11 16 8 5 9 
   X indicates a defining sort 
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As we can see from Table 6.1, automatic pre-flagging was performed to highlight each Q 
sort’s association with these uncovered patterns.  Then each Q sort’s association was further 
subjectively examined to make sure the results of pre-flagging are acceptable.  In fact, 
association of some Q sorts is not obvious.  According to Table 6.1, there are eleven Q sorts that 
are significantly loaded with two factors.  In order to determine the association of these Q sorts, 
their two significant loadings were compared to see if one factor loading is much higher than the 
other one in order to make these subjective decisions.  The association of Q sorts 05050502, 
05052001, 05052401, 05052701, and 05061501 is determined after two significant factor 
loadings are compared.  On the contrary, although Q sorts 05060802, 05060901, 05062302, 
05070501, 05070702, and 05082401 also have two significant factor loadings, the difference is 
not large enough to tell which factor they should be assigned to.  As a result, these Q sorts are 
not assigned to any one of the factors. 
It should also be noted that Q sort 05060701’s factor loading for Factor II is .4089, which 
is very close to .41 to be significant.  Because there have been eleven Q sorts which are 
significantly loaded with Factor II and they should provide enough information to define Factor 
II, Q sort 05060701 is not assigned to Factor II.  Finally, although Q sort 05081701 has only one 
factor loading (.4809 for Factor V) greater than .41, it is decided not to assign the Q sort to 
Factor V because its factor loadings for the other four factors are relatively high. 
There are 30 Q sorts identified as significantly loaded with a factor.  As Table 6.1 
indicates, at .01 level, seven Q sorts are significantly associated with factor 1; eleven Q sorts are 
significantly associated with factor 2; five Q sorts are significantly associated with factor 3; two 
Q sorts are significantly associated with factor 4; and five Q sorts are significantly associated 
with factor 5.  Five uncovered factors represent five patterns of officials’ attitudes toward fiscal 
decentralization in this study. 
Nine out of 30 officials whose Q sorts are significantly loaded with a pattern are national 
officials, and the remaining 21 officials are working in local governments.  Pattern I consists of 
five national officials and two local officials.  All of the eleven officials significantly loaded with 
Pattern II are local officials.  Officials of Pattern III include two national officials and three local 
officials.  Both of the officials of Pattern IV are national officials.  All five of the officials 
significantly loaded with Pattern V are local officials. 
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Based on the procedure discussed in the previous chapter, the factor array of each pattern 
was obtained to represent their views, and these factor arrays are listed in Appendix B.1.  In 
order to see how each pattern agrees or disagrees with the Q statement selected to represent ideas 
of ten categories in the factorial design of this study, factor scores of the four Q statements 
within each category, as shown in Appendix B.2, were added up and presented in Table 6.2.  
Similarly, factor scores for Q statements expressing ideas of central control and local freedom 
were added up separately to provide insights concerning how each pattern thinks of these two 
approaches.  The results are presented in the Table 6.3.  Finally, factor scores of Q statements for 
five policy objectives were also added up to see each pattern’s emphasis on these policy 
objectives, and the results are shown in Table 6.4. 
 
Table 6.2 Sum of Factor Scores for each Category of Factorial Design 
 Central Control Local Freedom 
 Ef Au Ac D Eq Ef Au Ac D Eq 
Pattern I 0 6 13 9 -6 -4 -3 1 -10 -6 
Pattern II -3 9 0 2 -2 -1 -1 -5 7 -6 
Pattern III -6 11 -2 0 -5 -3 5 8 -6 -2 
Pattern IV 5 -2 0 0 4 -4 -6 11 0 -8 
Pattern V 7 8 1 5 0 -3 -7 1 -1 -11 
Ef = Efficiency; Au = Autonomy; Ac = Accountability; D = Development; Eq = Equity 
 
Table 6.3 Sum of Factor Scores for two Approaches of Fiscal Decentralization 
 Central Control Local Freedom 
Pattern I 22 -22 
Pattern II 6 -6 
Pattern III -2 2 
Pattern IV 7 -7 
Pattern V 21 -21 
 
Table 6.4 Sum of Factor Scores for Five Policy Objectives of Fiscal Decentralization 
 Ef Au Ac D Eq 
Pattern I -4 3 14 -1 -12 
Pattern II -4 8 -5 9 -8 
Pattern III -9 16 6 -6 -7 
Pattern IV 1 -8 11 0 -4 
Pattern V 4 1 2 4 -11 
Ef = Efficiency; Au = Autonomy; Ac = Accountability; D = Development; Eq = Equity 
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It is observed from the Table 6.3 that officials in charge of local public finance in Taiwan 
tend to be in favor of the centralist approach to pursue fiscal decentralization.  The sum of factor 
scores for Q statements expressing ideas of central control is 22, 6, -2, 7, and 21 for the five 
patterns.  As we can see, officials of Patterns I and V are the strongest supporters of the centralist 
approach.  Based on Table 6.2, equity is the only one among five policy objectives to receive a 
negative score from officials of Pattern I when a centralist approach is adopted.  However, this 
does not mean that they would prefer a localist approach to pursue equity because they also give 
a negative overall score to the Q statements in the category of equity-local freedom.  Therefore, 
it can be argued that officials of Pattern I support a centralist approach to pursue efficiency, 
autonomy, accountability, and development while officials of Pattern V believe that a centralist 
approach should be employed to pursue all of the five objectives identified in this study. 
Officials of Patterns II and IV show a moderate support for the centralist approach in 
general.  While strongly supporting a centralist approach to pursue autonomy, officials of Pattern 
II prefer a localist approach when it comes to the issue of local development.  Although officials 
of Pattern IV strongly support a localist approach to ensure local government accountability, they 
tend to support a centralist approach for achieving other objectives.  Therefore, a positive overall 
score for the centralist approach is the result of their preferences on adopting the centralist 
approach for the other four objectives.  Officials of Pattern III strongly support a centralist 
approach for increasing local autonomy, while they prefer a localist approach to ensuring local 
accountability.  There is no strong preference observed in agreeing or disagreeing with either 
approach to pursuing the remaining three policy objectives.  As a result, their overall score of -2 
for the centralist approach demonstrates that officials of Pattern III do not strongly prefer one 
approach to the other. 
We can observe in Table 6.4 that officials of Pattern I strongly agree with Q statements 
concerning accountability while disagreeing with Q statements on equity.  The high positive 
score on accountability reflects the fact that they strongly agree with a centralist approach to 
ensuring local accountability, but they do not oppose the localist approach for pursuing the same 
goal.  On the contrary, although they also strongly support a centralist approach for pursuing 
local development, the overall score for development is not high because they expressed their 
strong negative opinions on pursuing local development by a localist approach.  Their high 
negative score on equity shows their negative views on pursuing equity by either approach. 
  110
Officials of Pattern II place more emphases on issues of autonomy, development, and 
equity.  The high overall score on Q statements concerning autonomy is a direct result of their 
strong preference for increasing local autonomy through a centralist approach. Their high overall 
score on Q statements concerning development is a result of their strong preference for pursuing 
local development via a localist approach.  Similar to the officials of Pattern I, officials of Pattern 
II tend to disagree with Q statements concerning equity regardless of the approaches employed.  
Officials of Pattern III strongly agree with increasing local autonomy through a centralist 
approach and moderately agree with pursuing the same objectives via a localist approach.  On 
the other hand, they moderately disagree with Q statements concerning efficiency regardless of 
which approaches are employed to pursue it. 
Although they are not opposed to the centralist approach, officials of Pattern IV strongly 
support the idea of adopting a localist approach to ensure local accountability.  Their overall 
score for the issue of autonomy shows that they disagree with Q statements of improving local 
autonomy.  It should be noted that officials of Pattern IV also disagree with pursuing equity via a 
localist approach.  Officials of Pattern V demonstrate a strong opposition to pursuing equity 
through a localist approach.  They also strongly believe that a centralist approach should be 
adopted to pursue efficiency and local autonomy.  The fact that the overall score is 1 for Q 
statements concerning the issue of autonomy reflects their relatively strong support on adopting a 
centralist approach and their opposition to adopting a localist approach for pursuing the issue. 
Based on Tables 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 presented above, it is concluded that officials in Taiwan 
tend to support the centralist approach for pursuing fiscal decentralization in general.  Officials 
of Patterns I and V show a strongest support for adopting the centralist approach.  While officials 
of Pattern I emphasize the issues of accountability and development most, officials of Patterns II, 
III, and V are concerned with more with the issue of improving local autonomy.  In addition, 
officials of Pattern I support a centralist approach to pursue the issue of efficiency.  On the other 
hand, it should also be noted that although adopting the centralist approach is often the rule of 
thumb, officials of Patterns III and IV support the idea of ensuring local accountability via a 
localist approach, while officials of Pattern II prefer a localist approach to pursue local 
development.  These patterns will be further understood and defined based on the scores they 
ranked each Q statement. 
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6.2 DEFINING AND UNDERSTANDING PATTERNS 
Based on the preliminary analysis conducted in the first section, we can concluded that, 
in general, officials in Taiwan tend to support the centralist approach for pursuing fiscal 
decentralization.  Among five revealed patterns, Patterns I and V show the strongest support of 
the centralist approach.  Officials of Pattern I support the use of a centralist approach to pursue 
local accountability and development most, while officials of Patterns II, III, and V propose to 
adopt a centralist approach to improve local autonomy.  However, there are policy objectives that 
officials might prefer to pursue via a localist approach.  For example, officials of Patterns III and 
IV agree with ensuring local accountability through a localist approach, and officials of Pattern II 
would prefer a localist approach to pursue local development. 
Although these analyses can provide indications of how each of these patterns perceive 
fiscal decentralization, we cannot know exactly how each pattern agrees or disagrees with 
various issues of fiscal decentralization.  In this section, each pattern revealed in this research is 
further examined to increase our understanding in this respect.  Factor arrays of each pattern are 
studied to define, describe, characterize, and interpret each pattern’s views on how fiscal 
decentralization should be pursued.  Tables 6.5 to 6.9 summarize the main ideas of each pattern 
for the five policy objectives of this study.  Bold statements are ideas obtained from 
distinguishing statements, and numbers preceding each idea are the scores they received from 
each identified pattern. 
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Table 6.5 Summary of Each Pattern’s Main Ideas for Efficiency 
Pattern I ? (-4) The main purpose of granting intergovernmental aid is to offset inefficiency 
caused by the spillover effect.  (-4) Intergovernmental grants will foster local 
overspending. 
? (+3) Due to local politics, local spending keeps growing and becomes inefficient.
Pattern II ? (-4) Intergovernmental grants will foster local overspending.  (-3) The main 
purpose of granting intergovernmental aid is to offset inefficiency caused by the 
spillover effect. 
? (+3) It would be far more efficient to provide local public services at different 
levels. 
Pattern III ? (-4) Competition for tax reduction will happen if local governments obtain 
authority to determine tax bases and rates. 
? (-4) Intergovernmental grants will foster local overspending.  (-3) The main 
purpose of granting intergovernmental aid is to offset inefficiency caused by the 
spillover effect. 
Pattern IV ? (+4) Due to local politics, local spending keeps growing and becomes inefficient.
? (+3) Decentralization will facilitate local governments’ creativity. 
? (-3) Tax competition will enhance economic resource allocation. 
? (-2) It would be far more efficient to provide local public services at different 
levels. 
Pattern V ? (+4) Due to local politics, local spending keeps growing and becomes inefficient.
? (+4) Competition for tax reduction will happen if local governments obtain 
authority to determine tax bases and rates.  (-4) Tax competition will enhance 
economic resource allocation. 
? (-3) The main purpose of granting intergovernmental aid is to offset inefficiency 
caused by the spillover effect. 
 
Table 6.6 Summary of Each Pattern’s Main Ideas for Autonomy 
Pattern I ? (-3) Local residents should be able to vote for local revenue collection. 
Pattern II ? (4) The national government should reduce the amount of conditional grants 
to allow more local flexibility. 
? (-4) Local residents should be able to vote for local revenue collection. 
? (3) The Law of Shared Tax should be enacted. 
? (3) Local government should have complete autonomy to set policy priorities. 
Pattern III ? (4) The Law of Shared Tax should be enacted. 
? (3) Itemize what local governments are prohibited to do. 
? (3) Self-governance and local fiscal systems should be enacted into law. 
? (3) Local government should have complete autonomy to set policy priorities. 
Pattern IV ? (-4) Itemize what local governments are prohibited to do. 
? (-2) The Law of Shared Tax should be enacted. 
Pattern V ? (-4) Local residents should be able to vote for local revenue collection. 
? (3) Self-governance and local fiscal systems should be enacted into law. 
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Table 6.7 Summary of Each Pattern’s Main Ideas for Accountability 
Pattern I ? (+4) The national government should have the authority to monitor and 
control local governments’ fiscal behavior. 
? (+4) The Law on Local Budgeting should be enacted to monitor local 
budgeting processes and implementation. 
? (+4) Local government officials should establish the notion of paying local 
services by local revenues. 
? (+3) The national government should establish a mechanism to reward or punish 
local governments in order to ensure a link between local public service provision 
and local tax collection. 
Pattern II ? (-4) A system of referenda on local fiscal issues should be established to hold 
local government officials accountable. 
? (-3) Only after local people feel the pain of paying taxes, will they ask local 
officials for more cost reduction and effectiveness improvement. 
Pattern III ? (+4) Local people should be encouraged to get involved in the local policy 
making process to better hold local officials accountable. 
? (+4) Local government officials should establish the notion of paying local 
services by local revenues. 
? (-4) The Law on Local Budgeting should be enacted to monitor local 
budgeting processes and implementation. 
? (-3) The national government should have the authority to monitor and control 
local governments’ fiscal behavior. 
? (+3) The national government should establish a set of objective indicators to 
evaluate and ensure local fiscal efforts. 
Pattern IV ? (+4) Local government officials should establish the notion of paying local 
services by local revenues. 
? (+3) A system of referenda on local fiscal issues should be established to hold 
local government officials accountable. 
? (+3) Local people should be encouraged to get involved in the local policy 
making process to better hold local officials accountable. 
? (-3) The national government should have the authority to monitor and control 
local governments’ fiscal behavior. 
Pattern V ? (+3) Local people should be encouraged to get involved in the local policy 
making process to better hold local officials accountable. 
? (-3) The Law on Local Budgeting should be enacted to monitor local budgeting 
processes and implementation. 
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Table 6.8 Summary of Each Pattern’s Main Ideas for Development 
Pattern I ? (-4) Reliance on national grants will result in an imbalance of local 
development. 
? (+3) National grants can stimulate local private investments. 
? (+3) When sufficient financial resources are retained, the national government 
will be better able to fund projects for balanced growth among localities. 
? (-3) Reliance on national transfers makes comprehensive local development 
planning impossible. 
? (+2) The national government should organize a technical assistance team to 
help local financial planning. 
Pattern II ? (+4) Money and power are centralized to make local governments unable to 
actively design and implement local development projects. 
? (+4) The national government should guarantee local governments sufficient 
financial resources to support their basic public programs. 
? (+3) Reliance on national transfers makes comprehensive local development 
planning impossible. 
? (-2) When sufficient financial resources are retained, the national 
government will be better able to fund projects for balanced growth among 
localities. 
Pattern III ? (-3) Money and power are centralized to make local governments unable to 
actively design and implement local development projects. 
Pattern IV ? (+4) Reliance on national transfers makes comprehensive local development 
planning impossible. 
? (-4) Money and power are centralized to make local governments unable to 
actively design and implement local development projects. 
? (-3) National grants can stimulate local private investments.  
Pattern V ? (+4) The national government should guarantee local governments sufficient 
financial resources to support their basic public programs. 
? (+3) When sufficient financial resources are retained, the national government 
will be better able to fund projects for balanced growth among localities. 
? (-2) The national government should organize a technical assistance team to 
help local financial planning. 
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Table 6.9 Summary of Each Pattern’s Main Ideas for Equity 
Pattern I ? (-3) If local governments get involved in the policies to promote equity, local 
economic resources will be drained. 
? (-3) Local governments can achieve distributional objectives by getting involved 
in policy areas such as education, medical care, or housing assistance. 
Pattern II ? (-3) If a local government performs redistribution functions, rich residents will 
move out and the poor will move in. 
? (-3) Local governments can achieve distributional objectives by getting involved 
in policy areas such as education, medical care, or housing assistance. 
Pattern III ? (-3) If local governments get involved in the policies to promote equity, local 
economic resources will be drained. 
? (-2) Local governments are incapable of dealing with unemployment, 
inflation, and income redistribution. 
Pattern IV ? (-4) Local governments can achieve distributional objectives by getting involved 
in policy areas such as education, medical care, or housing assistance.  (+3) Local 
governments are incapable of dealing with unemployment, inflation, and income 
redistribution. 
? (-3) If revenues collected from the progressive income tax can be the source for 
intergovernmental grants, income distribution will be better equalized. 
? (+2) If a local government performs redistribution functions, rich residents 
will move out and the poor will move in. 
Pattern V ? (-4) Locating more responsibility for redistributive policy with local 
governments allows them to design welfare programs that are more 
appropriate to their own needs and better reflect local preferences. 
? (+3) If revenues collected from the progressive income tax can be the source 
for intergovernmental grants, income distribution will be better equalized. 
? (-3) Local governments are expected to respond creatively and effectively if 
given increased responsibility for welfare policy. 
? (-3) Redistributive policies can also be a local public good. 
 
6.2.1 Defining and Understanding Officials of Pattern I 
Officials significantly loaded with Pattern I demonstrate a strong belief in the centralist approach 
of pursuing fiscal decentralization.  They believe that the benefits of fiscal decentralization can 
only be realized if the national government closely monitors and controls the reform process to 
ensure local fiscal accountability and facilitate local development.  What makes officials of 
Pattern I differ from officials of other patterns can be understood based on the statements 02, 32, 
31, 37, 16, 30, and 19.  These statements are surrounding two general themes: strengthening 
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local accountability and getting national government involved in local development.  These 
distinguishing statements are presented in the following (bold statements are distinguishing 
statements; and scores in parenthesis are for Patterns I, II, III, IV, and V, respectively). 
 
02. The national government should have the authority to monitor and 
control local governments’ practices in raising debts, budgeting, taxing, 
and collecting other local revenues. (+4, -1, -3, -3, +1) 
 
32. The Law on Local Budgeting, which includes penalties for unlawful 
practices, should be enacted to strengthen the ability of the Ministry of 
Finance and Directorate General of Budget Accounting and Statistics in 
the national government to monitor local budgeting processes and 
implementation. (+4, -1, -4, 0, -3) 
 
31. Grants from the national government can stimulate local private 
investments. (+3, -1, -1, -3, 0) 
 
37. The national government should organize a technical assistance team 
to help each local government develop a financial plan based on their 
unique economic activities to ensure sufficient financial resources for local 
development. (+2, +1, 0, 0, -2) 
 
16. Reliance on national grants will lead local governments to ignore 
projects not funded by the central government, resulting in an imbalance 
of local development. (-4, -2, -2, 0, 0) 
 
30. Local governments’ decisions on resource allocation will better reflect 
local interests because they are closer to local people. (-1, +2, +1, 0, +1) 
 
19. Tax competition will enhance the efficiency of economic resource 
allocation. (0, -2, -2, -3, -4) 
 
Officials of Pattern I strongly support a national monitoring and controlling mechanism.  
Considering the fact that five out of seven officials loaded significantly with Pattern I are 
national officials, it is not surprising to see their emphasis on the role of the national government 
to make sure that fiscal decentralization is properly carried out.  Among five policy objectives 
identified in this study, local fiscal accountability is most critical to them.  Based on the scores 
they give to statements 02 and 32, they strongly agree that the national government should have 
the authority to monitor and control all aspects of local fiscal behavior and that the Law on Local 
Budgeting should be enacted to establish such mechanism.  Both of these two statements were 
developed from the accountability–central control category in the factorial design of this study. 
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Officials of Pattern I also share a view that the national government can make positive 
impacts on local development by providing financial assistance in a form of intergovernmental 
grants to facilitate local development and stimulate the local economy.  Compared to officials of 
the other patterns, they tend to hold a stronger belief that the national government can make 
positive impacts on local development by providing national grants and technical assistance.  
They are the only group of officials to rank statement 31 positively, demonstrating their strong 
belief that national grants can help local economic development by stimulating local private 
investments.  Based on the score given to statement 37, they also had a relative strong view on 
the national government providing technical assistance to local financial management and 
development planning.  The negative score of -4 given to statement 16 further demonstrates that 
they really do not believe that providing national grants would result in an imbalance of local 
development or make comprehensive local planning impossible.  The fact that Pattern I is the 
only pattern to rank statement 30 negatively further confirms their belief that the national 
government should play a role in making local planning decisions.  It should be noted that 
statements 31 and 37 are statements from the category of development-central control while 
statements 16 and 30 are statements from the category of development-local freedom. 
Finally, Pattern I officials are the only group of officials who did not express a negative 
opinion on tax competition when they scored statement 19 at 0.  In other words, even with the 
risk that competition in tax reduction will occur, they still believe that decentralization of local 
revenue collection is the right direction for the reform.  This view is also confirmed by the recent 
efforts of the national government to grant local governments authority to raise local taxes 
through the passage of the General Law on Local Taxation.  In fact, as discussed in Chapter Four, 
the General Law on Local Taxation only authorizes local governments to increase existing taxes 
or impose new taxes while not allowing local governments to make tax cuts.  In other words, 
their neutral view on statement 19 might also be a reflection of their belief that tax competition 
will not happen in Taiwan as long as the national government can closely control and properly 
design the process of fiscal decentralization. 
In addition to the statements discussed above, statements 06, 11, and 34 are strongly 
agreed with by the officials of Pattern I although they are not distinguishing statements.  
Officials of Pattern I scored the statement 06 at +3 to express their deep concern that local 
politics and elections have made local spending irrational, and financial resources decentralized 
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would be used to reward political loyalty.  Therefore, as we have discovered from distinguishing 
statements discussed, officials of Pattern I strongly believe that a national mechanism to control 
and monitor local fiscal behavior is necessary.  They also strongly agreed with the statement 11 
to show their support of establishing a national mechanism to reward or punish local 
governments in order for local governments to take more responsibility in paying for their local 
services.  It is argued that when local governments share more responsibility to pay for local 
services, it is more likely that they will make spending decisions more rationally.  Officials of 
Pattern I also scored the statement 34 at +4 to confirm their hope that the notion of paying local 
services by local revenues should be established and provide additional evidence to explain why 
they are the only group of officials who do not worry about tax competition by not scoring 
statement 19 negatively.  These three statements are presented in the following for reference. 
 
06. Due to local politics, interests lobbying, and pressure groups, local 
spending keeps growing and becomes inefficient. (+3, +1, +2, +4, +4) 
 
34. Local government officials should recognize the essence of local self-
governance, establish the notion of paying local services by local revenues, 
and aggressively collect own-source revenue based on the law. (+4, +2, +4, +4, 
+1) 
 
11. In order to ensure a link between local public service provision and local 
tax collection, the national government should establish a mechanism to 
reward or punish local governments. (+3, 0, +2, +2, +1) 
 
In conclusion, officials significantly loaded with Pattern I propose a centrally controlled 
approach to implement fiscal decentralization.  The analysis here also confirms earlier findings 
that they strongly support improving local accountability and development via a centralist 
approach.  They propose that the national government should continue to use intergovernmental 
grants as a policy tool to guide local fiscal behavior and local development.  As one of the 
officials in Pattern I argued, “considering the fact that Taiwan is small with condensed 
population, the national government should retain sufficient power and resources to make sure 
that local fiscal health would not get worse because of dysfunctional local politics” (2005091201, 
personal communication, September 12, 2005). 
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6.2.2 Defining and Understanding Officials of Pattern II 
Officials significantly loaded with Pattern II highlight the fact that local governments do not 
have sufficient revenue to pay for local services and development projects because the power and 
financial resources are highly centralized in the national government.  Therefore, they ask for 
more local financial resources to promote local development and more freedom to allocate 
nationally transferred funds.  There are five distinguishing statements to define these views, and 
they are statements 24, 22, 08, 40, and 12. 
 
24. Money and power are centralized to make local governments unable 
to actively design and implement local development projects. (-2, +4, -3, -4, 
0) 
 
40. When sufficient financial resources are retained, the national 
government will be better able to push development projects with 
national significance in order to promote balanced growth among 
localities. (+3, -2, 0, +2, +3) 
 
12. The national government should reduce the amount of conditional 
grants year by year to allow local governments more flexibility for 
resource allocation. (+1, +4, +2, +2, +2) 
 
08. Only after local people feel the pain of paying taxes, will they actively 
ask local government officials for more cost reduction and effectiveness 
improvement. (-1, -3, +1, +1, -1) 
 
22. In order to better hold local government officials accountable, a 
system of referenda on local fiscal issues should be established. (-2, -4, -1, 
+3, -2) 
 
Officials of Pattern II scored statement 24 at +4 to demonstrate their strong belief that 
power and money are highly centralized at the national government, and that local governments 
in Taiwan do not have sufficient financial resources to promote local development.  As one 
official indicated, “because the level of local revenue is highly controlled by the national 
government, every local government has deficits and does not have enough revenue to support 
their spending, including basic public infrastructure” (2005051301, personal communication, 
May 13, 2005).  It should be noted that they are also the only group of officials to rank statement 
24 positively.  Accordingly, officials of Pattern II are the only group of officials who disagreed 
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with statement 40, further demonstrating their belief that local governments should be given 
sufficient financial resources to promote local development. 
In addition to the issue of local development, officials of Pattern II hope to obtain more 
freedom on local resource allocation without the local people’s involvement in ensuring local 
accountability.  They are the only group of officials ranking statement 12 at +4 to show a strong 
belief that the national government should allow local governments more freedom to allocate 
nationally transferred funds by gradually replacing conditional grants with general-purpose 
grants.  In addition, officials of Pattern II are not enthusiastic about employing a localist 
approach to ensure local accountability.  They strongly disagree with the view that local people 
will be more likely to hold local officials accountable after they feel the pain of paying local 
taxes.  They ranked statement 08 at -3 to show this view.  They also strongly disagree with the 
ideas of allowing people to vote on matters of local finance, as they scored statement 22 at -4.  
They worry that local people are not capable of making fiscal choices for the community’s long-
term interest and development.  Once local people can vote and have a final say on local fiscal 
policies, they expect that local spending would grow rapidly while no one is going to agree to 
any proposal of increasing local taxes.  As one of the officials interviewed pointed out, “if we 
allowed local people to vote on local fiscal matters, it would not be helpful from a policymaking 
standpoint while it would certainly place a great constraint for local executive agencies to 
implement various policies” (2005052501, personal communication, May 25, 2005).  It should 
be noted that statements 08 and 22 are in the category of accountability-local freedom.  It can be 
said that while asking for more freedom to allocate local financial resources, officials of Pattern 
II do not want their freedom to be constrained by local people. 
There are seven non-distinguishing statements that are either highly agreed or disagreed 
with by officials of Pattern II.  Although these statements do not distinguish Pattern II from other 
patterns, they nonetheless provide additional information to further understand the views of 
Pattern II and will also be discussed.  They are statements 33, 21, 26, 03, 01, 18, and 13. 
 
33. The national government should guarantee local governments sufficient 
financial resources to support their basic public programs. (+1, +4, +1, +1, +4) 
 
21. Intergovernmental grants from the national government will foster local 
overspending. (-4, -4, -4, -2, -1) 
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26. Local government should have complete independent autonomy to set 
policy priorities for its administrative activities. (-2, +3, +3, -1, -1) 
 
03. It would be far more efficient to allow local governments to provide local 
public services at different levels than to regulate them under a uniform level 
set by the national government. (0, +3, +2, -2, +2) 
 
01. Local governments continually and chronically rely on national grants to 
support local spending needs, rendering comprehensive local development 
planning impossible. (-3, +3, -2, +4, -2) 
 
18. The Law of Shared Tax should be enacted to regulate standards, formulas, 
and procedures of shared tax distribution. (+2, +3, +4, -2, +2) 
 
13. Following certain administrative procedures, local residents should be able 
to vote on proposals for local revenue collection. (-3, -4, -1, +1, -4) 
 
When officials of Pattern II ask for more freedom to allocate nationally transferred funds, 
they also implicitly suggest that the national government should transfer more financial resources 
to address the problem of poor local fiscal health.  They confirmed this view by scoring 
statement 33 at +4 to argue that the national government should guarantee local government 
sufficient financial resources for local basic spending needs.  In addition, they scored statement 
21 at –4 to show their belief that intergovernmental grants would not foster local overspending to 
result in an efficiency loss.  Instead, more intergovernmental grants would help local 
governments to obtain more financial resources for meeting local spending needs. 
In addition to the use of intergovernmental aid for guaranteeing sufficient local revenue, 
officials of Pattern II further advocate for additional freedom to allocate these transferred funds.  
They gave high positive scores to statements 26, 03, 01, and 18 to show their strong desire for 
more local freedom.  They believe that decentralization would increase efficiency and that local 
governments should be allowed complete freedom to set local policy priorities.  They highly 
agree with the argument that most national grants are destined for specific purposes, making 
local governments unable to allocate these funds for long-term local development.  They also 
agree that the Law of Shard Tax should be enacted to minimize the national government’s ability 
to interfere with local revenue allocation through the power to determine the standard, formulas, 
and procedures of distributing national shared tax. 
Finally, similar to the idea expressed by the statement 22, which is a distinguishing 
statement of Pattern II, statement 13 proposes the idea to allow people to vote on issues of local 
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revenue collection, and it also received a strong negative score (-4) from Pattern II officials.  
However, it is noted that statement 13 is not a distinguishing statement of Pattern II because the 
statement also received a high negative score from Patterns I and V.  Statement 22, on the other 
hand, received a high negative score from only Pattern II.  It is observed that when allowing 
people to vote on local fiscal issues is viewed as a mechanism to hold local officials accountable, 
the idea becomes more acceptable to officials of Patterns I, IV, and V, but it remains strongly 
disagreed with by officials of Pattern II. 
Pattern II, consisting of eleven local officials and no national official, represents the 
views of local officials.  They propose that local autonomy should be improved through a 
centralist approach while a localist approach is best suited for achieving local development.  
They hope to address the problem of insufficient local revenue through transferring more 
national revenue to local governments via general grants while allowing local officials more 
freedom to allocate local funds for local programs and development projects.  It should also be 
noted that officials of Pattern II hold a strong belief that allowing local people to vote on local 
fiscal matters would be problematic regardless of whether it is designed to improve local 
accountability or not. 
6.2.3 Defining and Understanding Officials of Pattern III 
There are five officials significantly loaded with Pattern III, two from the national level and three 
from the local level.  As we will discuss later in this chapter, Pattern III is the only pattern in 
which no clear indication exists regarding whether the pattern should be categorized as a view 
more likely to be shared by national officials or by local officials.  Officials of this pattern tend 
to be concerned with the issue of local autonomy and accountability most. 
As discussed earlier, they agree with employing a centralist approach to improve local 
autonomy, but prefer a localist approach to ensure local accountability.  They argue that the 
national government should trust local governments more and should not interfere with local 
policymaking.  As one official said, “the national government should give local governments a 
chance; and do not distrust local governments from the beginning” (2005052502, personal 
communication, May 25, 2005).  In general, officials of Pattern III tend to emphasize that local 
governments should have autonomy to set local priorities, and they are against the national 
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government over-controlling local fiscal affairs.  There are seven distinguishing statements to 
define Pattern III.  They are statements 09, 32, 35, 25, 17, 04, and 15. 
 
0910. The principle of regulating local governments is to itemize what they 
are prohibited to do. (+1, 0, +3, -4, 0) 
 
32. The Law on Local Budgeting, which includes penalties for unlawful 
practices, should be enacted to strengthen the ability of the Ministry of 
Finance and Directorate General of Budget Accounting and Statistics in 
the national government to monitor local budgeting processes and 
implementation. (+4, -1, -4, 0, -3) 
 
35. Over decentralization will make a consistent nation-wide fiscal policy 
impossible, resulting in an even more severe fiscal imbalance among 
localities. (+2, 0, -1, 0, +2) 
 
25. Once local government officials obtain authority to determine local tax 
bases and rates, it is easy for them to engage in a competition for tax 
reduction. (-1, -1, -4, 0, +4) 
 
17. Local governments are expected to respond creatively and effectively 
if given increased responsibility for welfare policy. (-1, 0, +1, -2, -3) 
 
04. Generally speaking, local governments can achieve distributional 
objectives by getting involved in policy areas such as education, medical 
care, or housing assistance. (-3, -3, 0, -4, -1) 
 
15. Local governments are incapable of dealing with unemployment, 
inflation, and income redistribution successfully. (-1, +2, -2, +3, +1) 
 
Officials of Pattern III emphasize trust in local governments and the need for local 
autonomy to set local priorities.  They strongly agreed with statement 09 to show their belief that 
the national government, instead of detailing what local governments can do, should only specify 
what local governments are prohibited to do in order to provide more room for local freedom and 
creativity.  They are strongly against the idea of enacting the Law on Local Budgeting to avoid 
over-controlling by the national government.  Based on Appendix A.9, officials of Pattern III 
                                                 
10It should be noted that statements 09, 32, and 25 are selected as distinguishing statements for two patterns.  For 
statement 09, Pattern III ranked it highly positive, but Pattern IV ranked it highly negative.  Statement 09 
distinguishes Pattern III from other patterns because Pattern III is the only pattern to rank it highly positive.  On the 
contrary, the statement distinguishes Pattern IV from other patterns because Pattern IV is the only pattern to rank it 
highly negative.  For statement 32, Pattern I ranked it highly positive while Pattern II ranked it highly negative.  
Finally, for statement 25, Pattern IIIranked it highly negative, but Pattern V ranked it highly positive.  These two 
statements are selected based on the same reason to select statement 09. 
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most disagree with statement 32 among all 40 statements.  In addition, they are the only group of 
officials to give statement 35 a negative score, showing that they do not worry about over 
decentralization as much as officials of other patterns do.  They ranked statement 25 at -4 to 
demonstrate their trust that local officials would not engage in a competition for tax reduction 
once they are granted authority to adjust the level of local taxation. 
Their trust in local officials’ ability to be creative in meeting local needs is also observed 
from the scores they gave to statement 17, 04, and 15 regarding the policy objective of equity.  
They are the only pattern to rank statement 17 positively.  In addition, they are the only group of 
officials to rank statement 04 at 0 while officials of Pattern I, II, and IV all strongly disagreed 
with the statement.  Compared to the officials of other patterns, they disagreed more with 
statement 15 to show they have more confidence in local governments’ ability to handle local 
redistributive policies.  Based on the scores they gave to these three statements, it is argued that 
officials of Pattern III are more open to the notion of getting local governments involved in 
making and providing local redistributive policies. 
In addition to the distinguishing statements used to define the pattern, additional 
informational can be obtained from statements that officials of Pattern III either highly agree or 
highly disagree with to further understand the views of Pattern III.  Officials of Pattern III 
strongly agreed with statements 26, 18, and 17 while strongly disagreeing with statement 02 to 
further demonstrate their view that more autonomy should be granted to local governments.  In 
statement 26, they argue that local government should have complete autonomy to set local 
policy priorities.  They propose that the national government should enact laws, not executive 
orders, to regulate all aspects of intergovernmental administrative and fiscal relationships in 
statements 18 and 07.  In a sense, these laws can be viewed as firewalls to protect local 
governments’ autonomy because national executive agencies will not have a free hand to amend 
these regulations.  By strongly disagreeing with statement 02, they oppose the idea that the 
national government should closely monitor and control local financial practices.  It is noted that 
they also expressed a similar view on statement 32, a distinguishing statement, to oppose 
national control and monitoring.  The following four statements reflect these views. 
 
26. Local government should have complete independent autonomy to set 
policy priorities for its administrative activities. (-2, +3, +3, -1, -1) 
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18. The Law of Shared Tax should be enacted to regulate standards, formulas, 
and procedures of shared tax distribution. (+2, +3, +4, -2, +2) 
 
07. The establishment of self-governance and local fiscal systems should be 
enacted into law. (+2, +1, +3, -1, +3) 
 
02. The national government should have the authority to monitor and control 
local governments’ practices in raising debts, budgeting, taxing, and collecting 
other local revenues. (+4, -1, -3, -3, +1) 
 
Finally, Pattern III is one of the two patterns that highly disagree with statement 24, 
showing their belief that local governments should not blame the national government for all 
local fiscal and development problems.  Sharing a similar view with officials of Patterns I and IV 
on statement 34, they highly agree that local governments should share more responsibility to 
raise local taxes rather than hoping to get more national grants.  In order to improve local fiscal 
accountability, they believe that both the national government and local people should be 
involved in the process.  They strongly agree with the idea to get local people more involved in 
the policymaking process by scoring statement 36 at +4.  They hope that local people can be 
educated in the process and eventually become a force to better hold their local officials 
accountable.  By ranking statement 29 at +3, they highly agree that the national government 
should establish a set of objective indicators in order to monitor and access the fiscal 
performance of local governments.  It should be noted again that these four statements do not 
distinguish officials of Pattern III from officials of other patterns, but they nonetheless represent 
the ideas that officials of Pattern III feel strongly about.  They are presented in the following. 
 
24. Money and power are centralized to make local governments unable to 
actively design and implement local development projects. (-2, +4, -3, -4, 0) 
 
34. Local government officials should recognize the essence of local self-
governance, establish the notion of paying local services by local revenues, 
and aggressively collect own-source revenue based on the law. (+4, +2, +4, +4, 
+1) 
 
36. Local people should be encouraged to get involved in the local policy 
making process to realize the costs and benefits of local services, and to better 
hold local officials accountable for local spending. (0, 0, +4, +3, +3) 
 
29. The national government should establish a set of objective indicators to 
evaluate local fiscal efforts and take them into account in the mechanism of 
distributing national shared tax revenue and intergovernmental transfers. (+2, 
+2, +3, +1, +2) 
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 In summation, officials of Pattern III emphasize that the national government should 
avoid interfering in local policymaking and administration.  Compared to officials of other 
patterns, officials of Pattern III have more confidence and trust in local governments.  They 
believe that local governments should be allowed sufficient autonomy to set local priorities and 
allocate their funds accordingly.  In addition, they are more open to the notion of getting local 
governments involved in making and providing local redistributive policies.  On the other hand, 
they also worry that local governments would abuse their new power and autonomy gained 
through fiscal decentralization.  Therefore, although not distinguishing them from officials of 
other patterns, officials of Pattern III emphasize the importance of getting both local people and 
the national government involved in holding local officials accountable for their policy decisions. 
6.2.4 Defining and Understanding Officials of Pattern IV 
Officials of Pattern IV place a high emphasis on a bottom-up approach to ensure fiscal 
accountability.  They believe that people should be encouraged to participate in the local 
policymaking process and that the national government should only play a limited role in the 
process of fiscal decentralization.  There are eleven distinguishing statements to define the 
pattern, but only four of them received a highly positive or negative score.  These distinguishing 
statements are statements 23, 03, 09, 39, 31, 22, 13, 07, 18, 20, and 10. 
 
23. Decentralization will facilitate local governments’ creativity to 
differentiate service provisions for meeting different needs. (0, +2, +1, +3, 
0) 
 
03. It would be far more efficient to allow local governments to provide 
local public services at different levels than to regulate them under a 
uniform level set by the national government. (0, +3, +2, -2, +2) 
 
09. The principle of regulating local governments is to itemize what they 
are prohibited to do. (+1, 0, +3, -4, 0) 
 
22. In order to better hold local government officials accountable, a 
system of referenda on local fiscal issues should be established. (-2, -4, -1, 
+3, -2) 
 
  127
13. Following certain administrative procedures, local residents should be 
able to vote on proposals for local revenue collection. (-3, -4, -1, +1, -4) 
 
39. The main purpose of granting intergovernmental aid is to offset 
inefficiency caused by the spillover effect, which means benefits of local 
services can be enjoyed by residents in other jurisdictions. (-4, -3, -3, +1,   
-3) 
 
31. Grants from the national government can stimulate local private 
investments. (+3, -1, -1, -3, 0) 
 
07. The establishment of self-governance and local fiscal systems should 
be enacted into law. (+2, +1, +3, -1, +3) 
 
18. The Law of Shared Tax should be enacted to regulate standards, 
formulas, and procedures of shared tax distribution. (+2, +3, +4, -2, +2) 
 
20. A law should be enacted to regulate the system of intergovernmental 
transfer in order to minimize the possibility that national government 
would use intergovernmental transfers as a policy tool to intervene in 
local affairs. (+1, +1, +2, -1, +1) 
 
10. If a local government performs redistribution functions, such as social 
welfare policies, rich residents will move out and the poor will move in. (-
2, -3, 0, +2, -2) 
 
Officials of Pattern IV believe that decentralization will facilitate local governments’ 
creativity to meet different local needs by scoring statement 23 at +3.  However, they are the 
only group of officials who scored statement 03 negatively to show their doubt that 
decentralization of local service provision alone would improve efficiency.  In other words, 
decentralization of financial and administrative resources cannot cure all of the existing problems 
of poor local fiscal health.  In fact, based on their opinion on statements 09, 22, and 13, it is 
argued that officials of Pattern IV believe that local government should also behave properly in 
order to realize the full benefits of fiscal decentralization.  They strongly disagreed with 
statement 09 to show their belief that the administrative and fiscal relationship between the 
national and local governments should be clearly defined and specified for local governments to 
know how they are supposed to behave in a decentralized system.  Moreover, they further 
believe that local people should be allowed to vote on local fiscal policies in order to improve 
and ensure local fiscal accountability.  They are the only group of officials to strongly agree with 
statement 22 and to rank statement 13 positively. 
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Pattern IV officials believe that the national government should limit the use of 
intergovernmental transfers and play a limited role in regulating the local fiscal system.  They 
disagreed with the notion that the national government should use intergovernmental transfers to 
ensure local funding for local projects and development.  They are the only group of officials to 
rank statement 39 positively.  Rather than supporting the argument of the spillover effect, their 
positive view on statement 39 shows that they disagree with the notion held by many Taiwanese 
officials that the main purpose of granting intergovernmental aid is to provide sufficient local 
financial resources to local governments.  They also scored statement 31 at -3 to demonstrate 
their belief that national grants should not be considered as a policy tool for local economic 
development.  In other words, intergovernmental aid is not the cure to all of the problems 
encountered by local governments in Taiwan today.  Local governments have to take more 
responsibility to deal with local problems and be more accountable for their decisions. 
In addition, officials of Pattern IV advocate a limited use of national legislation to 
regulate aspects of the local fiscal system.  Based on the scores received by statements 07, 18, 
and 20, officials of Pattern IV are the only group of officials to rank these statements negatively.  
It is argued that although defining intergovernmental fiscal relationships by laws can ensure that 
the national executive agencies cannot intervene in local affairs through executive orders, these 
laws also create a uniform system that severely limits the flexibility of local governments to meet 
different local needs.  Considering the fact that they also ranked statement 09 negatively, it is 
argued that officials of Pattern IV would suggest that the national government only define 
general guidelines for the intergovernmental fiscal relationship while leaving enough room of 
autonomy for local governments to meet different local needs. 
Officials of Pattern IV tend to agree with the traditional notion that equity or 
redistribution should be a function of the national government and that local governments should 
not handle redistributive policies.  They are the only group of officials to rank statement 10 
positively to confirm this opinion.  It should also be noted that many officials participating in the 
study believe that rich residents moving out will not happen in Taiwan because Taiwan has a 
highly centralized local fiscal system where a clear relationship between the level of social 
welfare policy and the level of local taxation does not exist.  Therefore, it is also argued that the 
opinion shared by officials of Pattern IV on statement 10 might reflect the fact that they are 
highly influenced by the ideas in the literature of local public finance.  In fact, one of the two 
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officials significantly loaded with Pattern IV is a scholar, and the other official is highly 
influenced by a former minister, who is also a scholar. 
In addition to the distinguishing statements discussed, there are nine statements that were 
ranked either highly positive or highly negative by officials of Pattern IV.  These statements 
provide additional information that can further our understanding about the views possessed by 
officials of Pattern IV.  These statements include 06, 34, 01, 24, 15, 04, 38, 02, and 36. 
 
06. Due to local politics, interests lobbying, and pressure groups, local 
spending keeps growing and becomes inefficient. (+3, +1, +2, +4, +4) 
 
34. Local government officials should recognize the essence of local self-
governance, establish the notion of paying local services by local revenues, 
and aggressively collect own-source revenue based on the law. (+4, +2, +4, +4, 
+1) 
 
01. Local governments continually and chronically rely on national grants to 
support local spending needs, rendering comprehensive local development 
planning impossible. (-3, +3, -2, +4, -2) 
 
24. Money and power are centralized to make local governments unable to 
actively design and implement local development projects. (-2, +4, -3, -4, 0) 
 
15. Local governments are incapable of dealing with unemployment, inflation, 
and income redistribution successfully. (-1, +2, -2, +3, -1) 
 
04. Generally speaking, local governments can achieve distributional 
objectives by getting involved in policy areas such as education, medical care, 
or housing assistance. (-3, -3, 0, -4, -1) 
 
38. If revenues collected from the progressive income tax can be the source for 
intergovernmental grants, income distribution will be better equalized. (0, -2, 0, 
-3, +3) 
 
02. The national government should have the authority to monitor and control 
local governments’ practices in raising debts, budgeting, taxing, and collecting 
other local revenues. (+4, -1, -3, -3, +1) 
 
36. Local people should be encouraged to get involved in the local policy 
making process to realize the costs and benefits of local services, and to better 
hold local officials accountable for local spending. (0, 0, +4, +3, +3) 
 
Officials of Pattern IV scored statement 06 at +4, showing their strong concern that 
dysfunctional local politics has become a problem of inefficiency and local overspending.  They 
ranked statement 34 at +4 to further demonstrate their belief that local governments should take 
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more responsibility to deal with local fiscal problems.  It is noted that they scored statements 01 
and 24 at +4 and -4, respectively.  This is puzzling because both of these two statements were 
classified in the category of development-local freedom when the Q statements were developed.  
One official belonging to this pattern pointed out that local governments are highly dependent on 
the national grants to make up budget shortfalls (2005042601, personal communication, April 6, 
2005).  This indicates that officials of Pattern IV believe that the problem is local governments’ 
dependence on national grants, not that the national government intentionally keeps the money 
and power at the center.  In fact, these ideas further confirm earlier discussion that officials of 
Pattern IV believe that local governments should take more responsibility to deal with their own 
problems, including poor local fiscal health. 
As mentioned in the earlier discussion, officials of Pattern IV believe that equity or 
redistribution should be addressed by the national government, not local governments.  This 
view is further confirmed by their strong positive view on statement 15 as well as their strong 
negative view on statement 04.  It should also be noted that officials of Pattern IV strongly 
disagreed with statement 38 that the national government can equalize income distribution by 
transferring national revenue collected from progressive income tax to local governments.  This 
view might also indirectly show that they do not agree with using the revenue collected from 
income tax as a revenue source for intergovernmental transfers. 
Finally, the scores received by statements 02 and 36 provide additional evidence that 
officials of Pattern IV would like the national government to play a limited role in the process of 
fiscal decentralization and would welcome bottom-up participation to ensure local fiscal 
accountability.  They ranked statement 02 at -3 to further demonstrate their idea that fiscal 
accountability should be ensured from the bottom, not from the top.  In other words, a localist 
approach should be adopted to ensure local fiscal accountability.  In fact, consistent with their 
opinion expressed on statements 22 and 13, they strongly agreed with statement 36 that local 
people should be encouraged to participate in the local policy process in order to enhance local 
fiscal accountability.  Although officials of Patterns III and V also strongly agreed with 
statement 36, it should be noted that they are not ready to join officials of Pattern IV by agreeing 
with the idea of allowing people to vote on local fiscal policies. 
There are only two national officials significantly loaded with Pattern IV.  One of them is 
a scholar, and the other is highly influenced by his former minister, who is also a scholar.  The 
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analysis in this subsection demonstrated that officials of Pattern IV hold views shared by many 
Taiwanese scholars.  They prefer a bottom-up approach to ensuring local fiscal accountability 
and pursuing local development.  The national government should limit the use of national grants 
and play a limited role in regulating the local fiscal system.  Officials of Pattern IV encourage 
people to participate in the local policymaking process, and, in fact, Pattern IV is the only pattern 
that shows a strong positive view on allowing people to vote on local fiscal issues. 
6.2.5 Defining and Understanding Officials of Pattern V 
Officials of Pattern V focus on addressing two of the most critical problems faced by local 
governments in Taiwan today, including insufficient local revenue and dysfunctional local 
politics.  They admitted that there are many local problems that need to be addressed and that 
local governments are incapable of dealing with these problems.  As a result, the national 
government should be involved in the process to deal with these problems.  Recalled from our 
discussion at the beginning of this chapter, officials of Patterns I and V are the strongest 
supporters of the centralist approach.  Six distinguishing statements are identified to define 
Pattern V.  These statements include statements 25, 38, 37, 27, 05, and 17. 
 
25. Once local government officials obtain authority to determine local tax 
bases and rates, it is easy for them to engage in a competition for tax 
reduction. (-1, -1, -4, 0, +4) 
 
38. If revenues collected from the progressive income tax can be the 
source for intergovernmental grants, income distribution will be better 
equalized. (0, -2, 0, -3, +3) 
 
37. The national government should organize a technical assistance team 
to help each local government develop a financial plan based on their 
unique economic activities to ensure sufficient financial resources for local 
development. (+2, +1, 0, 0, -2) 
 
27. Locating more responsibility for redistributive policy with local 
governments allows them to design welfare programs that are more 
appropriate to their own needs and better reflect the preferences of their 
residents. (-2, -1, -1, -1, -4) 
 
05. Redistributive policies can also be a local public good implemented by 
local governments. (0, -2, -2, -1, -3) 
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17. Local governments are expected to respond creatively and effectively 
if given increased responsibility for welfare policy. (-1, 0, 1, -2, -3) 
 
Officials of Pattern V seem to support the idea of transferring more national financial 
resources to local governments in order to deal with the problem of insufficient local revenue.  
They do not like the idea of granting local governments authority to adjust the level of local 
taxes.  By scoring statement 25 at +4, they expressed their deep concern that local governments 
would engage in a dysfunctional competition to lower local taxes once they have the authority to 
make local tax cuts.  In fact, they are the only group of officials expressing a positive view on the 
statement to demonstrate this concern. 
In addition, they are also the only group of officials to rank statement 38 positively and 
statement 37 negatively.  They agree with the idea to use the revenue collected from income tax 
as a revenue source to fund intergovernmental grants.  It is reasoned that income tax revenue, 
which is about half of the national tax revenue11, has been relatively stable in Taiwan over the 
years.  As a result, the positive view that they possess on statement 38 may only reflect the fact 
that they see income tax revenue as the largest and relatively stable tax revenue instead of seeing 
it as a viable redistributive policy.  In addition, their negative view on statement 37 further 
highlights their emphasis on providing local governments financial assistance rather than 
assistance in other forms.  These views provide additional evidence to show their support for 
transferring more national funds to deal with the problem of local fiscal health. 
Officials of Pattern V expressed a strong negative opinion on pursuing equity and 
redistribution through a localist approach.  They believe that equity and redistribution should be 
pursued by the national government.  They are strongly against the notion that local governments 
should get involved in equity or redistributive policies by scoring statements 27, 05, and 17 at -4, 
-3, and -3, respectively.  They do not believe that decentralizing more responsibility of making 
and implementing redistributive policies would allow local governments to better meet local 
needs by providing welfare programs creatively and effectively. 
In addition to the six distinguishing statements, there are nine statements that were ranked 
either highly positive or highly negative by officials of Pattern V.  They add additional 
                                                 
11 In FY 2005, income tax revenue accounted for about 46% of the total tax revenues (Yearbook of Financial 
Statistics, Republic of China, 2004: p. 66-67). 
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information to our understanding about the views shared by officials of Pattern V, and they will 
be discussed.  These statements include statements 06, 19, 36, 13, 07, 32, 33, 40, and 39. 
 
06. Due to local politics, interests lobbying, and pressure groups, local 
spending keeps growing and becomes inefficient. (+3, +1, +2, +4, +4) 
 
19. Tax competition will enhance the efficiency of economic resource 
allocation. (0, -2, -2, -3, -4) 
 
36. Local people should be encouraged to get involved in the local policy 
making process to realize the costs and benefits of local services, and to better 
hold local officials accountable for local spending. (0, 0, +4, +3, +3) 
 
13. Following certain administrative procedures, local residents should be able 
to vote on proposals for local revenue collection. (-3, -4, -1, +1, -4) 
 
07. The establishment of self-governance and local fiscal systems should be 
enacted into law. (+2, +1, +3, -1, +3) 
 
32. The Law on Local Budgeting, which includes penalties for unlawful 
practices, should be enacted to strengthen the ability of the Ministry of 
Finance and Directorate General of Budget Accounting and Statistics in the 
national government to monitor local budgeting processes and 
implementation. (+4, -1, -4, 0, -3) 
 
33. The national government should guarantee local governments sufficient 
financial resources to support their basic public programs. (+1, +4, +1, +1, +4) 
 
40. When sufficient financial resources are retained, the national government 
will be better able to push development projects with national significance in 
order to promote balanced growth among localities. (+3, -2, 0, +2, +3) 
 
39. The main purpose of granting intergovernmental aid is to offset 
inefficiency caused by the spillover effect, which means benefits of local 
services can be enjoyed by residents in other jurisdictions. (-4, -3, -3, +2, -3) 
 
Reflecting on the score that they gave to statement 06, many officials of Pattern V 
pointed out that local elected representatives are not serving as a check and balance against local 
executive agencies.  Rather, they try to obtain resources to reward their political supporters 
(2005061501, personal communication, June 15, 2005; 2005050501, personal communication, 
May 5, 2005).  Therefore, these local representatives would only care if local funds were spent to 
meet their political interests, not if these funds were spent to pursue welfare of the public.  From 
a revenue collection standpoint, local elected representatives would ask for more tax cuts or, at 
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least, for no tax increase.  Accordingly, they do not believe that tax competition would enhance 
efficiency, as evidenced by their scoring statement 19 at -4. 
To address the problem of dysfunctional local politics, they believe that local people 
should be encouraged to participate in the local policymaking process, as evidenced by their 
scoring statement 36 at +3.  They hope that people’s participation in the policy process would 
make them better realize the costs and benefits of local services and use this knowledge to hold 
their local elected officials accountable.  However, they are not ready to support the idea of 
allowing local people to vote on local fiscal issues as they ranked statement 13 at -4.  On the 
other hand, they believe that local governments should be allowed more autonomy to meet local 
needs.  Based on their strong positive view on statement 07, they advocate restricting the 
national government’s ability to interfere in local affairs by using law, not executive orders, to 
regulate national-local administrative and fiscal relationships.  By scoring statement 32 at -3, 
they show their strong opinion against the enactment of the Law on Local Budgeting, which 
includes penalties for unlawful practices, to strengthen the ability of the national government to 
monitor and control local financial activities.  As one official indicated, “local officials working 
at either finance or accounting and statistics are often playing a role of brakemen in the local 
government.  Enacting the Law on Local Budgeting would not be fair to them since they will be 
the officials to get punished, not elected officials who actually make decisions” (2005052701, 
personal communication, May 27, 2005). 
Finally, in terms of addressing the problem of insufficient local revenue, they strongly 
agreed with statement 33 that the national government should guarantee local governments 
sufficient revenue to support their basic local spending needs.  As one official interviewed said 
that “the national government should use a stable revenue source to fund intergovernmental 
grants, and should not think about how to financially assist local governments only after national 
spending needs are met” (2005061501, personal communication, June 15, 2005).  For this reason, 
they agree that the national government should retain sufficient financial resources in order to 
help local governments financially by scoring statement 40 at +3.  They ranked statement 39 at -
3 to indicate their belief that national grants are a policy tool to provide local financial assistance 
for meeting local basic spending needs, not to offset the spillover effect. 
All five officials significantly loaded with Pattern V are from the local level, but they 
demonstrate a strong preference to employ a centralist approach to pursue fiscal decentralization.  
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Officials of this pattern think that local governments should be given more autonomy to 
administer local programs and the national government should guarantee that local governments 
have revenue necessary to meet local basic spending needs.  They also emphasize the problem of 
dysfunctional local politics and insufficient local revenue.  They believe that local people should 
be encouraged to participate in local affairs, get more knowledge about local programs, and 
ultimately hold their elected officials accountable.  However, what distinguishes them from 
officials of other patterns is their strong negative opinion toward making and implementing 
redistributive policies by local governments.  After views of the five patterns are defined and 
understood, background factors will be examined in the next section to see whether they play a 
role in shaping these patterns’ different perceptions. 
6.3 BACKGROUND ANALYSIS OF REVEALED PATTERNS 
The focus of this section is to see whether background factors play a role in shaping the revealed 
patterns by examining the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter.  Factors examined 
include levels of government, duties performed within each level of government, types of local 
government, and local governments’ reliance on national transfers.  These analyses would allow 
us to see whether officials’ backgrounds would affect their perception of fiscal decentralization. 
This section begins with a brief discussion on officials loaded with one of the patterns 
and an examination of whether their views are affected by the levels of government they serve.  
Then national officials and local officials are examined separately to provide in-depth knowledge 
about these officials working at each level.  Based on the factor loadings obtained through Q 
methodology, 30 of 40 officials are loaded into one of the five patterns, as summarized by Table 
6.1.  Nine national officials and 21 local officials are significantly loaded with one of the 
revealed patterns.  Among national officials, five of them are loaded with Pattern I, two of them 
are loaded with Pattern III, and the remaining two officials are loaded with Pattern IV.  Among 
local officials, two of them are loaded with Patten I, eleven of them are loaded with Pattern II, 
three of them are loaded with Pattern III, and five of them are loaded with Pattern V.  Table 6.10 
provides background information for each of the loaded officials.  Information provided in Table 
6.10 is also used to perform background analysis of each revealed pattern. 
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Table 6.10 Pattern and background of loaded Q sorts 
Case 
Number 
Pattern Level of 
Government 
National Officials’ 
Duties 
Local Officials’ Duties Types of Local 
Government 
Reliance on 
National 
Transfers 
05040801 I National General grants and 
local budgeting 
- - - 
05041801 I National Local budgeting - - - 
05053002 I Local  - Accounting & Statistics Provincial City High 
05082201 I National Local financial 
management 
- - - 
05062102 I Local - Accounting & Statistics County High 
05090501 I National Categorical grants - - - 
05091201 I National Categorical grants - - - 
05051301 II Local - Accounting & Statistics Provincial City Moderate 
05052401 II Local - Accounting & Statistics Special City Low 
05052501 II Local  - Finance County High 
05053001 II Local - Finance Provincial City High 
05060801 II Local - Accounting & Statistics County High 
05061001 II Local - Finance County Very high 
05061002 II Local - Accounting & Statistics County Very high 
05062101 II Local - Finance County High 
05070701 II Local - Finance County Moderate 
05071501 II Local  - Finance Provincial City Low 
05072101 II Local - Finance County Very high 
05042801 III National Local taxes - - - 
05050502 III Local  - Accounting & Statistics County High 
05052001 III Local - Finance Special City Low 
05052502 III Local - Accounting & Statistics County High 
05080201 III National Local taxes - - - 
05042601 IV National Local financial 
management and 
national shared tax  
- - - 
05083101 IV National Local development - - - 
05050501 V Local - Finance County High 
05052701 V Local - Finance Provincial City Moderate 
05061501 V Local  - Finance County High 
05061502 V Local - Accounting & Statistics County High 
05062301 V Local - Finance Provincial City Moderate 
 
6.3.1 Overview and the Factor of Levels of Government 
Whether Taiwanese officials share a single pattern of attitudes toward fiscal decentralization (H1 
discussed in Chapter 5) is first examined.  Based on the results obtained from Q methodology, 
five patterns are revealed to represent the views of 30 out of 38 Taiwanese officials participating 
in the study.  Seven officials are significantly loaded with Pattern I, including five national 
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officials and 2 local officials.  Eleven officials are significantly loaded with Pattern II and all of 
them are working for local government.  Five officials are significantly loaded with Pattern III, 
including two national officials and three local officials.  Two national officials are significantly 
loaded with Pattern IV, with which no local official is loaded.  Finally, five officials are 
significantly loaded with Pattern V, and all of them are from local governments.  As described, it 
is clear that no single pattern of attitude toward fiscal decentralization can represent the views 
held by Taiwanese officials.  Therefore, H1 should be rejected.   
Then the question becomes: why is there a difference in their views toward fiscal 
decentralization?  Do officials serving at different levels of government tend to have different 
views on fiscal decentralization (H2)?  Table 6.11 summarizes the distribution of national and 
local officials of each pattern.  As it demonstrates, Pattern II and Pattern V are only comprised of 
the views of local officials while Pattern IV only embraces the views of national officials.  
Pattern I and Pattern III are represented by both national and local officials. 
 
Table 6.11 Distribution of officials for each pattern by number/percentage 
 Pattern I Pattern II Pattern III Pattern IV Pattern V Total 
National Level 5/56% 0/0% 2/22% 2/22% 0/0% 9/100% 
Local Level 2/10% 11/52% 3/14% 0/0% 5/24% 21/100% 
 
In addition, more than half (56%) of the national officials are loaded with Pattern I.  Both 
Pattern III and Pattern IV represent 22% of the national officials.  This may indicate that the 
view represented by Pattern I is the most dominant view among national officials.  However, it 
should also be noted that, although only two national officials are loaded with Pattern IV, it is 
only representing the views of national officials because no local official is significantly loaded 
with it.  On the other hand, more than half (52%) of the local officials are loaded with Pattern II, 
and another 20% of local officials are loaded with Pattern V.  No national official is loaded with 
either Pattern II or Pattern V.  In other words, approximately 72% of the local officials are 
loaded with the patterns that no national official is loaded with.  This makes it easy to conclude 
that Pattern II and Pattern V represent the views of local officials.  The remaining five local 
officials, representing about 24% of the local officials, are either loaded with Pattern III or 
Pattern I.  These two patterns of views do not represent the majority of the views shard by local 
officials.  A multiple line chart is drawn in order to visualize the pattern described above. 
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As Figure 6.1 demonstrates, the line of national officials and the line of local officials go 
in different directions.  When the line of national officials goes up, the line of local officials goes 
down.  This indicates that the level of government served affects the official’s view on fiscal 
decentralization.  If the level of government does not play a role in shaping an official’s view, we 
should expect that the two lines go the same direction to imply that, among these five patterns, 
how national officials are distributed is similar to how local officials are distributed.  Figure 6.2 
rearranges the order of the patterns to better demonstrate the relationship between these two lines 
described above. 
 
Figure 6.1 Comparison for officials working at different levels of government (I) 
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As we recalled that more than half of the national officials are loaded with Pattern I, we 
can see the line of national officials peaks at Pattern I.  The line of national officials hits bottom 
at Pattern V and Pattern II with which no national officials are loaded.  The line of local officials 
goes in a different direction.  After the line hits bottom at Pattern IV, with which no local official 
is loaded, the line goes up.  The line peaks at Pattern II to show the fact that more than 50% of 
the local officials are loaded with Pattern II.  Based on the discussion above, it is concluded that 
officials serving at different levels of government possess different patterns of attitudes toward 
fiscal decentralization.  As a result, H2 is accepted.  In other words, the level of government an 
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official serves in does affect his or her views on fiscal decentralization.  In addition, it is further 
observed that Patterns I and IV are more likely to represent the views of national officials toward 
fiscal decentralization, while Patterns II and V are more likely to represent the views of local 
officials.  Based on the data obtained in the study, Pattern III is a mixed pattern that represents 
the views of some national and local officials.  In the following two subsections, whether 
officials working at the same level of government share a single pattern of attitude is examined. 
 
Figure 6.2 Comparison for officials working at different levels of government (II) 
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6.3.2 Background Factors Affecting National Officials 
The focus here is to examine whether national officials share a single pattern of attitudes toward 
fiscal decentralization.  As indicated in the Table 6.11, Pattern I, Pattern III, and Pattern IV have 
a number of national officials significantly loaded with them.  Pattern I clearly represents the 
view shared by the majority of the national officials, as 56% of the national officials (or five out 
of nine) are loaded with Pattern I.  Pattern III and Pattern IV has two national officials 
significantly loaded with them.  This means that each of these two patterns represents about 22% 
of the national officials loaded significantly in this research.  Accordingly, although Pattern I 
represents the view shard by the majority of national officials, some of national officials possess 
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different views, which are represented by Patterns III and IV.  There is no single pattern of 
attitudes shared by all national officials. 
If we take a closer look at duties performed by these national officials and the agencies 
they are affiliated with, we can obtain a better understanding of why they might have different 
views on fiscal decentralization.  Table 6.12 presents main duties and organizational affiliations 
of national officials significantly loaded with the three patterns.  Pattern I may represent the 
views shared by most national officials.  All three national officials, in charge of some aspects of 
distributing intergovernmental aid, including general grants and categorical grants, are 
significantly loaded with Pattern I.  As we can recall from our discussion in Chapter Four that the 
DGBAS is the agency to lead efforts in reforming intergovernmental aid, it is not surprising to 
see that three national officials in charge of distributing either general grants or categorical grants 
and an official also working at the DGBAS monitoring local budgeting procedures share similar 
views on fiscal decentralization and that they are significantly loaded with Pattern I.  In addition, 
there is another official significantly loaded with Pattern I.  He is from the National Treasury 
Agency, the Ministry of Finance, and he is responsible for supervising, advising, and monitoring 
on local finance management matters.  On the other hand, both officials significantly loaded with 
Pattern III are in charge of local tax-related matters and work at the same agency in the Ministry 
of Finance.  One of them works at a division administering the laws on local taxes, and the other 
official is working at a division administering the General Law on Local Taxation, which 
authorizes local governments to raise local taxes.  As a result, it is not difficult to understand 
why they share similar views on fiscal decentralization. 
Two, and the only two, officials significantly loaded with Pattern IV are not in charge of 
similar policy areas, nor are they from the same ministry, but the fact that they perceive fiscal 
decentralization similarly is not coincidental.  The official working at the Research, 
Development, and Evaluation Commission is a scholar of public administration.  He was 
working in academia before accepting his current position a few years ago.  The other official 
significantly loaded with Pattern IV is a career civil servant and heavily influenced by the former 
Minister of Finance, who was a public finance scholar before he was appointed to several public 
offices.  This official constantly referred to the former Minister’s opinion and ideas while 
explaining why he agreed or disagreed with particular Q statement during the Q sorting process.  
Indeed, the analysis in the previous section also showed that officials of Pattern IV prefer a 
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bottom-up approach to ensuring local fiscal accountability and pursuing local development, and 
they are group of officials most open to the idea of allowing people to vote on local fiscal issues.  
These are ideas advocated by many scholars in Taiwan to encourage local participation, collect 
locally raised tax revenues and fees, and eventually build a bottom-up mechanism for ensuring 
local fiscal accountability. 
 
Table 6.12 Main duties and affiliation of national officials 
Pattern Main Duties Organizational Affiliation 
General grants and local budgeting Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, 
and Statistics (DGBAS) 
Local budgeting Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, 
and Statistics (DGBAS) 
Local financial management National Treasury Agency, Ministry of 
Finance 
Categorical grants Environmental Protection Administration 
Pattern I 
Categorical grants Ministry of Education 
Local taxes National Tax Administration, Ministry of 
Finance 
Pattern III 
Local taxes National Tax Administration, Ministry of 
Finance 
National shared tax and local 
financial management 
National Treasury Agency, Ministry of 
Finance 
Pattern IV 
Local development Research, Development, and Evaluation 
Commission 
 
Based on the analyses above, there are at least three distinct patterns of attitudes existing 
among national officials.  Therefore, H3 is rejected.  Although Pattern I represents the view 
shared by the majority of national officials, Patterns III and IV do represent the views of some 
national officials.  Local officials’ perceptions on fiscal decentralization and background factors 
shaping these views are discussed next. 
6.3.3 Background Factors Affecting Local Officials 
Different localities often have different socioeconomic characteristics and are facing different 
challenges in dealing with issues of local public finance.  As a result, local officials working for 
different local governments are expected to have different patterns of attitudes toward fiscal 
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decentralization.  In addition to examining whether local officials working at different local 
governments possess different patterns of attitudes toward fiscal decentralization, this subsection 
intends to further examine which background factors might also affect the views of local officials 
if more than one pattern of attitudes is revealed among local officials. 
Based on the Table 6.10, 21 local officials are significantly loaded with four patterns.  
Eleven of them are loaded with Pattern II, and five of them are loaded with Pattern V.  It should 
be noted that there is no national official significantly loaded with these two patterns, and these 
two patterns combined represent approximate 76% of the local officials loaded significantly in 
this study.  In other words, these two patterns can be considered as the two dominant views held 
by local officials.  Two local officials are significantly loaded with Pattern I, with which more 
than half of the national officials are loaded.  The remaining three local officials are significantly 
loaded with Pattern III, with which two national officials in charge of local tax administration are 
also significantly loaded.  It is concluded that there are at least four patterns of attitudes shared 
by local officials concerning fiscal decentralization.  Accordingly, H4 is rejected. 
With regard to what background factors might play a role in shaping these different 
patterns, duties performed, types of local government they serve, and local governments’ 
reliance on national transfers are examined. 
6.3.3.1 Duties performed and patterns of attitude 
All of the local officials who participated in this research are working at either the 
Finance Bureau (FB) or the Accounting and Statistics Office (ASO) of a local government.  
Generally speaking, the FB is dealing with the finance side of local public finance while the 
ASO is dealing with the budgeting side of local public finance.  This difference in their duties 
makes it possible to categorize local officials based on which of these two agencies they are 
working at in order to reflect the duties they perform.  Table 6.13 summarizes how local officials 
working at these two agencies are distributed among four revealed patterns. 
 
Table 6.13 Distribution of local officials by patterns and duties 
 Pattern I Pattern II Pattern III Pattern V Total 
Finance 0/0% 7/59% 1/8% 4/33% 12/100% 
Accounting & Statistics 2/22% 4/45% 2/22% 1/11% 9/100% 
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Based on Table 6.13, 12 local officials significantly loaded with one of the patterns are 
working at the FB while nine are working at the ASO.  As for local officials working at the FB, 
seven, representing about 60% of them, are significantly loaded with Pattern II while four of 
them are significantly loaded with Pattern V.  Pattern III only represents the view of one local 
official working at the FB.  This distribution is similar to the overall distribution of local officials 
in that the majority of them are significantly loaded with Pattern II and Pattern V.  Four local 
officials, accounting for about 45% of local officials working at the ASO, are loaded 
significantly with Pattern II, while the rest of them almost evenly distributed among the other 
three patterns.  Figure 6.3 was drawn to examine the distribution described above. 
 
Figure 6.3 Comparison for local officials with different duties  
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It is noted that both local officials significantly loaded with Pattern I are working at the 
ASO.  As we can recall, Pattern I represents the views mostly held by national officials.  It is 
argued that the views of some local officials working at the ASO are influenced by their 
colleagues working at the national government because they are hired based on a nationally 
uniformed personnel code for officials of budgeting, accounting, and statistics, and co-supervised 
by local elected top officials and personnel officers at the DGBAS.  This might also explain why 
there is no local official working at the FB loaded significantly with Pattern I because they are 
  144
not subject to such co-supervision and the national local government does not have control over 
personnel decisions at the FB. 
As we can see, the shape of these two lines in Figure 6.3 is similar, except the line 
representing local officials in charge of finance goes up at Pattern V.  Both lines peak at Pattern 
II to indicate that Pattern II is the pattern of attitudes shared by most local officials regardless of 
what duties they perform.  Although it is suspected that some local officials working at the ASO 
may be influenced by their peers in the national government, the evidence is not strong enough 
to suggest that most local officials working at the ASO are under such influence.  Therefore, it is 
concluded that different duties performed by local officials do not make them perceive fiscal 
decentralization differently.  As a result, H5 is rejected. 
6.3.3.2 Types of local government and patterns of attitude 
The highest local governance units in Taiwan include two special cities, 18 counties, and 
five provincial cities (see Figure 3.2).  Based on the types of local government they serve, local 
officials can further be categorized into three groups.  The assumption is that different types of 
local government are serving localities with different socioeconomic characteristics, economic 
patterns, and population characteristics.  Therefore, different needs and goals are developed for 
pursuing fiscal decentralization.  For example, the special cities, which have more economic 
activities and high-income population, might propose to reduce the amount or decrease the 
percentage of local taxes to be shared with other local governments in order to keep more 
revenue for themselves.  Table 6.14 summarizes how local officials working in different types of 
local government are distributed among four revealed patterns. 
 
Table 6.14 Distribution of local officials by patterns and types of local government 
 Pattern I Pattern II Pattern III Pattern V Total 
Special city 0/0% 1/50% 1/50% 0/0% 2/100% 
County 1/8% 7/54% 2/15% 3/23% 13/100% 
Provincial City 1/17% 3/50% 0/0% 2/33% 6/100% 
 
According Table 6.14, the two special city officials are evenly distributed between 
Pattern II and Pattern III.  About half of county officials and provincial city officials are 
significantly loaded with Pattern II.  This shows that Pattern II is the dominant pattern of 
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attitudes shared by local officials regardless the types of local government in which they serve.  
Pattern V is the pattern of attitudes shared by 23% of county officials and 33% of provincial 
officials.  Be reminded that this is also the pattern that no national officials are loaded with.  As 
we can see, the way county and provincial city officials distributed among the four patterns is 
similar.  Although the distribution of special city officials is different, this may be due to the fact 
that only a small number of local officials working at special cities participated in the study. 
Figure 6.4 demonstrates the pattern of distribution for local officials working at different 
levels of local government.  The shape of lines representing county and provincial city officials 
is similar as expected.  Both lines begin to climb from Pattern I and peak at Pattern II.  Then the 
lines go down to hit bottom at Pattern III before they go up again for Pattern V.  There is no 
sufficient evidence to suggest that Taiwanese local officials working at different types of local 
government perceive the concept of fiscal decentralization differently.  As a result, it is 
concluded that H6 should be rejected. 
 
Figure 6.4 Comparison for local officials working at different types of local government 
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6.3.3.3 Reliance on national transfers and patterns of attitudes 
A local government’s reliance on national transfers, including national shared tax and 
intergovernmental aid, not only reflects its fiscal condition, but also indicates its ability to collect 
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locally raised revenue for supporting itself.  Local governments with low reliance on national 
transfers might advocate for a more decentralized local fiscal system while local governments 
with high reliance on national transfers might support a more centralized local fiscal system to 
ensure more available revenue to be transferred.  Accordingly, it is assumed that local officials 
working at local governments with different degrees of reliance on national transfers would 
perceive fiscal decentralization differently.  However, before any analysis can begin, the data of 
each local government’s reliance on national transfers has to be transformed into categorical data. 
K-Means cluster analysis was performed to obtain two classification solutions with three 
and four categories.  The results were carefully examined, and classification with four categories 
was determined to best reflect and describe the degree of each local government’s reliance on 
national transfers.  Table 6.15 summarizes these four categories and local governments 
associated with them. 
 
Table 6.15 Classification of a local government’s reliance on national transfers 
Low Moderate High Very High 
Cluster Center = .34 Cluster Center = .50 Cluster Center = .65 Cluster Center = .80 
Taipei City Kaohsiung City Ilan County Nantou County 
Hsinchu City Taipei County Hsinchu County Yunlin County 
Taichung City Taoyuan County Miaoli County Chiayi County 
 Chiayi City Taichung County Pingtung County 
 Tainan City Changhua County Taitung County 
  Tainan County Hualien County 
  Kaohsiung County Penghu County 
  Keelung City  
 
Based on this classification and each local government’s membership, local officials 
significantly loaded with one of the patterns are classified into these four categories.  Table 6.16 
shows how local officials in each of the categories are distributed among four patterns. 
 
Table 6.16 Distribution of local officials by patterns and reliance on national transfers 
 Pattern I Pattern II Pattern III Pattern V Total 
Low 0/0% 2/67% 1/33% 0/0% 3/100% 
Moderate 0/0% 2/50% 0/0% 2/50% 4/100% 
High 2/18% 4/37% 2/18% 3/27% 11/100% 
Very High 0/0% 3/100% 0/0% 0/0% 3/100% 
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Local officials working for a local government with low reliance on national transfers are 
loaded significantly with either Pattern II and Pattern III; local officials working for a local 
government with moderate reliance on national transfers are loaded significantly with either 
Pattern II or Pattern V; and local officials working for a local government with very high reliance 
on national transfers are significantly loaded with only Pattern II.  All of the four patterns have a 
number of local officials working for a local government with high reliance on national transfers 
significantly loaded with them.  Figure 6.5 is drawn to better demonstrate the distribution of 
officials in each category among the four patterns. 
 
Figure 6.5 Comparison for local officials working at localities with different reliance on national transfers 
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A general pattern these lines indicate is that Pattern II is a view shared by more local 
officials regardless which of the four categories they are associated with.  It is noted that the line 
representing local officials working for a local government with high reliance is flatter than the 
other three lines are.  In order to search for the reason for this, original data in the Table 6.16 is 
examined and it is discovered that eleven local officials loaded significantly in this research work 
for a local government with high reliance, while only three, four, and three local officials are 
working for local governments with low, moderate, and very high reliance, respectively.  In other 
words, because the category of high reliance has more local officials associated with it, the 
difference in views within the category is more likely to be revealed.  The other categories may 
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not have a sufficient number of local officials associated to show the difference within the 
categories.  Considering that Pattern II is the most popular view across different categories of 
reliance on national transfers, H7 is rejected. 
It is concluded in this section that Taiwanese officials do not share a single pattern of 
attitudes toward fiscal decentralization, and officials working at different levels of government 
perceive the concept differently.  It is also observed that Patterns I and IV are more likely to 
represent the views of national officials while Patterns II and V are more likely to represent the 
views of local officials.  Based on the data available, however, Pattern III cannot be concluded to 
represent the views of either national or local officials and can only be considered as a mix 
pattern representing views from some of the national and local officials. 
In addition, there are at least three distinct patterns of attitudes existing among national 
officials.  Although most national officials’ views are represented by the Pattern I, Pattern III and 
Pattern IV do represent some national officials’ views.  It should also be noted that both national 
officials significantly loaded with Pattern III are in charge of local taxes related matter, and both 
national officials significantly loaded with Pattern IV may reflect the thoughts of many scholars 
to have a more decentralized system.  Finally, it is also concluded that local officials do not share 
a single pattern of attitude toward fiscal decentralization.  However, background factors, 
including duties performed, types of local government, and local governments’ reliance on 
national transfers, cannot be concluded to have an impact on shaping these different patterns of 
attitudes. 
6.4 FIVE THEORIES OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
Based on the discussion in the previous two sections, it is concluded that there are at least five 
patterns of officials’ attitudes toward fiscal decentralization coexisting in Taiwan.  These five 
patterns represent five theories that Taiwanese officials use to conceptualize fiscal 
decentralization.  The five theories include authoritative fiscal decentralization, unrestrained 
fiscal decentralization, cooperative fiscal decentralization, democratic fiscal decentralization, and 
conflicted fiscal decentralization.  These different theories of fiscal decentralization specify the 
relationships between the national and local governments and ideas about the best ways to pursue 
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fiscal decentralization in Taiwan.  According to Table 6.5 to Table 6.9, Table 6.17 summarizes 
each pattern’s main ideas toward five policy objectives in short phrases.  Bold phrases are ideas 
derived from the distinguishing statements. 
The theory of authoritative fiscal decentralization is a highly centralized form of fiscal 
decentralization.  Authoritative fiscal decentralization theorists express a high degree of distrust 
toward local governments to maximize the benefits of fiscal decentralization and to carry out 
reform initiatives properly.  Therefore, they emphasize the role of the national government to 
manage from the top in the process of fiscal decentralization.  In the theory of authoritative fiscal 
decentralization, the primary focus is to prevent inefficiency caused by dysfunctional local 
politics from offsetting efficiency gain resulting from fiscal decentralization.  Accordingly, the 
importance of national control and monitoring is emphasized to ensure local accountability.  It is 
proposed that laws should be enacted to set standards and guidelines of local fiscal behavior and 
that national mechanisms should be established to enforce local compliance.  In addition, the use 
of national transfers as a policy tool is recommended to ensure that national objectives are not 
compromised in local planning and development.  Finally, authoritative fiscal decentralization 
theorists are against the idea of allowing people to vote on local fiscal issues and implementing 
local redistributive policies.  In the theory of authoritative fiscal decentralization, the benevolent 
national government has to play an essential role in guiding and guarding the process of fiscal 
decentralization to maximize the benefits while preventing unintended policy outcomes. 
 
 Authoritative Unrestrained Cooperative Democratic Conflicted 
Efficiency ? More transfers 
? Inefficiency caused by 
politics 
? More transfers 
? More Efficiency 
? Possible dysfunctional 
tax competition 
? More transfers 
? Inefficiency caused by 
politics 
? Creativity 
? Dysfunctional tax 
competition 
? Inefficiency 
? Inefficiency caused by 
politics 
? Dysfunctional tax 
competition 
? More transfers 
Autonomy ? No local voting ? Unconditional grants
? No local voting 
? Law on shared tax 
? Local priorities 
? Law on shared tax 
? Prohibitions itemized 
? Legal regulation 
? Local priorities 
? Allowances itemized 
? Limited use of laws 
? No local voting 
? Legal regulation 
Accountability ? National control and 
monitoring 
? Local budgeting law 
? Local pay services 
? System of rewards and 
punishments 
? No referenda 
? No accountability to 
the people 
? Popular involvement 
? Paying for local 
services 
? No local budgeting 
law 
? Limited national 
control and monitoring 
? Objective indicators 
? Local pay services 
? Referenda 
? Local involvement 
? Limited national 
control and monitoring
? Popular involvement 
? No local budgeting 
law 
Development ? Balanced 
Development 
? Stimulation for 
investment 
? Resources 
Centralization 
? Comprehensive 
planning 
? Technical assistance 
? Resources 
Decentralization 
? Guaranteed spending 
? Planning not 
comprehensive 
? Imbalanced 
development 
? Resource not 
centralized 
? Imbalanced 
development 
? No decentralized 
resources 
? No stimulation for 
investment 
? Guaranteed spending 
? Balanced development 
? No need for technical 
assistance 
Equity ? Sufficient resources 
for local redistribution 
? No local redistribution
? No lodging change 
? No local redistribution
? Sufficient resources 
for local redistribution 
? Possible 
redistribution 
? No local redistribution
? No income tax for 
paying redistribution 
? Lodging changes 
? No improvement in 
meeting local needs 
? Support from Income 
tax 
? No improvement in 
creativity 
? Non-local goods 
  
Table 6.17 Theory of Fiscal Decentralization 
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Contrary to authoritative fiscal decentralization, unrestrained fiscal decentralization is a 
highly decentralized form of fiscal decentralization.  Unrestrained fiscal decentralization 
theorists express a high degree of distrust for the national government’s desire to truly 
decentralize financial resources and local policymaking authorities.  Their primary objectives in 
pursuing fiscal decentralization are to obtain more financial resources in a form of national 
transfers and to increase local autonomy for setting local priorities and allocating local funds.  It 
is theorized that power and financial resources is highly centralized at the center.  Because of the 
lack of local financial resources and autonomy, local officials are restrained from setting local 
priorities and promoting local comprehensive planning.  As a result, the national government 
should transfer more financial resources to local governments to guarantee local basic spending 
needs as well as to reduce its control on local budgetary and policy decisions.  It is proposed that 
the national government should make more use of unconditional grants instead of conditional 
grants to increase local autonomy and that local people should not be allowed to vote on local 
fiscal issues for holding local elected officials accountable.  It is further suggested that the 
national government should limit its role in local development and planning and that authority 
and financial resources for local development and planning should be decentralized to local 
governments.  They are also against the idea of allowing local governments to make and 
implement local redistributive policies.  In sum, restrained fiscal decentralization theorists 
advocate for local executive freedom by increasing local revenues and autonomy through fiscal 
decentralization and by minimizing national and local constraints imposed on local officials. 
Cooperative fiscal decentralization is a moderate centralized approach to pursuing fiscal 
decentralization.  It proposes that the national government should play a reduced role in guiding 
the process of fiscal decentralization and should empower local governments to take more 
responsibility for setting local priorities.  This implies that the national officials should trust local 
officials more.  In order to give local governments sufficient administrative and financial 
autonomy to provide local public services, it is proposed that the national government should 
only specify what local governments are prohibited to do and transfer more revenues to local 
governments.  It is further suggested that the national government should play a reduced role in 
ensuring local accountability by an employing incentive-based approach to monitoring local 
fiscal behavior instead of enacting laws to enforce local fiscal accountability.  On the other hand, 
local people are expected to get more involved in the local policy process, take more 
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responsibility to pay for local services, and hold their local elected officials accountable.  
Because of the higher trust they place on local officials, cooperative fiscal decentralization 
theorists are more open to the ideas of local governments to make and implement redistributive 
policies.  In conclusion, the theme of cooperative fiscal decentralization is empowering local 
governments or, at least, giving local governments a chance to prove themselves by 
decentralizing appropriate financial and administrative freedom to local governments. 
Democratic fiscal decentralization is a highly decentralized form of fiscal 
decentralization.  Unlike the theory of unrestrained fiscal decentralization in which maximizing 
local executive freedom is the goal, the theory of democratic fiscal decentralization emphasizes 
the process in which local policy decisions are formulated and made.  Democratic fiscal 
decentralization theorists have faith in local people and believe that local people’s participation 
is the key to successful fiscal decentralization, which can lead to more local creativity and more 
efficiency.  In order to ensure such reforms are properly carried out, they propose that local 
people should be encouraged to participate in the local policy process, including voting on local 
fiscal issues to hold local officials accountable.  In addition, local people are expected to bear 
more responsibility to pay local services that they decide to receive.  They believe that local 
redistributive policies should not be made and implemented by local governments.  In the theory 
of democratic fiscal decentralization, the national government takes a back seat in guiding the 
process of fiscal decentralization and making local policy decisions.  Democratic fiscal 
decentralization theorists believe that the national government should play a limited role in 
controlling and monitoring local fiscal behaviors, and in influencing local development decisions.  
They propose that the national government should clearly specify what local governments can do 
in terms of providing local services and avoid creating a nationally uniform local fiscal system 
by enacting laws to regulate all aspects of local finances.  Democratic fiscal decentralization 
theorists do not necessary place a higher trust on local governments.  Rather, they believe in the 
value of democracy and advocate pursuing fiscal decentralization from the bottom. 
The problems of dysfunctional local politics and insufficient local revenue are two 
primary concerns of conflicted fiscal decentralization theorists who do not trust local 
governments and local people’s ability to behave appropriately in a decentralized system.  
Although they propose that the national government should transfer more financial resources to 
address the problem of insufficient local revenues, they worry at the same time that efficiency 
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gain through fiscal decentralization would be offset by dysfunctional local politics.  As a result, 
it is suggested that the national government should decentralize financial resources through 
national transfers without granting local governments the authority to adjust the level of local 
taxation.  In addition, local people should not be allowed to vote on local fiscal issues.  Although 
local people’s participation in the policy process is generally encouraged, conflicted fiscal 
decentralization theorists believe that local people will always ask for more local services and 
more tax cuts simultaneously to make the problem of insufficient local revenue worse.  In other 
words, officials employing the theory of conflicted fiscal decentralization believe that the 
national government should transfer and guarantee sufficient local revenues for local basic 
spending needs, but they do not completely trust that local officials and local people would make 
policy decisions responsibly, especially in area of local redistributive policies.  However, 
conflicted fiscal decentralization theorists do not support more national control and monitoring 
of local fiscal behaviors, either.  In fact, the theory of conflicted fiscal decentralization 
emphasizes decentralizing financial resources and granting more autonomy to local governments, 
while offering no suggestions to address potential loss resulting from dysfunctional local politics. 
There are two conclusions that can be made based on these five theories of fiscal 
decentralization.  First, national-local dichotomy in the literature is confirmed: there are at least 
two distinct theories of fiscal decentralization, one with a national perspective and the other one 
with a local perspective.  Authoritative fiscal decentralization is a theory of national perspective, 
emphasizing national control and monitoring.  On the other hand, unrestrained fiscal 
decentralization is a theory of local perspective, demanding more local administrative and 
financial freedom.  In these two forms of fiscal decentralization, there is a high degree of distrust 
between national and local officials.  Although officials of both levels meet and communicate on 
the reform proposals, it is very difficult that policy consensus can be reached.  As a result, even 
if the national officials can utilize their political power to determine the form of the reform, 
attempts are often made by the local officials to reverse the implemented policies of fiscal 
decentralization.  Indeed, these two theories are the most dominant theories of fiscal 
decentralization employed by the national and local officials. 
In addition to the two theories discussed in the literature, the results of this study reveal 
three more theories of fiscal decentralization in Taiwan.  Cooperative fiscal decentralization is a 
moderate centralized form of fiscal decentralization, highlighting the importance of trusting and 
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empowering local governments.  This form of fiscal decentralization does not demonstrate a 
clear bias toward a national or local perspective, and it can be seen as a compromised approach 
to the reform.  Democratic fiscal decentralization, on the other hand, is a highly decentralized 
form of fiscal decentralization.  Unlike the theory unrestrained fiscal decentralization that 
maximizes local executive freedom, democratic fiscal decentralization emphasizes the 
importance of democratic participation in the process of local policymaking.  In other words, 
fiscal decentralization empowers local people, not local officials, to make local decisions and 
hold their elected officials accountable.  Finally, conflicted fiscal decentralization proposes a 
moderate decentralized form of fiscal decentralization in which financial resources are 
decentralized and local autonomy is increased.  Although they recognize the potential problems 
that may be caused by dysfunctional local politics, they choose to ignore the concerns for the 
moment.  These three forms of fiscal decentralization challenge the existing literature that 
debates of fiscal decentralization can be generalized into the context of a national-local 
dichotomy.  This study shows that multiple theories coexist and are employed by officials 
participating in the process of fiscal decentralization.  In addition, it also opens up the possibility 
of policy learning in the reform process to reach a compromised proposal such as cooperative 
fiscal decentralization. 
In summation, analyses conducted in this chapter have helped to gain a basic 
understanding of these patterns’ background and views toward fiscal decentralization.  The focus 
of the next chapter is to further compare, contrast, and evaluate these patterns’ views on fiscal 
decentralization in order to identify their differences in views and search for common ground for 
reaching policy consensus. 
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7.0  CONSENSUS BUILDING FOR FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
In the previous chapter, each of revealed patterns was analyzed and understood.  The focus of 
this chapter is to compare, contrast, and evaluate these patterns of attitudes in order to identify 
issues through which policy consensus might be reached.  As discussed previously, there are five 
patterns of attitudes toward fiscal decentralization revealed through the use of the Q 
methodological approach.  It is learned that Pattern I and Pattern IV seems to reflect the view of 
national officials.  Pattern II and Pattern V are views shared by local officials.  Pattern III is the 
only pattern as to whether it can be classified as a view shared by either national officials or local 
officials. 
With this information in mind, the first section of this chapter will emphasize the 
difference among these patterns.  The second section will discuss statements that these patterns 
tend to disagree with.  The final section will attempt to find their agreement in order to search for 
policy consensus.  A set of criteria developed in Chapter Five (subsection 5.2.2.4) will be 
employed to select statements showing difference or consensus in these patterns’ views.  In 
addition, as also discussed in Chapter Five, the definiteness of each selected statement will also 
be identified in order to interpret the policy meanings embedded in these statements and obtain 
policy relevant knowledge to make policy recommendations. 
7.1 COMPARING THE DIFFERENCE 
Based on the criterion set forth above, there are nine statements about which at least two patterns 
have differences in their opinions.  In general, these statements are centered on two broad policy 
areas.  The first issue concerns the intergovernmental fiscal relationship in Taiwan, and the 
second issue focuses on how local governments should be controlled and monitored.  By 
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analyzing the differences in opinion among the five patterns, it is hoped to shift the focus of 
ongoing policy debates away form these issues while providing a better and clearer 
understanding of what these differences are. 
7.1.1 Intergovernmental Fiscal Relationship 
The first major difference in officials’ attitudes toward fiscal decentralization is on the issue of 
intergovernmental fiscal relationships.  Five statements, including four bias statements and one 
wish statement, are identified based on the criterion described above.  Statements 01, 24, 25, and 
31 are classified as bias statements showing officials’ views on current intergovernmental fiscal 
relationships.  Statement 01 was strongly agreed with by Patterns II and IV, but strongly 
disagreed with by Pattern I.  Officials of Patterns II and IV would argue that over-relying on 
national grants to fund local programs would make it impossible to formulate and implement 
comprehensive local planning. 
Local governments’ poor fiscal health is well documented, and local elected officials 
desperately need funds to meet local development needs.  Therefore, when a national grant 
becomes available, local governments would make every possible effort to apply regardless 
whether this grant can be used to fund local prioritized needs.  After development projects, such 
as convention centers, gymnasiums, and public parking garages are built, local governments 
often find themselves criticized by people and media because usage rates are low and they often 
have to find additional revenues to pay for the maintenance.  This is not to say that Pattern II and 
Pattern IV officials implicitly suggest that the national grants should be reduced.  Rather, they 
emphasize the fact that local governments’ reliance on national grants has made the national 
government able to use these grants as a policy tool to influence and make local development 
decisions.  However, officials of Patterns II and IV do not share similar view on why local 
governments have to rely on national grants.  Pattern II officials would argue that local 
governments are too poor to be selective in receiving national grants.  On the other hand, 
officials of Pattern IV would say that it is because local governments do not want to share more 
responsibility in raising local revenue.  Since they do not think that local projects funded by 
national grants fit local real needs, they do not see how national grants can stimulate local 
economy and development.  This view is reflected on the score of -3 received by statement 31. 
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On the other hand, Pattern I officials do not agree that the lack of comprehensive local 
planning is a direct result of local governments’ reliance on national grants.  An official of 
Pattern I said, “the first half of the statement is correct, but the second half of the statement is not 
correct” (2005090501, personal communication, September 5, 2005).  They tend to emphasize 
that the national government has made efforts to make more national grants unconditional and 
that local governments should be responsible for the lack of comprehensive local development 
planning.  They show their belief that the use of national grants is helpful to local economy and 
development by scoring statement 31 at +3.  Without these grants, local governments will not 
have resources to build local development projects and foster local economic development.  
Statements 01 and 31 are presented for reference. 
 
01. Local governments continually and chronically rely on national grants to 
support local spending needs, rendering comprehensive local development 
planning impossible. (-3, +3, -2, +4, -2) 
 
31. Grants from the national government can stimulate local private 
investments. (+3, -1, -1, -3, 0) 
 
Although officials of Pattern II and Pattern IV share similar views on statement 01, their 
opinion on statement 24 is opposite.  For officials of Pattern II, statement 01 and statement 24 
were interpreted as discussing similar ideas.  To elaborate both statements, one official of Pattern 
II said (2005053001, personal communication, May 30, 2005): 
 
Under the current system, the funds received from national grants are just 
enough for local governments to meet basic spending needs. The money is not 
enough for local development projects.  If local governments want to fund 
development projects, they would have to borrow. 
 
Therefore, they scored statement 24 at +4 to highlight their opinion that money and 
power are centralized and local governments do not have additional revenues available to take on 
local development projects.  Based on their view, the national government should not only 
guarantee revenue for local basic fiscal needs, but it should also provide funding for 
development needs.  On the contrary, officials of Pattern IV, joined by officials of Pattern III, 
strongly disagreed with statement 24.  An official of Pattern III indicated that “based on the level 
of government to which the taxes are assigned, the national government only receives about 60% 
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of overall tax revenue.  This level is not high regardless compared to federal or unitary counties” 
(2005052001, personal communication, May 20, 2005).  Another official of Pattern III 
commented on the statement and said, “the national government should guarantee funding for 
basic local fiscal needs” (2005050502, personal communication, May 2, 2005).  Although he did 
not elaborate, he implicitly argued that local governments should be responsible for local 
development projects.  In other words, officials of Patterns III and IV believe that it is the local 
governments’ responsibility to raise local revenue for local development needs while the national 
government should make sure that local governments have sufficient revenue to support local 
basic spending needs.  Statement 24 is listed in the following. 
 
24. Money and power are centralized to make local governments unable to 
actively design and implement local development projects. (-2, +4, -3, -4, 0) 
 
Statement 25 concerns whether granting local governments authority to determine local 
tax bases and rates will lead to a competition of tax reduction among local governments.  
Officials of Pattern III believe competition of tax reduction will not happen while officials of 
Pattern V strongly believe it will happen.  Officials of Pattern III emphasize that there is no room 
for lowering local taxes before local fiscal health is improved.  One official said that although it 
is possible that [tax competition] would happen, local governments and councils would not push 
for it as long as people do not make demands (2005052502, personal communication, May 25, 
2005).  Another official was also optimistic and said that after people understand, trust, and 
accept what kind of services local taxes are paying for, local tax competition may not happen 
after all (2005042801, personal communication, April 28, 2005).  Officials of Pattern V believe 
otherwise.  As we can recall from the discussion of the previous chapter, Pattern V officials 
express a great deal of concern about dysfunctional local politics.  One official pointed out that if 
local governments were authorized to lowering taxes, they would do it because a democratic 
political culture has not yet been developed among voters and local councilors (2005052701, 
personal communication, May 27, 2005).  Statement 25 is listed for reference. 
 
25. Once local government officials obtain authority to determine local tax 
bases and rates, it is easy for them to engage in a competition for tax 
reduction. (-1, -1, -4, 0, +4) 
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Statement 38 is a wish statement that officials of Pattern IV strongly disagreed with, 
while officials of Pattern V strongly agreed.  Although the statement was originally designed as 
one of the central control approaches to achieve redistributive goals, a lot of participates 
interpreted the statement as to whether income tax revenue should be used as a revenue source 
for national grants.  Having this understanding in mind, the discussion in the pervious chapter 
has indicated that Pattern V officials worry about the problem of insufficient local revenue and 
hope that income tax revenue can be used as a revenue source to increase the total amount of 
revenue available for national grants.  In contrast, consistent with their opinion on statements 01, 
31, and 24, officials of Pattern IV believe that local governments should share more 
responsibility in raising revenue, and scored statement 38 at -3.  Statement 38 is presented in the 
following. 
 
38. If revenues collected from the progressive income tax can be the source for 
intergovernmental grants, income distribution will be better equalized. (0, -2, 0, 
-3, +3) 
 
In summation, regarding the issue of intergovernmental fiscal relationships, these five 
patterns can be roughly divided into two groups.  The first group includes officials of Patterns I, 
III, and IV.  In general, they believe that local governments should share more responsibility in 
both local planning and revenue-raising and the national government should only guarantee local 
governments’ basic fiscal needs.  The other group includes officials of Patterns II and V.  Both of 
them favor a centralized local revenue-raising system and agree that the national government 
should not only guarantee local governments’ basic fiscal needs, but it should also provide 
sufficient revenue for local development.  Although the two groups do not agree with each other 
on whether the national government should provide more financial resources for local 
development, they do agree that funding for local basic fiscal needs should be guaranteed by the 
national government. 
7.1.2 Monitoring and Controlling Local Governments 
The second difference in opinion toward fiscal decentralization regards how local governments 
should be monitored and controlled.  Four statements selected include one wish statement and 
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three policy statements.  Statement 02 and 32 concern how and how much the national 
government should monitor and control local governments.  Statement 02 is a wish statement 
stating that the national government should closely monitor and control all aspects of local 
financial behaviors.  It is strongly agreed with by the officials of Pattern I, but strongly disagreed 
with by the officials of Patterns III and IV. 
Statement 32 is a policy statement proposing the enactment of the Law on Local 
Budgeting to enable the national government to control and monitor local budgetary processes.  
The statement is strongly agreed with by the officials of Pattern I, but strongly disagreed with by 
the officials of Patterns III and V.  According to our earlier discussion the Chapter Six, it is 
expected that Pattern I officials would believe that the national government should closely 
monitor and control local governments through the process of fiscal decentralization to ensure 
that they do not abuse their newly acquired power.  One of the Pattern I officials said that it is 
likely that local elected officials would overspend without appropriate control (2005053002, 
personal communication, May 30, 2005).  The Law on Local Budgeting as a policy tool will set a 
uniform procedure and standard for local budgetary practices that make the national government 
better able to monitor local fiscal behavior and, if necessary, to punish for their wrongdoing. 
Although closely monitoring and controlling might prevent fiscal wrongdoing by local 
governments, it certainly would also hurt local flexibility and autonomy to provide local services.  
When making comments on both statements 02 and 32, one official explicitly pointed out that 
these ideas are violating the principles of local self-governance set forth by the Law on Local 
Governments System (2005050501, personal communication, May 05, 2005).  Moreover, they 
argued that the national government has instituted mechanisms to monitor and control local 
governments.  One official said that there have been mechanisms to monitor and control, 
including the requirement of submitting monthly reports of debt services to the Ministry of 
Finance, performance evaluation on local tax collection, and review procedures on raising new 
local taxes based on the General Law on Local Taxation (2005062301, personal communication, 
June 23, 2005).  As for the local budgetary process, one official pointed out that the existing 
Budget Act is enough to ensure proper local financial management and that most aspects of the 
Law on Local Budgeting have been regulated by the Budget Act (20050525, personal 
communication, May 25, 2005).  In fact, one of the new components of the Law on Local 
Budgeting is to specify punishment for financial wrongdoing, and this has been the center of 
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opposition.  One official indicated that it would be unfair to non-elected local officials since they 
will be the ones to receive punishments, while elected officials are the ones to make decisions 
(2005052701, personal communication, May 27, 2005).  Statements 02 and 32 are presented for 
reference. 
 
02. The national government should have the authority to monitor and control 
local governments’ practices in raising debts, budgeting, taxing, and collecting 
other local revenues. (+4, -1, -3, -3, +1) 
 
32. The Law on Local Budgeting, which includes penalties for unlawful 
practices, should be enacted to strengthen the ability of the Ministry of 
Finance and Directorate General of Budget Accounting and Statistics in the 
national government to monitor local budgeting processes and 
implementation. (+4, -1, -4, 0, -3) 
 
Statement 09 is a wish statement concerning how to regulate what local governments can 
do.  In general, there are two ways of doing this.  One way is to specify what local governments 
can do and then prohibit them from doing anything not thus specified.  The other way is to 
specify what they are prohibited to do and then allow them to do anything not specified.  
Officials of Pattern III strongly agreed with the first way, hoping that local governments would 
be given more autonomy to creatively provide local services and meet local needs.  On the other 
hand, officials of Pattern IV strongly disagreed with statement 09.  This does not mean that they 
do not support granting more autonomy to local governments.  They perceive that specifying 
what local governments can do is a more moderate approach to control and monitoring local 
governments’ behavior, compared to what is proposed by statements 02 and 32.  Statement 09 is 
listed in the following. 
 
09. The principle of regulating local governments is to itemize what they are 
prohibited to do. (+1, 0, +3, -4, 0) 
 
Finally, statement 22 is a policy statement advocating allowing people to vote on local 
fiscal issues.  Officials of Pattern IV strongly agreed with the statement and believe that people 
should be allowed to vote on local fiscal issues in order to hold local officials accountable.  It is 
believed that when people have a chance to vote, they will care more about local affairs, realize 
the true costs and benefits of local projects, make informed decisions on local public policies, 
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and eventually be able to hold their elected local officials accountable.  On the contrary, officials 
of Pattern II strongly disagreed with allowing people to vote on local fiscal issues.  They would 
argue that local people do not have the knowledge and democratic experience necessary to make 
the right decisions and that local governments would be handicapped by these decisions 
(2005052401, personal communication, May 24, 2005; 2005052501, personal communication, 
May 25, 2005).  In the end, it is likely that people will always vote for increasing local spending 
while voting against raising local taxes (2005072101, personal communication, July 21, 2005; 
2005070701, personal communication, July 07, 2005).  Statement 22 is listed in the following for 
reference. 
 
22. In order to better hold local government officials accountable, a system of 
referenda on local fiscal issues should be established. (-2, -4, -1, +3, -2) 
 
Three out of four statements selected for analysis here are policy statements, indicating 
that a set of policy solutions have been developed for these issues.  However, it seems that there 
has been no consensus regarding which course of action should be adopted.  Other than officials 
of Pattern I, who mostly comprised of national officials, Taiwanese officials seem to be against 
close national control and monitoring.  Officials of Pattern I strongly agree with closely national 
controlling and monitoring, as well as the enactment of the Law on Local Budgeting.  Officials 
of Pattern II expressed strong opposition on using local referenda to decide local fiscal decisions, 
while officials of Pattern V expressed strong opposition to the enactment of the Law on Local 
Budgeting.  However, both patterns did not express strong opinions on how to regulate what 
local governments can do.  Officials of Pattern III strongly agreed with allowing local 
governments more autonomy by only regulating what they are prohibited to do.  While officials 
of Pattern IV also prefer to allow more autonomy to local governments in general, they do think 
that mechanisms should be available to hold local officials accountable.  As a result, they 
propose that the national government should explicitly specify what local governments could do 
and allow local people to vote on local fiscal issues. 
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7.2 AGREE ON WHAT TO DISAGREE 
There are six statements that received either zero or a negative score from the revealed five 
patterns.   These statements can be categorized into two broad policy areas.  The first policy area 
concerns how national grants and the local taxation system will affect local fiscal behavior, and 
the second policy area deals with whether local governments should play a role in redistributive 
policies.  They will be discussed separately in the following section. 
7.2.1 Impacts of National Grants and Local Taxation System 
There are three statements selected for this policy area, and all of them are bias statements.  
Statement 21 is strongly disagreed with by officials of Patterns I, II, and III, and moderately 
disagreed with by officials of Patterns IV and V.  It states that intergovernmental grants will 
foster local spending.  Many officials (2005050502, personal communication, May 02, 2005; 
2005052001, personal communication, May 20, 2005; 2005053001, personal communication, 
May 30, 2005; 2005060801, personal communication, June 08, 2005; 2005072101, personal 
communication, July 21, 2005) strongly disagreed and pointed out that local governments are too 
poor to pay for the basic spending needs such as salaries and utilities.  Therefore, the funding 
they receive from the national grants would only be used to pay for these basic spending needs 
and would not cause the problem of local overspending. 
Even if general grants and categorical grants are considered separately, Taiwanese 
officials still tend to think that these grants will not result in local overspending.  They argued 
that the national governments provide these grants because local governments do not have 
sufficient funds to pursue local programs or projects, which are good for local developments 
(2005053002, personal communication, May 30, 2005; 2005090501, personal communication, 
September 05, 2005).  While generally agreeing with the previous argument, one official did 
point out that receiving general grants would not result in local overspending, but, in terms of 
categorical grants, it is hard to say (2005071501, personal communication, July 15, 2005).  The 
official implied that local elected officials might decide to apply for a categorical grant only 
because they hope to get more financial resources from the national government and show their 
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efforts to the voters.  Only when this happens, it becomes possible that intergovernmental grants 
will foster local overspending.  Statement 21 is listed in the following for reference. 
 
21. Intergovernmental grants from the national government will foster local 
overspending. (-4, -4, -4, -2, -1) 
 
Statement 16 concerns with whether an imbalance of local development will occur 
because local governments will ignore development needs not funded by the national 
government in favor of those funded by national grants.  Officials of Pattern I strongly disagreed 
with the statement while officials of Patterns II and III expressed moderate opposition.  It was 
pointed out that the distribution of general grants would not lead to a problem of imbalance in 
local development because local governments can allocate these funds freely.  It is also agreed 
that the distribution of categorical grants will not affect local governments’ overall development 
because local governments can make proposals able to meet local needs in the application 
process.  Indeed, one official argued that the process of distributing categorical grants has been 
transformed to be a bottom-up process rather than a top-down process (2005061501, personal 
communication, June 15, 2005).  When they are developing proposals for application, local 
governments can make sure that their development needs are met.  Although some of the 
national grants are matching grants, for which local governments might have to commit some 
funds from other more important local needs, the matching ratio is often very low in Taiwan, as 
one official indicated (2005090501, personal communication, September 05, 2005).  As another 
official argued, “providing categorical grants to local governments will not lead to a imbalance 
of local development.  Rather, it leads to more jobs and more developments” (2005053002 
personal communication, May 30, 2005).  Statement 16 is provided for reference. 
 
16. Reliance on national grants will lead local governments to ignore projects 
not funded by the central government, resulting in an imbalance of local 
development. (-4, -2, -2, 0, 0) 
 
Statement 19 states that tax competition will increase efficiency.  Officials of Patterns IV 
and V strongly disagreed with the statement, while Officials of Patterns II and III moderately 
disagreed with.  Both Patterns IV and V officials perceive local politics in Taiwan to be 
dysfunctional, and believe that tax competition would be dysfunctional as well.  If local 
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governments were authorized to increase or decrease the level of local taxation, the level would 
only go south (2005061001, personal communication, June 10, 2005).  Rich localities have some 
room to lower taxes and attract business, but poor localities cannot do the same.  Therefore, an 
official pointed out that tax competition will widen the gap between the rich and poor 
(2005072101, personal communication, July 21, 2005).  The following statement is Statement 19. 
 
19. Tax competition will enhance the efficiency of economic resource 
allocation. (0, -2, -2, -3, -4) 
 
In conclusion, none of the patterns identified in this study perceive that 
intergovernmental grants will foster local overspending, and these grants will not lead to an 
imbalance of local development.  In other words, officials of these five patterns would not 
strongly oppose to the idea of using categorical grants for local development.  On the other hand, 
they believe that tax competition is more likely to be dysfunctional and implicitly imply that the 
national government should not grant local governments authority to make local tax cuts.  The 
making of the General Law on Local Taxation, which only allows local governments to increase 
the level of local taxes, is consistent with this belief.  It should also be noted that statements 19 
and 21 belong to the efficiency-local freedom category in the factorial design of this study, 
providing some indication that these revealed patterns disclose the benefit that a centralized 
approach is needed to ensure efficiency during the fiscal decentralization process. 
7.2.2 The Role of Local Governments in Redistributive Policies 
There are three wish statements selected for discussion in this subsection, and all of them come 
form equity-local freedom category of the factorial design.  This provides a strong indication that 
there is a consensus among these five patterns that redistributive policies should be made and 
implemented by the national government instead of local governments. 
Statement 05 argues that redistributive policies can also be a local public good, and 
statement 04 specifies the redistributive policy areas that local governments can get into.  
Statement 27 is a general statement saying that local governments can better meet local 
redistributive needs if they are granted more responsibility to make and implement redistributive 
policies.  Statement 05 was strongly disagreed with by Pattern V, while moderately disagreed 
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with by Patterns II, III, and IV.  Statement 04 was strongly disagreed with by Patterns I, II, and 
IV, while moderately disagreed with by Pattern V.  Statement 27 was strongly disagreed with by 
Pattern V, while moderately disagreed with by all other patterns. 
During local elections, it becomes popular for candidates to call for better redistributive 
or social welfare policies, often in a form such as free lunch for elementary school students or 
monthly stipends to the elderly.  The goal of making these policies is to gain short-term support 
to win elections, not to take better care of low-income people or those with disabilities.  These 
policies may not be truly “redistributive” in nature, but they have made local governments’ poor 
local fiscal health worsen.  As a result, it is not difficult to understand why there is a consensus 
among both national officials and local officials in charge of local finance to support a 
centralized approach for making and implementing local redistributive policies.  When 
commenting on statement 27, an official said that “redistributive policies would be more biased 
and unfair to those truly in need if local governments are granted more responsibilities to make 
and implement redistributive policies” (2005061502, personal communication, June 15, 2005).  
Officials also expressed their concern that local governments do not have sufficient revenue to 
pay for the costs of redistributive policies (2005060801, personal communication, June 08, 2005; 
2005061002, personal communication, June 10, 2005; 2005062301, personal communication, 
June 23, 2005).  In fact, the majority of local governments in Taiwan are experiencing financial 
hardships in the recent years.  They will not have the financial resources necessary to provide 
these services without improving their fiscal health first.  Statements 05, 04, and 27 are presented 
in the following. 
 
05. Redistributive policies can also be a local public good implemented by 
local governments. (0, -2, -2, -1, -3) 
 
04. Generally speaking, local governments can achieve distributional 
objectives by getting involved in policy areas such as education, medical care, 
or housing assistance. (-3, -3, 0, -4, -1) 
 
27. Locating more responsibility for redistributive policy with local 
governments allows them to design welfare programs that are more 
appropriate to their own needs and better reflect the preferences of their 
residents. (-2, -1, -1, -1, -4) 
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7.3 POLICY CONSENSUS AMONG DIFFERENT PATTERNS 
There are eight statements that received no negative score from any of the five patterns.  This 
means that none of the revealed five patterns are opposed to these statements.  From a 
policymaking standpoint, these statements are, at least, acceptable to officials of all revealed 
patterns and are more likely to be adopted as policies for pursuing fiscal decentralization.  In 
addition, policies made based on these statements are more likely to be faithfully and 
successfully implemented by both national and local officials because they do not oppose these 
ideas.  These statements are, therefore, considered as policy consensus among the five patterns in 
this study.  However, it should also be noted that the analysis made in this section, as well as 
analyses made in the previous two sections, is based on scores of each revealed pattern’s 
hypothetical Q sort, not scores of each participating official’s individual Q sort.  Therefore, when 
a statement receiving no negative score from each of the five patterns, it is selected in this 
section, but this does not mean that the statement receive no negative score from each of 
participating officials significantly loaded with one of the five patterns. 
These statements can be classified into two board policy issues, including local politics 
and accountability, and decentralization and local autonomy.  The first policy issue concerns 
how local governments can be hold officials accountable to prevent inefficiency caused by 
dysfunctional local politics.  The later policy issue deals with how local autonomy can be 
improved during the decentralization process.  More detailed discussion will be provided 
separately in this section. 
7.3.1 Local Politics and Accountability 
Five statements selected for discussion on this policy issue include one bias statement, two wish 
statements, and two policy statements.  Statement 06 is a bias statement, which is highly agreed 
with by Patterns I, III, and IV, while moderately agreed with by Patterns II and III.  It is 
understandable why Pattern II, which is comprised of eleven local officials only, would 
deemphasize the statement indicating that local politics, interests lobbying, and pressure groups 
have made local spending growing and inefficient. 
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Generally speaking, officials in Taiwan recognize the problem of dysfunctional local 
politics, as one official argued that calculation of political benefits often out weighs cost-benefit 
analysis during the process of making local spending decisions (2005050501, personal 
communication, May 05, 2005).  Although at least two officials who participated in this study 
believe that the problem of dysfunctional local politics can be minimized if local governments 
and their elected officials are better disciplined and able to resist the pressure from local councils 
and other interests lobbying (2005062301, personal communication, June 23, 2005; 2005070701, 
personal communication, July 07, 2005), the more pervasive view is that the national 
governments should establish mechanisms to ensure local fiscal accountability.  Statement 06 is 
presented in the following for reference. 
 
06. Due to local politics, interests lobbying, and pressure groups, local 
spending keeps growing and becomes inefficient. (+3, +1, +2, +4, +4) 
 
Statements 29 and 11 are two policy statements that explicitly suggest establishing 
mechanisms to hold local governments and their officials fiscally accountable.  Statement 29 was 
highly agreed with by officials of Pattern III and moderately agreed with by officials 
significantly loaded with all of other patterns.  It proposes that a set of objective indicators 
should be established to evaluate local fiscal efforts that are the overall efforts of local 
governments to increase local revenue and reduce costs.  Then these indicators are incorporated 
into formula of distributing national transfers.  In fact, the current formulae of distributing the 
national shared tax and the general grant have incorporated some indicators of fiscal efforts.  The 
problem, as one official pointed out, is that existing mechanisms cannot actually facilitate local 
governments’ fiscal efforts (2005052401, personal communication, May 24, 2005).  In other 
words, the key is how to develop these objective indicators to facilitate local fiscal efforts and 
improve local fiscal accountability. 
An official pointed out that “all indicators are subjective” (2005061502, personal 
communication, June 15, 2005).  Another official elaborated that “all of the indicators are 
selected by the national government” (2005061002, personal communication, June 10, 2005).  
Each local government has different social, economic, and fiscal conditions, and there is no 
indicator that does not favor some localities over the others (2005072101, personal 
communication, July 21, 2005).  Indeed, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, that the 
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national government can develop a set of unbiased, objective indicators which are acceptable to 
all local governments.  Therefore, the focus should be on the process, not the result.  As one 
official suggested, “local governments should be allowed to participate in the process of 
selecting these indicators” (2005062102, personal communication, June 21, 2005).  After a more 
appropriate set of fiscal effort indicators are used in the formulae, it is hoped that this can lead 
local governments to behave in a more accountable way. 
Statement 11 was strongly agreed with by officials of Pattern I and moderately agreed 
with by officials of Patterns III, IV, and V.  It proposes that a mechanism of rewarding or 
punishing local governments should be established to ensure a linkage between the level of local 
service provision and the level of local taxes.  Local governments can do two things to 
strengthen the linkage.  They can improve tax administration to make sure that local residents are 
paying their due under the existing local tax and user fees system.  For example, the level of land 
value tax can be increased through the increase of land assessment value.  In a sense, this is 
similar to the notion of increasing local fiscal efforts.  Authorized by the General Law on Local 
Taxation, local governments can also raise local taxes in order to pay for additional local public 
services and projects.  It is hoped that after the linkage is strengthened, local officials and 
residents will be more cost-cautious in administering and initiating local programs and projects 
because local people have to pay for them, or, at least, a large proportion of them.  Accordingly, 
local fiscal accountability can be improved. 
Most officials participating in this study interpreted the statement as to improve tax 
administration rather than to raise local taxes.  Although officials recognized that the national 
government has made similar efforts suggested by statement 11 in recent years, they do not 
believe that these efforts have made a big difference in changing local governments’ fiscal 
behavior (2005060801, personal communication, August 01, 2005).  It was argued that existing 
rewards and punishments are not sufficient (2005061001, personal communication, June 10, 
2005; 2005061502, personal communication, June 15, 2005).  In other words, the national 
government has to increase the significance of rewards or punishments in order to obtain 
intended policy outcomes.  On the other hand, although officials generally think that 
strengthening the linkage between the level of local service provision and the level of local 
taxation by asking local governments to share more responsibility of raising local taxes is the 
right thing to do, they believe that it is almost practically impossible to achieve (2005052001, 
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personal communication, May 20, 2005).  It was argued that the mechanism to reward or punish 
local governments is only part of equation and that the key to success is that local people have to 
accept this idea of paying local services by local taxes (2005042801, personal communication, 
April 28, 2005).  Statements 29 and 11 are listed in the following for reference. 
 
29. The national government should establish a set of objective indicators to 
evaluate local fiscal efforts and take them into account in the mechanism of 
distributing national shared tax revenue and intergovernmental transfers. (+2, 
+2, +3, +1, +2) 
 
11. In order to ensure a link between local public service provision and local 
tax collection, the national government should establish a mechanism to 
reward or punish local governments. (+3, 0, +2, +2, +1) 
 
Although not intensely discussed and developed into a prominent view yet, officials in 
Taiwan do share the hope that local elected officials and voters would realize that they have to 
share more responsibility in making local policies and paying locally initiated services.  
Statements 34 and 36 are two wish statements reflecting this thinking.  Statement 34 was highly 
agreed with by officials of Patterns I, III, and IV, and moderately agreed with by officials of 
Patterns II and V.  This seems to suggest that national officials feel more strongly and urgently to 
establish the notion of paying local services by local taxes than local officials do, as we can 
recall that both Patterns II and V are comprised of local officials only. 
It was argued that local governments have to be fiscally accountable before they can ask 
for decentralization and local self-governance (2005042801, personal communication, April 28, 
2005; 2005052502, personal communication, May 25, 2005).  Furthermore, it is believed that 
local governments have to generate own-source revenues to support local development projects 
in a decentralized local governments system (2005053002, personal communication, May 30, 
2005).  It is noted, however, that agencies in charge of local finance would like to see this 
happening, but there is still a long way to go before local elected officials and people can 
embrace the idea and put it into practice (2005061501, personal communication, June 15, 2005).  
Another official also pointed out that “only after the system of national shared tax is stabilized, 
can local governments begin to focus on generating more revenue from local taxes” 
(2005052401, personal communication, May 24, 2005).  As we can recall from our discussion in 
chapter four, the national shared tax system is currently in favor of two special cities and is 
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expected to undergo major changes.  Considering national shared tax revenue represented nearly 
20% of total local revenue in FY 2004, it is not surprising to that see counties and provincial 
cities would like to focus on increasing their share of national shared tax revenue before they try 
other options to generate local revenues.  Statement 34 is a policy objective that most officials 
can accept, but it might not be easy to achieve it in the foreseeable future. 
Statement 36 was strongly agreed with by officials of Patterns III, IV, and V, but received 
zero score form Patterns I and II.  It proposes to encourage people to get involved in the local 
policy process in order to realize the true costs and benefits of local programs and projects.  It is 
reasoned that the more people are informed, the more likely they would hold local officials 
accountable for their policy and fiscal decisions.  An official elaborated and said that if people 
would like to see their local governments doing a good job, they have to get involved and keep 
an eye on the local governments to make sure that their needs are met (2005042801, personal 
communication, April 28, 2005).  However, some officials worry that if people do not have 
knowledge and experience needed for them to be responsible and rational citizens, allowing them 
to get involved in the local policymaking process would only make dysfunctional local politics 
more chaotic (2005062102, personal communication, June 21, 2005). 
An official said that if an incinerator is built, for example, nearby communities will 
organize to ask for cash feedback, and it is doubtful that they really care about public interests or 
environmental harm (2005053002, personal communication, May 30, 2005).  As we can see, 
officials do not completely trust people to make good judgments in the local policymaking 
process.  In other words, although they do not oppose getting people involved, they hope that 
people could be better prepared and more competent before being allowed to participate in the 
policy process.  Statements 34 and 36 are listed in the following for reference. 
 
34. Local government officials should recognize the essence of local self-
governance, establish the notion of paying local services by local revenues, 
and aggressively collect own-source revenue based on the law. (+4, +2, +4, +4, 
+1) 
 
36. Local people should be encouraged to get involved in the local policy 
making process to realize the costs and benefits of local services, and to better 
hold local officials accountable for local spending. (0, 0, +4, +3, +3) 
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Officials have agreed that dysfunctional local politics is a problem that leads to 
inefficiency in local spending.  In order to improve local fiscal accountability, it is suggested that 
indicators of fiscal efforts are developed to be used formulae of distributing national transfers 
and that a mechanism of rewarding and punishing is established to strengthen the linkage 
between the level of local service provision and the level of local taxation.  These are centralized 
approaches to ensure local fiscal accountability.  It is also hoped that a notion of paying local 
services by local revenues can be developed and local people would be encouraged to get 
involved in the local policy process in order to better hold local officials accountable for their 
decisions.  These two ideas may not be immediate feasible, but they represent a long-term goal to 
hold local officials accountable through a bottom-up approach. 
7.3.2 Decentralization and Local Autonomy 
Three statements are selected for the discussion in this subsection, including a bias statement, a 
wish statement, and a policy statement.  Statement 23 is a bias statement arguing that 
decentralization will facilitate local governments’ creativity to differentiate service provision in 
order to meet different local needs.  The statement was strongly agreed with by officials of 
Pattern IV and moderately agreed by officials of Patterns II and III.  In fact, among statements 
discussed in this section, statement 23 received weakest endorsement.  This is somewhat 
surprising because the statement represents one of the major reasons to pursue fiscal 
decentralization.  After examining comments of officials made during the interviews, it was 
discovered that officials do not see much room for creativity and differentiation of local service 
provision because local governments do not have sufficient revenue to do so (2005061502, 
personal communication, June 15, 2005).  Another official, although agreeing with the statement 
in general, warned that what people want is not necessary good for the society as a whole 
(2005090501, personal communication, September 05, 2005).  These views indicate that officials 
generally agree with the statement, but they do not agree with this statement as strongly as they 
do with other policy consensus statements because they do not think it would happen soon under 
existing local fiscal conditions and because they are worried that local people might demand 
something that hurts the common good.  Statement 23 is presented for reference. 
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23. Decentralization will facilitate local governments’ creativity to 
differentiate service provisions for meeting different needs. (0, +2, +1, +3, 0) 
 
The concern that local governments do not have sufficient revenues to realize the benefits 
they might gain through decentralization also appears in the statement 33.  Statement 33 is a 
wish statement expressing the hope that the national government would guarantee local 
governments sufficient financial resources to pay for their local programs.  The statement was 
strongly agreed with by officials of Patterns II and V, while moderately agreed with by officials 
of Patterns I, III, and IV.  It is noticed that Patterns II and V consist of only local officials, and 
this indicates that the most urgent need that local officials want to pursue during the process of 
fiscal decentralization is to make sure that the national government would agree to guarantee the 
funding for local basic spending needs.  When we discussed “intergovernmental fiscal 
relationship” in the first section of this chapter, a similar conclusion was drawn that although 
officials may have different opinions on whether the national government should provide 
funding for local development needs, they do agree that funding for local basic fiscal needs 
should be guaranteed by the national government. 
It is argued that the decentralization would be meaningless if local governments are not 
guaranteed enough revenue to support local basic needs (2005053001, personal communication, 
May 30, 2005).  It is reasoned that without guaranteeing to fulfill local basic needs, local 
governments will not have financial resources necessary to meet local other development needs 
(2005052502, personal communication, May 25, 2005).  In fact, in the current system of 
intergovernmental transfers, fiscal needs as a factor are considered in the formulae of distributing 
both national shared tax and the general grant.  Like the indicators just discussed earlier in this 
section, there is a difference of opinion between the national and local officials regarding how 
the basic fiscal needs or basic local expenditures should be defined.  One official explicitly 
argued that national and local officials should both agree that the current estimation of the level 
of basic local expenditures does not reflect the actual fiscal needs of local governments 
(2005062102, personal communication, June 21, 2005).  Indeed, local governments may need 
more from the national government in order to meet their basic spending needs, but as one 
official argued, the national government does not have the financial resources needed to fully 
guarantee local basic spending needs (2005070701, personal communication, July 07, 2005).  In 
general, it is expected that the national government will continue to use national shared tax and 
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the general grant to meet local basic spending needs, but local governments are also expected to 
raise more local revenues by themselves.  Statement 33 is listed in the following. 
 
33. The national government should guarantee local governments sufficient 
financial resources to support their basic public programs. (+1, +4, +1, +1, +4) 
 
Statement 12 is a policy statement proposing that the national government should make 
more national grants unconditional in order to increase local autonomy in resources allocation.  
The statement was strongly agreed with by officials of Pattern II, and moderately agreed with by 
officials of Patterns I, III, IV, and II.  It is argued that local governments know local needs better 
than the national government does.  Accordingly, the national government should not constrain 
local governments’ flexibility to provide local services.  In fact, during the 2001 reform on the 
system of intergovernmental aid, many categorical grants were replaced by the general grant, as 
we may recall from our discussion in Chapter Four.  The national government later found that 
local governments often used the funding of general grants to fund programs and projects that 
were not considered basic, and no appropriate funding was allocated to maintain basic public 
infrastructure, such as sewerage system. 
As a result, the system of memorandum was established to ask local governments to 
make plans in advance regarding how the funding from the general grant will be allocated.  The 
national government will then evaluate how these plans are implemented, and the result may 
affect the level of general grants in the following fiscal year to hold them accountable.  The 
system has become the center of criticism made by local officials for the system of the general 
grant.  From local officials’ viewpoints, the system seriously hurts local autonomy in allocating 
funds and violates the general principle of providing a general grant.  However, from national 
officials’ point of view, they just want to make sure that basic local infrastructure is adequately 
funded.  The debate will continue, but the overall direction, as agreed by officials of all patterns, 
will continue to be reducing the constraints for local governments to freely allocate local funds.  
Statement 12 is provided for reference. 
 
12. The national government should reduce the amount of conditional grants 
year by year to allow local governments more flexibility for resource 
allocation. (+1, +4, +2, +2, +2) 
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In sum, the national officials constantly express their deep concern on how local politics 
would negatively affect local fiscal behavior.  Although it is generally agreed that 
decentralization is the right way to go, they still hope to maintain a certain level of control on 
local fiscal behavior through mechanisms such as the system of memorandum.  On the other 
hand, the major concern of local officials is to raise sufficient revenue for local expenditure 
needs.  Decentralization will no doubt increase the responsibility of local governments to provide 
more local services.  However, local governments currently do not even have sufficient funds to 
pay for basic local spending.  As a result, it is argued that if the national government does not 
guarantee the funding for basic local spending, it is just not financially viable for local 
governments to meet other local needs in a decentralized system. 
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8.0  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
In the final chapter of this study, policy recommendations will be made to pursue fiscal 
decentralization in Taiwan.  Long-term and short-term recommendations will be discussed 
separately in the first section of this chapter.  In the next section, possible future researches will 
be suggested to add our understanding of Taiwan’s fiscal decentralization process and ways to 
pursue future reforms.  Finally, a briefly summary of this dissertation and few final thoughts will 
be presented in the final section. 
8.1 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Once labeled “guarded self-governance” (Huang, Jin-Tang, 1995: 1-2), the local governments 
system in Taiwan was highly centralized.  This centralization in intergovernmental 
administrative relationship led to an intergovernmental fiscal relationship in which local 
governments were extremely dependent on national transfers.  In a sense, the national 
government was acting like the parents of local governments, advising them on what to do, 
giving them an allowance or pocket money for spending needs, telling them to behave in a good 
manner, and asking them to keep out of trouble.  What the national government did not do, 
intentionally or unintentionally, was teach them how to become an independent and responsible 
grownups.  This relationship worked just fine before the beginning of democratization in the late 
1980s. 
After democratization and the decentralization that followed, local governments suddenly 
found themselves on the verge of moving out and away from the big family.  They were asked to 
support themselves and be independent, but they also quickly discovered that they did not have 
the knowledge and resources to do so.  They began to enjoy the freedom of not living with 
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parents, but they lost the financial security that was once guaranteed as well.  They could not 
make enough money to pay for their expenses, and they asked their parents for help.  On the 
other hand, facing a financial hardship themselves, the parents were no longer able to completely 
meet their children’s financial demands.  The parents tried to help their children to live at a 
minimal acceptable level, and tried to tell the children how they should live.  Their children did 
not listen, continued to spend, and asked for more financial help.  In the end, the parents sighed 
and said, “you are a grown person, and you go to find a way to make money yourself.” 
I am sure this is not a completely appropriate analogy to describe the national-local 
relationship in Taiwan, and the national and local governments have sustained a good working 
relationship to deal with the problem of poor local fiscal health together.  What I want to 
demonstrate in this analogy is how unprepared both levels of government are to deal with the 
new intergovernmental relationship that has emerged after decentralization.  Based on the 
discussion in the previous two chapters, it is not difficult to conclude that the national 
government is not ready to trust local governments and thus reduce its control of local public 
administration.  The same applies to local governments as well in that they are not ready to be 
financially independent and share more responsibility in raising local revenues.  In fact, 
regardless of the degree of decentralization, administrative and fiscal relationships need to be 
redefined between these two levels of governments in Taiwan.  When local governments are 
given more autonomy to prioritize local services and programs, they are expected to share more 
responsibility to raise local revenues and pay for local services.  However, it is obvious that both 
levels of government in Taiwan are not prepared to pursue this new relationship yet. 
In addition, there seems to be a distrust of the ability for ordinary people to demonstrate 
responsible citizenship.  Based on the scores of statements 13 and 22, both national and local 
officials tend to disagree with allowing people to vote on proposals for local revenue collection 
and establishing a system of referenda on local fiscal issues.  Pattern IV is the only pattern that 
ranked these two statements positively.  Two officials of Pattern IV include an official with 
academic experience and an official influenced by his former minister who was a public finance 
scholar.  In other words, regardless of which levels of government they are working for and 
regardless of whether they are career civil servants or political appointees, most officials in 
Taiwan do not think that it is a good idea to allow people to directly make local fiscal choices.  
As this belief that people do not have the knowledge and democratic experience necessary to 
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make the right choices is expressed by Taiwanese officials again and again in our previous 
discussion, a question should be asked: what efforts are being made to give people the 
knowledge and experience necessary for responsible citizenship? 
A policy learning process is needed to develop trust between national and local officials 
and between officials and people.  The existing distrust among stakeholders in the policy process 
of fiscal decentralization can be conceptualized by using the idea of “defensive routine” (Argyris, 
1993).  In fact, holding local governments accountable through national control and monitoring 
is only a process of single-loop learning, which can only produce strategies to bypass and cover-
up, as Argyris (1993) has told us.  Therefore, a process of double-loop learning needs to be 
initiated to transform espoused theories of stakeholders in the policy process of fiscal 
decentralization into theories-in-use by learning a “new” set of skills and a “new” set of 
governing values (Argyris, 1993).  In other words, the reform process of fiscal decentralization 
should not be ended right after redefinition of a new set of intergovernmental administrative and 
fiscal relationships is completed.  Rather, what is more important is to develop a strategy that 
allows officials and people to learn and be prepared to participate and act in the policy process of 
a decentralized system. 
In order to facilitate this learning process, an incremental approach should be adopted.  
As Lindblom argued, public administrators and policy analysts in Western democracies in 
general do largely limit their analyses to incremental or marginal differences in policies that are 
chosen to differ only incrementally in order to be relevant (1959: 84).  In other words, 
incremental policy changes increase the knowledge and experience of stakeholders in the policy 
process, allow this new knowledge and experience to be relevant in dealing with the policy 
problems, and eventually facilitate the learning process of stakeholders to adopt a new set of 
skills and a new set of governing values. 
The formulation of policy recommendations in this dissertation will follow these two 
general guidelines described above.  Both short-term and long-term policy recommendations will 
be developed to suggest directions of future reform of fiscal decentralization.  These 
recommendations are formulated mainly based on the policy consensus shared by five identified 
patterns in this study, with a few exceptions that reflect my views on what should be 
accomplished through the process of fiscal decentralization. 
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8.1.1 Short-Term Policy Recommendations 
This subsection makes policy recommendations based on the policy consensus identified in 
Chapter Seven.  As we can remember, there were two general themes discussed.  The first theme 
was to ensure local fiscal accountability by improving local fiscal efforts, strengthening the 
linkage between local service provision and local taxation, and encouraging people to get 
involved in the local policy process.  The second theme was to improve local autonomy by 
guaranteeing sufficient revenue for local basic spending needs and increasing the proportion of 
unconditional grants.  Suggestions are made based on these discussions. 
8.1.1.1 Developing indicators of fiscal efforts with local officials’ participation 
Incorporating indicators of fiscal efforts into the formulas of distributing national 
transfers is not a new idea in Taiwan.  The scores that statement 29 received from the revealed 
five patterns show that there is a consensus among officials to continue and improve the current 
practices.  As we discussed in the previous chapter, the real challenge, however, is to develop a 
set of indicators that are acceptable to all parties involved.  Based on the earlier analysis of 
policy consensus, it is suggested that a set of indicators measuring fiscal efforts should be 
developed to guide the fiscal behavior of local governments.  It is also discovered that existing 
indicators of fiscal efforts are unsatisfactory, at least, to some local officials participating in this 
study.  It goes beyond the scope of this study to suggest a set of indicators to be adopted.  Rather, 
it is recommended that local officials should be allowed an opportunity to participate in the 
process of developing these indicators, and they should be allowed to make suggestions based on 
the interests of the localities they serve.  Each locality has different social, economic, and fiscal 
conditions, and each faces different advantages and challenges when it makes fiscal decisions.  
By going through a deliberative process in which all national and local officials can freely 
exchange their ideas, evaluate each proposal, and eventually reach an collective decision, it is 
more likely that an appropriate and acceptable set of indicators would be adopted to guide the 
behavior of local governments and to improve local fiscal accountability. 
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8.1.1.2 Encouraging local governments to apply the General Law on Local Taxation 
The General Law on Local Taxation was enacted in 2002 to authorize local governments 
to impose special taxes, provisional taxes, or added taxes, and to increase some specified 
national and local tax rates up to 30% of the existing rates.  The goal is to give local governments 
authority raising local taxes in order to pay for their local services and improve local fiscal 
condition.  The law can be the seen as the first step in Taiwan to establish the notion of paying 
local services by local taxes as described by Statement 34.  A few years have passed since the 
passage of the law, and there were only few attempts of local governments to utilize this new 
authority.  As we discussed in the first section of Chapter Five, local officials believe that the 
political costs to raising local taxes are very high while the benefits or revenues generated are 
low. 
If establishing the notion of paying local services by local taxes is a desired policy goal to 
pursue, the General Law on Local Taxation needs to be better utilized to facilitate the learning 
process of accepting and adopting this notion.  It is often argued that Taiwan is small, and a 
uniform local taxation system is more appropriate in Taiwan.  However, the fact is that people 
have begun to ask local governments to do a lot more different things in different localities after 
democratization.  Local service provision is no longer uniform, and it is difficult for a uniform 
local revenue collection system to generate enough revenue to meet these different needs.  There 
is no doubt that it is not easy for local governments to ask their voters and the councils to agree 
to a local tax hike.  A question can easily be asked: why do nearby local governments not need to 
do this while continuing to provide all the same services? 
In order for local governments to answer the question, it is argued that the national 
government has to provide more financial incentives and help local governments convince their 
voters and the councils.  The existing mechanism that counts the efforts of raising local revenue 
through the law as an indicator of fiscal efforts will not be able to get the job done.  A new grant, 
in addition to the existing national shared tax and intergovernmental aid, can be made available 
on a temporary basis to reward local efforts of collecting taxes through the authorization of the 
General Law on Local Taxation.  By clearly establishing the linkage between local tax hikes and 
financial rewards that follow, local people and councils are more likely to approve the proposal 
of raising local taxes. 
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8.1.1.3 Increasing the size of national shared tax and eliminating the use general grants 
Officials of the five patterns scored statement 12 positively, and they generally agreed 
that the national government should use unconditional grants to replace conditional grants in 
order to provide local governments more flexibility for local revenue allocation.  In fact, as 
discussed in Chapter Four, the DGBAS has drastically replaced categorical grants by a general 
grant in 2001 to meet local basic spending needs.  It is hoped that the general grant can increase 
local autonomy since it is unconditional and local governments would have complete autonomy 
to allocate these funds in order to meet their basic spending needs. 
After the reform was implemented, the national government found that local governments 
often allocate the funding from the general grant to fund projects or programs that are not 
considered basic spending needs by the national government.  The system of memorandum was 
established to ask local governments to specify the amount of funds that will allocate to the 
spending categories considered basic by the national government.  Although the purpose is to 
make sure that local basic infrastructures and services are funded, the system makes the general 
grant conditional again, and there is no doubt that local autonomy would be hurt. 
It is recommended that the national government should increase the size of the national 
shared tax and eliminate the current practice of granting the general grant.  By transforming the 
general grant to conditional grants, the funding can be designed to fund specified local basic 
spending needs without worrying that local governments would reallocate the funding to other 
spending needs.  On the other hand, the size of the national shared tax should be increased to 
make up the reduction in the general grant and to allow local governments more financial 
resources to work with.  The goal is to make sure that local basic spending needs can be met 
while local governments would know in advance the amount of money available to fund locally 
prioritized spending needs. 
8.1.2 Long-Term Policy Recommendations 
Policy recommendations proposed in this subsection may not be feasible for implementation in 
the immediate future or would require a major change in the current system for adoption.  
Therefore, only after officials and people begin to realize the benefits of decentralization and 
become ready for more changes, can these recommendations be adopted for implementation.  In 
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addition, it is hoped that these recommendations can serve as a starting point to facilitate 
deliberation and on issues concerning fiscal decentralization and future reforms.  When ideas are 
freely exchanged, criticized, and debated, new policy relevant knowledge and ideas can be 
generated for future reforms. 
8.1.2.1 Sharing power of policymaking with local officials 
Most officials in charge of local finance agree that fiscal decentralization is a trend 
happening in Taiwan right now.  Although there seems to be a lack of enthusiasm outside of the 
policy community to pursue this policy goal, the differences in opinions among officials 
regarding which approach should be adopted to achieve fiscal decentralization has become an 
obstacle to the reform.  Therefore, the process of fiscal decentralization has been mostly stagnant 
in recent years.  For example, a major amendment bill of the Law on Allocation of Government 
Revenues and Expenditures was introduced to the congress in 2002 to initiate a major reform of 
the system of national shared tax and intergovernmental aid.  Although there is no strong 
opposition to the bill, it has attracted almost no attention in the congress and has not been 
reviewed for passage.  In order to understand the lack of support for reform in this policy area, 
the process in which the policies are formulated and made needs to be evaluated. 
As a unitary country, the national government has the power to make final decisions to 
define intergovernmental administrative and fiscal relationships.  In regards to the policy process 
of fiscal decentralization, the policies are often formulated at the center before meetings are 
called to invite local officials for comment and input.  A local official indicated that when there 
is a difference in opinions between national officials and local officials, the only thing local 
officials can do is keep telling national officials what local opinions are (2005060901, personal 
communication, June 09, 2005).  When there are disputes between the national and local officials, 
local officials have little leverage to change the policy decisions that are already made.  Although 
it is said that local officials would be consulted before the final decisions are made, they are 
informed, instead, in reality.  Therefore, when policies are formulated, they are often only 
intended to deal with the problems that the national government feels strongly need to be solved, 
and local needs are mostly ignored in the policy process.  This will lead either to a strong 
opposition from local governments or reluctance to support the proposals.  The 2002 incident in 
which Taipei City Mayor Ying-jeou Ma utilized his popularity and support in the congress to 
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pass an amendment to the Law on Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures best 
demonstrates the resentment which local opinions are ignored by the national government.  Their 
reluctance to support can best be seen through their limited actions to apply the General Law on 
Local Taxation enacted in 2002 in order to raise local taxes for improving fiscal conditions. 
It is clear that national and local officials do not share similar views on how fiscal 
decentralization should be achieved.  However, this does not mean that national officials should 
mostly ignore the needs of local governments in order to formulate policies that they like most.  
Instead, because there is a difference in views, a proactive effort should be taken in order to 
search for consensus by sharing the power to make policy decisions with local governments.  
When local needs are addressed in the new policy proposals, a sense of ownership for these 
proposals can be developed among local governments.  Then collaborative efforts can be 
initiated to get these proposals legislated and implemented.  Summarizing the lessons of fiscal 
decentralization learned in developing countries, Bird and Vaillancourt (1998: 35) said that 
“what may matter more than the precise nature of the technical solutions found in the different 
countries is the process through which such solutions are reached.” 
In conclusion, an appropriate political forum involving both national and local officials in 
charge of local finance should be established to make policy decisions of fiscal decentralization 
and facilitate the reform process to move forward.  The organization and authority of the forum 
may be subjected to more analyses and debates, and they will not be discussed here.  In the end, 
only when local governments are allowed to share the responsibility of making policy decisions 
of fiscal decentralization, will they support and faithfully implement the policies. 
8.1.2.2 Allowing people to vote on local fiscal policies 
The main idea of the statement 36 is that local people should be encouraged to get 
involved in local policy making process.  The statement was strongly agreed with by officials of 
Patterns III, IV, and V, while it received a zero score from officials of Patterns I and II.  The 
other two statements concerning the people’s role in the policy process of fiscal decentralization 
are more controversial.  Statement 22 advocates establishing a system of referenda on local fiscal 
issues while statement 13 argues that local people should be allowed to vote on proposals for 
local revenue collections.  Both of these two statements were scored negatively by all patterns 
other than Pattern IV.  Therefore, although it is generally agreed that local people should be 
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encouraged to get involved in the policy process, the majority of national and local officials still 
disagree that local people should participate by voting.  They claim that people should not be 
trusted and cannot make the right choices when they vote on the fiscal issues. 
There is another school of thought, however.  It recommends that people should be 
allowed to vote on local fiscal matters.  Voting is the most direct way of expressing the people’s 
ideas and making decisions in a democratic society.  However, it is also agreed that the claims 
made by officials is valid, and people should be given the knowledge and experience necessary 
to become responsible citizens.  In fact, voting on local fiscal decisions can be the process that 
encourages people to participate in the policy making process, to obtain more knowledge 
regarding a public issue, and ultimately to learn how to make policy choices.  With a carefully 
designed procedure and clearly defined question, it is believed that people will be able to vote 
responsibly and improve local fiscal accountability in the long run. 
It is suggested that at the initiation stages of allowing people to vote on local fiscal issues, 
they should be limited to vote on a projects basis.  For example, the question can be to increase 
certain percentage of property tax for a certain number of years in order to pay for a stadium.  
This avoids the possibility that people would vote for a tax cut to make local fiscal health even 
worse.  Moreover, when people begin to realize that there are costs they have to pay in order to 
get new projects or services, they will pay more attention to compare the costs and benefits 
before they make their voting decisions.  Accordingly, they can begin to learn to accept the 
notion of paying local services by local taxes, and the linkage between the level of local tax 
revenue and the level of local expenditures can be strengthened. 
8.1.2.3 Controlling only the minimum level of local tax revenue 
One of keys for fiscal decentralization to succeed is to strengthen the linkage between 
local taxation and local expenditures.  Officials of the five patterns all agree with this idea by 
ranking statement 34 positively.  However, under the existing centralized and uniform local 
taxation system, it is almost practically impossible for local governments to adjust the level of 
local taxation in accordance with the level of local spending.  The fact that local governments are 
reluctant to utilize the General Law on Local Taxation can best demonstrate how difficult it is to 
make changes to the existing local taxation system.  As a result, it is suggested that efforts should 
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be made to encourage local governments utilizing the new authority given in the General Law on 
Local Taxation to increase local tax revenue in the short run. 
In the long run, it is recommended that more flexibility should be given to local 
governments.  Currently, even with the enactment of the Law on Local Taxation, local 
governments are still constrained or handicapped to develop a tax portfolio according to their 
unique socioeconomic conditions.  As a result, it is recommended that, based on their local 
socioeconomic characteristics and local needs, local governments should be allowed to adjust 
their local tax bundle above a certain minimum level of local tax revenues set by the national 
government.  In other words, while maintaining the level of local tax revenue, local governments 
should be allowed to increase or decrease the level of individual local taxes within the tax bundle.  
Viewing the system of local taxation as a package of local taxes rather than many separate local 
tax streams allows local governments more flexibility and autonomy while making sure that 
there will be no competition for tax reduction.  The national government only controls and 
monitors the preset minimum level of local tax revenue and no longer maintains a nationally 
uniform rate and base for local taxes. 
8.2 FUTURE RESEARCHS AND QUESTIONS 
The focus of this study was to understand Taiwanese officials’ subjective views toward fiscal 
decentralization.  It was discovered, among other things, that there was a clear difference in 
views toward fiscal decentralization between national and local officials.  In fact, there were five 
patterns revealed in this study.  This indicated that at least five different views toward fiscal 
decentralization existing among officials in Taiwan.  These different patterns of attitudes were 
analyzed, compared, contrasted, and evaluated to see the difference and similarities among these 
different points of view.  Policy consensuses were identified, and policy recommendations were 
made to suggest future directions of the reform.  However, due to the constraints of time and 
resources, the scope of this study could not be extended to make more specific suggestions on 
some of the issues discussed in this study.  It is suggested that more research is needed to 
produce policy relevant knowledge in order to add to the policy discussion and deliberation on 
fiscal decentralization.  These future research areas are discussed in this section. 
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8.2.1 Policy Process of Fiscal Decentralization in Taiwan 
There are at least two questions that need to be addressed regarding the policy process of fiscal 
decentralization in Taiwan.  First, it is important to identify stakeholders in the policy process 
and understand their relationships.  Second, research should be conducted to search for an 
appropriate forum that allows national and local officials to discuss, debate, and reach policy 
consensus on issues of fiscal decentralization. 
During the stage of conducting interviews for this study, it was found that discussion and 
debates concerning fiscal decentralization are held only among national and local officials in 
charge of local finance.  Legislators, including those in the Finance Committee, do not actively 
and continuously participate in the policy deliberation process.  In addition, the new amendment 
bill of the Law on Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures was submitted to the 
congress in 2002, and the bill has not generated enough attention to be reviewed by the congress.  
Therefore, in order to facilitate the reform process of fiscal decentralization, a better 
understanding needs to be gained about the stakeholders involved in the process, their 
relationships, and the motivation for actions or inaction. 
In the section of recommendations, it is recommended that an appropriate political forum 
involving both national and local officials in charge of local finance should be established to 
provide opportunities for national and local officials to jointly formulate a proposal that can 
address both national and local needs.  In order to establish the forum, there are several questions 
that need to be answered.  How the forum is going to be organized?  To what extent is the forum 
authorized to make policy recommendations or policy decisions?  Who should be invited to 
participate and should they meet regularly or meet on a need basis?  These questions are essential 
to determine whether the forum can successfully facilitate the process to reach policy consensus 
between national and local officials and, therefore, warrant further research. 
8.2.2 Local Taxation System 
Taiwan’s local taxation system is highly centralized and uniform.  Local governments have very 
little autonomy to adjust the level of local taxation even after the General Law on Local Taxation 
was passed in 2002.  As a result, it is recommended that the national government should 
 187 
encourage local governments to apply the law for increasing local tax revenue in the short run, 
and allow local governments to adjust the their tax bundle above a preset minimum level of local 
tax revenue in the long run.  The hope is to strengthen the linkage between the level of local 
taxation and the level of local expenditures. 
It is assumed that if local governments decide to take more responsibility of raising local 
tax revenues, local fiscal health would be improved because not only they would increase the 
level of local revenue but also local fiscal accountability would be improved.  However, based 
on the fiscal data of FY 2004 presented in Table 4.4, more than 87% of local tax revenues were 
generated from land tax, property tax, and license tax if national shared tax is not included in the 
calculation.  In other words, even if local governments are willing to take more responsibility to 
raise local taxes, it is questionable whether there is enough room for them to do that.  There are 
at least four questions that can be studied.  First, to what extent can the rates of land tax, property 
tax, and license tax be raised and how much tax revenues can be generated?  Second, to what 
extent can the level of other local taxes be increased and how much tax revenues can be 
generated?  Third, are there any items or activities on which local governments can impose local 
taxes and how much local tax revenue can be generated from these new local taxes?  Finally, is 
there a need for the national government to assign a portion of certain national taxes to local 
governments in order to give them an more adequate local tax base?  For example, it might 
assign one or two percent of the income tax to localities where the tax revenue is collected and 
allowing local governments to adjust this rate. 
When the local taxation system is designed properly, it cannot only generate sufficient 
local revenue, but it can also facilitate local development and improve social equity.  The four 
questions above would only be starting points to research local taxes in a decentralized local 
fiscal system.  More information is needed for policymaking to make appropriate policy 
decisions and for academics to debate and generate new ideas for future reforms. 
8.3 SUMMING UP THE STUDY 
This is a study of subjectivity.  By employing Q methodology, this study intends to investigate 
officials’ patterns of attitudes toward fiscal decentralization.  Unlike other studies that are 
 188 
devoted to search for the best way of dealing with many problems of local public finance in 
Taiwan, this research attempts to understand the problems and issues at stake through the eyes of 
officials participating in this research and to formulate recommendations for future reforms by 
looking for consensus among the different views identified. 
This dissertation began by defining the research problem and briefly introducing the 
background of this study.  A literature review followed to depict the theoretical framework that 
this research is based on.  Two approaches of fiscal decentralization, both the centralist approach 
and the localist approach, were introduced by surveying the literature of fiscal decentralization.  
Literature written by Taiwanese scholars concerning five policy objectives, including efficiency, 
autonomy, accountability, development, and equity was summarized in order to develop this 
body of literature into a concourse, from which Q statements were selected.  It was also 
emphasized that the policy process of fiscal decentralization is a political process in nature, 
involving stakeholders negotiating and searching for policy consensuses.  When policy 
consensus is reached, both national and local officials are more likely to faithfully implement the 
proposed policies and make these policies more likely to succeed.  Therefore, it is important to 
understand the views held by officials participating in the policy process in order to search for 
the policy consensus. 
Taiwan’s current administrative and fiscal decentralization reforms were discussed next.  
Recent administrative reforms of the local governments system were introduced to demonstrate 
that power and autonomy have been decentralized in the recent years for local governments to 
meet different local needs and improve efficiency.  However, because the local fiscal system in 
Taiwan is highly centralized and uniform, local governments do not have the flexibility 
necessary to set the level of local spending, set local priorities to reflect local preferences, and be 
held accountable for local fiscal decisions. 
After research questions, hypotheses, and methodology were outlined, five revealed 
patterns of officials’ attitudes toward fiscal decentralization were analyzed.  It was found that 
officials working at different levels of government tend to perceive the concept of fiscal 
decentralization differently.  However, this does not mean that national officials tend to support 
the centralist approach while local officials would advocate for the localist approach.  If fact, it 
was discovered that Taiwanese officials tend to support the centralist approach in general with 
the few exceptions that officials of Patterns III and IV support the ideas of ensuring local 
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accountability via a localist approach while officials of Pattern II prefer adopting a localist 
approach to pursuing local development. 
With understanding of each pattern’s attitudes toward fiscal decentralization, the 
emphasis of the study became to find the differences and similarities in the officials’ views and 
ultimately to identify policy consensus for formulating policy recommendations.  The analysis 
showed that the centralist approach is often the choice of Taiwanese officials.  It is agreed that a 
national mechanism to reward or punish local fiscal behavior should be established to ensure 
local fiscal accountability.  It is also proposed that the national government should guarantee 
local governments sufficient financial resources for local development and reduce the use of 
conditional grants to increase local autonomy.  Although involving people in the policy process 
and making them share more responsibility for paying local services are generally encouraged, it 
is found that Taiwanese officials are not ready to agree with the notion of allowing local people 
to vote on local fiscal policies. 
Based on the consensuses identified, three short-term policy recommendations were 
suggested: (1) developing indicators of fiscal efforts with local officials’ participation; (2) 
encouraging local governments to apply the General Law on Local Taxation; and (3) increasing 
the size of the national shared tax and eliminating the use of general grants.  In addition, there 
were three long-term policy recommendations proposed: (1) sharing power of policymaking with 
local officials; (2) allowing people to vote on local fiscal policies; and (3) controlling only the 
minimum level of local tax revenue.  It was hoped that these short-term and long-term policy 
recommendations would be adopted to improve the local fiscal system in Taiwan. 
It should also be noted that this research contributes to the existing literature by 
confirming the existence of national-local dichotomy.  Moreover, the research reveals additional 
theories of fiscal decentralization to demonstrate that the discussion of the national-local 
dichotomy can only explain part of the story, not the whole.  It is shown that that multiple 
theories coexist and are employed by officials participating in the process of fiscal 
decentralization.  This further opens up the likelihood of policy learning in the reform process to 
reach a compromised proposal such as cooperative fiscal decentralization. 
Many Taiwanese scholars have studied the problems of poor local fiscal health, and 
policy recommendations have been made to reform different aspects of the local fiscal system in 
order to address the problems.  This research has attempted to understand the problem though the 
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eyes of officials participating in the process.  Although several recommendations have been 
made to improve the current system, what also matters is the process in which policy decisions 
are made.  As suggested, policy learning of fiscal decentralization has to occur, and an 
incremental approach should be adopted for the future reforms of fiscal decentralization.  Only 
after a culture of learning, deliberation, and collaboration is developed among stakeholders 
involved in the policy process, can local fiscal system in Taiwan begin to evolve and gradually to 
improve. 
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APPENDIX A 
SELECTED REPORTS FROM PQMETHOD OUTPUTS 
Appendix A provides selected reports generated through PQMethod.  These reports provide 
useful information about results of the Q methodology study conducted but are deemed to 
detailed to be included as one of the tables in this dissertation. 
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A.1 CORRELATION MATRIX BETWEEN Q SORTS 
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A.2 UNROTATED FACTOR MATRIX 
           Factors 
                 1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
SORTS 
  1 05040801    0.4328    0.2380    0.0363    0.3773    0.1262    0.0868   -0.3530 
  2 05041801    0.4700    0.2004    0.0258   -0.1342    0.1241    0.0143   -0.2934 
  3 05042601    0.2555    0.1362    0.0121   -0.0555    0.4648    0.1120   -0.0365 
  4 05042801    0.4023    0.0539    0.0021   -0.4934   -0.1548    0.1419    0.0367 
  5 05050501    0.6462    0.0844    0.0049    0.0868   -0.0809    0.0089    0.3042 
  6 05050502    0.4809    0.2659    0.0454   -0.3611   -0.1353    0.0757    0.4113 
  7 05051301    0.5300   -0.4453    0.1250   -0.1763    0.0209    0.0139   -0.3247 
  8 05052001    0.4918    0.2636    0.0446   -0.1291   -0.5007    0.1506   -0.1488 
  9 05052401    0.7002   -0.1942    0.0216   -0.0681   -0.0424    0.0030   -0.2769 
 10 05052501    0.5537   -0.3635    0.0805   -0.2598    0.1524    0.0425    0.0751 
 11 05052502    0.5146   -0.0564    0.0015   -0.0715   -0.4065    0.0942    0.0773 
 12 05052701    0.6381   -0.1638    0.0151    0.3639    0.1197    0.0804    0.4032 
 13 05053001    0.4478   -0.2600    0.0396   -0.2271   -0.1060    0.0309   -0.1845 
 14 05053002    0.3935    0.1256    0.0104    0.1810   -0.1489    0.0318   -0.3704 
 15 05060701    0.5208   -0.0822    0.0035   -0.1305    0.2812    0.0454    0.1971 
 16 05060801    0.4116   -0.4620    0.1356   -0.1260   -0.0202    0.0071    0.0983 
 17 05060802    0.6160   -0.1847    0.0194    0.2158   -0.1539    0.0404    0.1999 
 18 05060901    0.6263   -0.0417    0.0008    0.1316    0.0224    0.0103   -0.2315 
 19 05061001    0.4485   -0.4612    0.1351    0.0411    0.2203    0.0239    0.0513 
 20 05061002    0.4913   -0.2099    0.0253    0.1952    0.3358    0.0782   -0.0853 
 21 05061501    0.4685    0.2452    0.0385    0.1516    0.4839    0.1363    0.2890 
 22 05061502    0.3078    0.1719    0.0191    0.2230    0.1984    0.0466    0.2478 
 23 05062101    0.3499   -0.4658    0.1381    0.1063   -0.0194    0.0073   -0.0484 
 24 05062102    0.5437    0.2215    0.0315    0.1646   -0.3851    0.0997   -0.2792 
 25 05062301    0.5037    0.3013    0.0584    0.0645   -0.0672    0.0058    0.1676 
 26 05062302    0.7424   -0.0181    0.0001   -0.0246    0.0492    0.0008   -0.1000 
 27 05070501    0.7203   -0.0746    0.0029    0.0916   -0.0870    0.0100    0.1614 
 28 05070701    0.5367   -0.1243    0.0084   -0.2112    0.0443    0.0211    0.0838 
 29 05070702    0.7038    0.0573    0.0024    0.2327   -0.1110    0.0381   -0.0004 
 30 05071501    0.6666   -0.1922    0.0211    0.1540   -0.2227    0.0420   -0.0961 
 31 05072101    0.6185   -0.2957    0.0519   -0.0059   -0.1645    0.0155    0.0479 
 32 05080201    0.4055    0.0551    0.0022   -0.2710   -0.3037    0.0881    0.1327 
 33 05081701    0.6939    0.2761    0.0490   -0.0847    0.2051    0.0222    0.1392 
 34 05082201    0.5382    0.0610    0.0026    0.2690   -0.0039    0.0405   -0.1612 
 35 05082401    0.7643    0.0695    0.0034   -0.2183    0.1131    0.0275   -0.0872 
 36 05083101    0.1012    0.1422    0.0132   -0.4142    0.3772    0.1641    0.1640 
 37 05090501    0.2478    0.6035    0.2636    0.3202    0.0976    0.0613   -0.1381 
 38 05091201    0.5163    0.5117    0.1795    0.0709   -0.3023    0.0542   -0.0733 
 
 Eigenvalues  10.8104   2.5893   0.2012   1.7497   1.9682   0.1778   1.6066 
 % expl.Var.     28       7        1        5        5        0        4 
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A.3 ROTATING ANGLES USED BETWEEN FACTORS 
  FTR#1  FTR#2  ANGLE 
    1      3     10.        
    2      7     10.        
    5      7     -5.        
    4      7     -8.        
    1      7     -2.        
    1      5     10.        
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A.4  RANK STATEMENT TOTALS WITH EACH FACTOR 
                                                                             Factors 
No.  Statement                                         No.    1        2        3        4          5  
1 Reliance on nat transfers makes L_comp. planing impo  1 -1.04 35  1.05  6 -0.64 29  1.59  2 -0.66 29 
2 N_gov't have authority to monitor L_debts, budget, &  2  1.50  3 -0.39 25 -1.17 35 -1.27 36  0.38 16 
3 More efficient to allow Lgov provide L_services       3  0.14 20  1.17  5  0.65 12 -0.86 31  0.73 11 
4 Lgov can achieve distributional objectives in E, MC,  4 -1.01 34 -1.08 34  0.12 19 -1.50 39 -0.55 26 
5 Redistributive policies can be a L_public goods       5  0.18 18 -0.70 30 -0.67 30 -0.51 26 -1.09 34 
6 L_politics, lobbying, & P_groups L_spending grows     6  1.13  7  0.30 13  0.94  8  2.13  1  1.67  3 
7 L_governance & L_fiscal system should be enacted int  7  0.83 11  0.28 14  1.21  6 -0.42 24  1.48  4 
8 Paying taxes, people will ask for costs_Red & effe_i  8 -0.58 26 -1.18 37  0.22 17  0.62 14 -0.57 27 
9 To itemize what L_gov'ts are prohitited to do         9  0.45 14 -0.13 23  1.24  5 -1.39 38  0.01 21 
10 Rich will move out and the poor will move in for L_ 10 -0.91 32 -1.08 35 -0.07 22  0.86 11 -0.70 31 
11 N_mech. should be estab. to reward or pubish L_gov' 11  1.22  6  0.12 21  0.66 11  0.74 12  0.39 15 
12 N_gov't should reduce conditional grants for L_flex 12  0.63 13  2.17  3  0.77 10  0.95  9  0.90  8 
13 L_residents should vote for proposal of L_Revenue C 13 -1.15 36 -1.76 40 -0.60 27  0.67 13 -1.58 38 
14 L_gov'ts promote equity, L_econ. resour. will be dr 14 -1.27 37  0.25 16 -1.29 36  0.86 11  0.09 18 
15 L_gov'ts incapable of unemp., inflation, and I_redi 15 -0.40 24  0.55 10 -0.83 32  1.29  4 -0.19 24 
16 N_grants lead to ignore projects unfunded by the ce 16 -1.80 39 -0.72 31 -0.81 31  0.21 19 -0.16 23 
17 L_gov'ts can be creative and effective if more resp 17 -0.70 28 -0.03 22  0.53 14 -0.95 33 -1.39 37 
18 Law of NST be enacted to set stand., formu., & proc 18  1.08  9  0.94  7  1.68  2 -0.74 29  0.82 10 
19 Tax competition will enhance the efficiency         19 -0.33 23 -1.05 33 -0.90 33 -1.39 38 -1.77 40 
20 Law to regulate IT to min. N_gov't intervention     20  0.33 15  0.27 15  0.86  9 -0.74 29  0.43 14 
21 I_grants will foster L_overspending                 21 -1.81 40 -1.35 38 -1.68 38 -0.88 32 -0.59 28 
22 To hold L_officials accountable, enact referenda    22 -1.00 33 -1.73 39 -0.33 25  0.97  8 -0.83 32 
23 Decentral. will facilitate L_creativity to differen 23 -0.15 22  0.80  8  0.65 13  1.06  6  0.01 20 
24 Money & power central., L_gov't can't be act. in L_ 24 -0.76 29  2.18  2 -0.91 34 -1.80 40  0.05 19 
25 L_determine tax rate & base leads competition tax r 25 -0.50 25 -0.20 24 -1.73 39 -0.23 22  1.80  2 
26 L_gov'ts should have autonomy to set L_priorities   26 -0.78 30  1.23  4  1.28  4 -0.51 26 -0.47 25 
27 More L_respons. allows welfare prog. better fit L_n 27 -0.85 31 -0.47 27 -0.28 24 -0.53 27 -1.75 39 
28 N_gov't should revoke control of L_revenue collecti 28  0.20 17  0.15 20 -0.04 21 -0.86 31 -1.09 33 
29 N_gov't to establish indicators for distr. NST & IT 29  1.09  8  0.44 11  1.13  7  0.51 15  0.59 12 
30 L_decisions will better reflect L_interests         30 -0.65 27  0.32 12  0.51 15  0.00 21  0.44 13 
31 N_grants can stimulate local private investments    31  1.25  5 -0.67 28 -0.63 28 -1.09 34 -0.06 22 
32 Law on L_Budgeting should be enacted for N_monitori 32  1.63  2 -0.45 26 -1.96 40 -0.35 23 -1.12 35 
33 N_gov't should guarantee sufficient L_revenue       33  0.22 16  2.20  1  0.45 16  0.42 17  1.97  1 
34 L_gov't establ. the notion paying L_services by L_r 34  1.76  1  0.75  9  2.09  1  1.48  3  0.36 17 
35 Over_decen. will make N_wide fiscal policy impossib 35  0.74 12  0.18 19 -0.43 26  0.32 18  0.90  9 
36 L_people to involve in L_policy to realize costs &  36  0.13 21  0.20 18  1.36  3  1.18  5  1.12  6 
37 N_gov't should organize a technical assistance team 37  0.99 10  0.23 17  0.18 18  0.00 21 -0.69 30 
38 Progressive income tax for I_grants can equalize    38  0.17 19 -1.03 32 -0.08 23 -1.27 36  1.07  7 
39 Purpose of IA is to offset inefficiency from spillo 39 -1.43 38 -1.09 36 -1.45 37  0.44 16 -1.19 36 
40 Sufficient N_resources to promote balanced L_growth 40  1.45  4 -0.69 29 -0.03 20  0.97  8  1.21  5 
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A.5 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FACTOR SCORES 
            1       2       3       4       5 
 
    1     1.0000  0.2726  0.3980  0.0443  0.4459 
 
    2     0.2726  1.0000  0.4187  0.1044  0.4751 
 
    3     0.3980  0.4187  1.0000  0.1738  0.3709 
 
    4     0.0443  0.1044  0.1738  1.0000  0.2117 
 
    5     0.4459  0.4751  0.3709  0.2117  1.0000 
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A.6 NORMALIZED FACTOR SCORES FOR FACTOR 1 
No.  Statement                                                No. Z-SCORES 
  
 34  L_gov't establ. the notion paying L_services by L_reven.   34     1.755 
 32  Law on L_Budgeting should be enacted for N_monitoring      32     1.631 
  2  N_gov't have authority to monitor L_debts, budget, & tax    2     1.495 
 40  Sufficient N_resources to promote balanced L_growth        40     1.452 
 31  N_grants can stimulate local private investments           31     1.250 
 11  N_mech. should be estab. to reward or pubish L_gov'ts      11     1.220 
  6  L_politics, lobbying, & P_groups L_spending grows           6     1.127 
 29  N_gov't to establish indicators for distr. NST & IT        29     1.085 
 18  Law of NST be enacted to set stand., formu., & proced.     18     1.082 
 37  N_gov't should organize a technical assistance team        37     0.988 
  7  L_governance & L_fiscal systems should be enacted into law  7     0.831 
 35  Over_decen. will make N_wide fiscal policy impossible      35     0.744 
 12  N_gov't should reduce conditional grants for L_flex        12     0.632 
  9  To itemize what L_gov'ts are prohitited to do               9     0.449 
 20  Law to regulate IT to min. N_gov't intervention            20     0.333 
 33  N_gov't should guarantee sufficient L_revenue              33     0.225 
 28  N_gov't should revoke control of L_revenue collection      28     0.202 
  5  Redistributive policies can be a L_public goods             5     0.180 
 38  Progressive income tax for I_grants can equalize           38     0.172 
  3  More efficient to allow Lgov provide L_services             3     0.142 
 36  L_people to involve in L_policy to realize costs & bene.   36     0.127 
 23  Decentral. will facilitate L_creativity to differentiate   23    -0.152 
 19  Tax competition will enhance the efficiency                19    -0.326 
 15  L_gov'ts incapable of unemp., inflation, and I_redistri.   15    -0.401 
 25  L_determine tax rate & base leads competition tax reduc.   25    -0.503 
  8  Paying taxes, people will ask for costs_Red & effe_impro.   8    -0.578 
 30  L_decisions will better reflect L_interests                30    -0.654 
 17  L_gov'ts can be creative and effective if more respon.     17    -0.700 
 24  Money & power central., L_gov't can't be act. in L_proj.   24    -0.755 
 26  L_gov'ts should have autonomy to set L_priorities          26    -0.780 
 27  More L_respons. allows welfare prog. better fit L_needs    27    -0.851 
 10  Rich will move out and the poor will move in for L_Redis   10    -0.911 
 22  To hold L_officials accountable, enact referenda           22    -1.004 
  4  Lgov can achieve distributional objectives in E, MC, & HA   4    -1.006 
  1  Reliance on nat transfers makes L_comp. planing imposs      1    -1.043 
 13  L_residents should vote for proposal of L_Revenue Coll.    13    -1.145 
 14  L_gov'ts promote equity, L_econ. resour. will be drained   14    -1.272 
 39  Purpose of IA is to offset inefficiency from spillover     39    -1.430 
 16  N_grants lead to ignore projects unfunded by the center    16    -1.797 
 21  I_grants will foster L_overspending                        21    -1.814 
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A.7 NORMALIZED FACTOR SCORES FOR FACTOR 2 
No.  Statement                                                No. Z-SCORES 
  
 33  N_gov't should guarantee sufficient L_revenue              33     2.203 
 24  Money & power central., L_gov't can't be act. in L_proj.   24     2.184 
 12  N_gov't should reduce conditional grants for L_flex        12     2.168 
 26  L_gov'ts should have autonomy to set L_priorities          26     1.227 
  3  More efficient to allow Lgov provide L_services             3     1.172 
  1  Reliance on nat transfers makes L_comp. planing imposs      1     1.054 
 18  Law of NST be enacted to set stand., formu., & proced.     18     0.937 
 23  Decentral. will facilitate L_creativity to differentiate   23     0.798 
 34  L_gov't establ. the notion paying L_services by L_reven.   34     0.749 
 15  L_gov'ts incapable of unemp., inflation, and I_redistri.   15     0.551 
 29  N_gov't to establish indicators for distr. NST & IT        29     0.444 
 30  L_decisions will better reflect L_interests                30     0.317 
  6  L_politics, lobbying, & P_groups L_spending grows           6     0.299 
  7  L_governance & L_fiscal systems should be enacted into law  7     0.279 
 20  Law to regulate IT to min. N_gov't intervention            20     0.273 
 14  L_gov'ts promote equity, L_econ. resour. will be drained   14     0.255 
 37  N_gov't should organize a technical assistance team        37     0.226 
 36  L_people to involve in L_policy to realize costs & bene.   36     0.201 
 35  Over_decen. will make N_wide fiscal policy impossible      35     0.184 
 28  N_gov't should revoke control of L_revenue collection      28     0.155 
 11  N_mech. should be estab. to reward or pubish L_gov'ts      11     0.118 
 17  L_gov'ts can be creative and effective if more respon.     17    -0.030 
  9  To itemize what L_gov'ts are prohitited to do               9    -0.130 
 25  L_determine tax rate & base leads competition tax reduc.   25    -0.202 
  2  N_gov't have authority to monitor L_debts, budget, & tax    2    -0.391 
 32  Law on L_Budgeting should be enacted for N_monitoring      32    -0.446 
 27  More L_respons. allows welfare prog. better fit L_needs    27    -0.471 
 31  N_grants can stimulate local private investments           31    -0.672 
 40  Sufficient N_resources to promote balanced L_growth        40    -0.692 
  5  Redistributive policies can be a L_public goods             5    -0.699 
 16  N_grants lead to ignore projects unfunded by the center    16    -0.723 
 38  Progressive income tax for I_grants can equalize           38    -1.029 
 19  Tax competition will enhance the efficiency                19    -1.049 
  4  Lgov can achieve distributional objectives in E, MC, & HA   4    -1.076 
 10  Rich will move out and the poor will move in for L_Redis   10    -1.080 
 39  Purpose of IA is to offset inefficiency from spillover     39    -1.095 
  8  Paying taxes, people will ask for costs_Red & effe_impro.   8    -1.176 
 21  I_grants will foster L_overspending                        21    -1.349 
 22  To hold L_officials accountable, enact referenda           22    -1.727 
 13  L_residents should vote for proposal of L_Revenue Coll.    13    -1.759 
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A.8 NORMALIZED FACTOR SCORES FOR FACTOR 3 
No.  Statement                                                No. Z-SCORES 
  
 34  L_gov't establ. the notion paying L_services by L_reven.   34     2.087 
 18  Law of NST be enacted to set stand., formu., & proced.     18     1.678 
 36  L_people to involve in L_policy to realize costs & bene.   36     1.358 
 26  L_gov'ts should have autonomy to set L_priorities          26     1.283 
  9  To itemize what L_gov'ts are prohitited to do               9     1.239 
  7  L_governance & L_fiscal systems should be enacted into law  7     1.211 
 29  N_gov't to establish indicators for distr. NST & IT        29     1.128 
  6  L_politics, lobbying, & P_groups L_spending grows           6     0.936 
 20  Law to regulate IT to min. N_gov't intervention            20     0.857 
 12  N_gov't should reduce conditional grants for L_flex        12     0.770 
 11  N_mech. should be estab. to reward or pubish L_gov'ts      11     0.660 
  3  More efficient to allow Lgov provide L_services             3     0.648 
 23  Decentral. will facilitate L_creativity to differentiate   23     0.645 
 17  L_gov'ts can be creative and effective if more respon.     17     0.533 
 30  L_decisions will better reflect L_interests                30     0.514 
 33  N_gov't should guarantee sufficient L_revenue              33     0.446 
  8  Paying taxes, people will ask for costs_Red & effe_impro.   8     0.220 
 37  N_gov't should organize a technical assistance team        37     0.178 
  4  Lgov can achieve distributional objectives in E, MC, & HA   4     0.118 
 40  Sufficient N_resources to promote balanced L_growth        40    -0.027 
 28  N_gov't should revoke control of L_revenue collection      28    -0.038 
 10  Rich will move out and the poor will move in for L_Redis   10    -0.070 
 38  Progressive income tax for I_grants can equalize           38    -0.083 
 27  More L_respons. allows welfare prog. better fit L_needs    27    -0.276 
 22  To hold L_officials accountable, enact referenda           22    -0.330 
 35  Over_decen. will make N_wide fiscal policy impossible      35    -0.427 
 13  L_residents should vote for proposal of L_Revenue Coll.    13    -0.595 
 31  N_grants can stimulate local private investments           31    -0.627 
  1  Reliance on nat transfers makes L_comp. planing imposs      1    -0.643 
  5  Redistributive policies can be a L_public goods             5    -0.669 
 16  N_grants lead to ignore projects unfunded by the center    16    -0.809 
 15  L_gov'ts incapable of unemp., inflation, and I_redistri.   15    -0.831 
 19  Tax competition will enhance the efficiency                19    -0.902 
 24  Money & power central., L_gov't can't be act. in L_proj.   24    -0.909 
  2  N_gov't have authority to monitor L_debts, budget, & tax    2    -1.169 
 14  L_gov'ts promote equity, L_econ. resour. will be drained   14    -1.287 
 39  Purpose of IA is to offset inefficiency from spillover     39    -1.453 
 21  I_grants will foster L_overspending                        21    -1.677 
 25  L_determine tax rate & base leads competition tax reduc.   25    -1.725 
 32  Law on L_Budgeting should be enacted for N_monitoring      32    -1.963 
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A.9 NORMALIZED FACTOR SCORES FOR FACTOR 4 
No.  Statement                                                No. Z-SCORES 
  
  6  L_politics, lobbying, & P_groups L_spending grows           6     2.127 
  1  Reliance on nat transfers makes L_comp. planing imposs      1     1.595 
 34  L_gov't establ. the notion paying L_services by L_reven.   34     1.479 
 15  L_gov'ts incapable of unemp., inflation, and I_redistri.   15     1.295 
 36  L_people to involve in L_policy to realize costs & bene.   36     1.179 
 23  Decentral. will facilitate L_creativity to differentiate   23     1.063 
 22  To hold L_officials accountable, enact referenda           22     0.971 
 40  Sufficient N_resources to promote balanced L_growth        40     0.971 
 12  N_gov't should reduce conditional grants for L_flex        12     0.948 
 10  Rich will move out and the poor will move in for L_Redis   10     0.855 
 14  L_gov'ts promote equity, L_econ. resour. will be drained   14     0.855 
 11  N_mech. should be estab. to reward or pubish L_gov'ts      11     0.740 
 13  L_residents should vote for proposal of L_Revenue Coll.    13     0.671 
  8  Paying taxes, people will ask for costs_Red & effe_impro.   8     0.624 
 29  N_gov't to establish indicators for distr. NST & IT        29     0.508 
 39  Purpose of IA is to offset inefficiency from spillover     39     0.439 
 33  N_gov't should guarantee sufficient L_revenue              33     0.416 
 35  Over_decen. will make N_wide fiscal policy impossible      35     0.324 
 16  N_grants lead to ignore projects unfunded by the center    16     0.208 
 30  L_decisions will better reflect L_interests                30     0.000 
 37  N_gov't should organize a technical assistance team        37     0.000 
 25  L_determine tax rate & base leads competition tax reduc.   25    -0.231 
 32  Law on L_Budgeting should be enacted for N_monitoring      32    -0.347 
  7  L_governance & L_fiscal systems should be enacted into law  7    -0.416 
 26  L_gov'ts should have autonomy to set L_priorities          26    -0.508 
  5  Redistributive policies can be a L_public goods             5    -0.508 
 27  More L_respons. allows welfare prog. better fit L_needs    27    -0.532 
 20  Law to regulate IT to min. N_gov't intervention            20    -0.740 
 18  Law of NST be enacted to set stand., formu., & proced.     18    -0.740 
 28  N_gov't should revoke control of L_revenue collection      28    -0.855 
  3  More efficient to allow Lgov provide L_services             3    -0.855 
 21  I_grants will foster L_overspending                        21    -0.879 
 17  L_gov'ts can be creative and effective if more respon.     17    -0.948 
 31  N_grants can stimulate local private investments           31    -1.087 
  2  N_gov't have authority to monitor L_debts, budget, & tax    2    -1.271 
 38  Progressive income tax for I_grants can equalize           38    -1.271 
 19  Tax competition will enhance the efficiency                19    -1.387 
  9  To itemize what L_gov'ts are prohitited to do               9    -1.387 
  4  Lgov can achieve distributional objectives in E, MC, & HA   4    -1.503 
 24  Money & power central., L_gov't can't be act. in L_proj.   24    -1.803 
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A.10 NORMALIZED FACTOR SCORES FOR FACTOR 5 
No.  Statement                                                No. Z-SCORES 
  
 33  N_gov't should guarantee sufficient L_revenue              33     1.973 
 25  L_determine tax rate & base leads competition tax reduc.   25     1.798 
  6  L_politics, lobbying, & P_groups L_spending grows           6     1.673 
  7  L_governance & L_fiscal systems should be enacted into law  7     1.481 
 40  Sufficient N_resources to promote balanced L_growth        40     1.215 
 36  L_people to involve in L_policy to realize costs & bene.   36     1.120 
 38  Progressive income tax for I_grants can equalize           38     1.067 
 12  N_gov't should reduce conditional grants for L_flex        12     0.900 
 35  Over_decen. will make N_wide fiscal policy impossible      35     0.896 
 18  Law of NST be enacted to set stand., formu., & proced.     18     0.820 
  3  More efficient to allow Lgov provide L_services             3     0.734 
 29  N_gov't to establish indicators for distr. NST & IT        29     0.591 
 30  L_decisions will better reflect L_interests                30     0.438 
 20  Law to regulate IT to min. N_gov't intervention            20     0.432 
 11  N_mech. should be estab. to reward or pubish L_gov'ts      11     0.386 
  2  N_gov't have authority to monitor L_debts, budget, & tax    2     0.385 
 34  L_gov't establ. the notion paying L_services by L_reven.   34     0.361 
 14  L_gov'ts promote equity, L_econ. resour. will be drained   14     0.093 
 24  Money & power central., L_gov't can't be act. in L_proj.   24     0.053 
 23  Decentral. will facilitate L_creativity to differentiate   23     0.014 
  9  To itemize what L_gov'ts are prohitited to do               9     0.008 
 31  N_grants can stimulate local private investments           31    -0.057 
 16  N_grants lead to ignore projects unfunded by the center    16    -0.156 
 15  L_gov'ts incapable of unemp., inflation, and I_redistri.   15    -0.189 
 26  L_gov'ts should have autonomy to set L_priorities          26    -0.470 
  4  Lgov can achieve distributional objectives in E, MC, & HA   4    -0.554 
  8  Paying taxes, people will ask for costs_Red & effe_impro.   8    -0.573 
 21  I_grants will foster L_overspending                        21    -0.586 
  1  Reliance on nat transfers makes L_comp. planing imposs      1    -0.659 
 37  N_gov't should organize a technical assistance team        37    -0.686 
 10  Rich will move out and the poor will move in for L_Redis   10    -0.697 
 22  To hold L_officials accountable, enact referenda           22    -0.832 
 28  N_gov't should revoke control of L_revenue collection      28    -1.089 
  5  Redistributive policies can be a L_public goods             5    -1.090 
 32  Law on L_Budgeting should be enacted for N_monitoring      32    -1.116 
 39  Purpose of IA is to offset inefficiency from spillover     39    -1.186 
 17  L_gov'ts can be creative and effective if more respon.     17    -1.392 
 13  L_residents should vote for proposal of L_Revenue Coll.    13    -1.581 
 27  More L_respons. allows welfare prog. better fit L_needs    27    -1.752 
 19  Tax competition will enhance the efficiency                19    -1.772 
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A.11 FACTOR Q-SORT VALUES FOR EACH STATEMENT 
                                                                      Factor Arrays 
No.  Statement                                               No.   1   2   3   4   5 
  
 1  Reliance on nat transfers makes L_comp. planing imposs      1   -3   3  -2   4  -2 
 2  N_gov't have authority to monitor L_debts, budget, & tax    2    4  -1  -3  -3   1 
 3  More efficient to allow Lgov provide L_services             3    0   3   2  -2   2 
 4  Lgov can achieve distributional objectives in E, MC, & HA   4   -3  -3   0  -4  -1 
 5  Redistributive policies can be a L_public goods             5    0  -2  -2  -1  -3 
 6  L_politics, lobbying, & P_groups L_spending grows           6    3   1   2   4   4 
 7  L_governance & L_fiscal systems should be enacted into law  7    2   1   3  -1   3 
 8  Paying taxes, people will ask for costs_Red & effe_impro.   8   -1  -3   1   1  -1 
 9  To itemize what L_gov'ts are prohitited to do               9    1   0   3  -4   0 
10  Rich will move out and the poor will move in for L_Redis   10   -2  -3   0   2  -2 
11  N_mech. should be estab. to reward or pubish L_gov'ts      11    3   0   2   2   1 
12  N_gov't should reduce conditional grants for L_flex        12    1   4   2   2   2 
13  L_residents should vote for proposal of L_Revenue Coll.    13   -3  -4  -1   1  -4 
14  L_gov'ts promote equity, L_econ. resour. will be drained   14   -3   1  -3   2   0 
15  L_gov'ts incapable of unemp., inflation, and I_redistri.   15   -1   2  -2   3  -1 
16  N_grants lead to ignore projects unfunded by the center    16   -4  -2  -2   0   0 
17  L_gov'ts can be creative and effective if more respon.     17   -1   0   1  -2  -3 
18  Law of NST be enacted to set stand., formu., & proced.     18    2   3   4  -2   2 
19  Tax competition will enhance the efficiency                19    0  -2  -2  -4  -4 
20  Law to regulate IT to min. N_gov't intervention            20    1   1   2  -2   1 
21  I_grants will foster L_overspending                        21   -4  -4  -4  -2  -1 
22  To hold L_officials accountable, enact referenda           22   -2  -4  -1   2  -2 
23  Decentral. will facilitate L_creativity to differentiate   23    0   2   1   3   0 
24  Money & power central., L_gov't can't be act. in L_proj.   24   -2   4  -3  -4   0 
25  L_determine tax rate & base leads competition tax reduc.   25   -1  -1  -4   0   4 
26  L_gov'ts should have autonomy to set L_priorities          26   -2   3   3  -1  -1 
27  More L_respons. allows welfare prog. better fit L_needs    27   -2  -1  -1  -1  -4 
28  N_gov't should revoke control of L_revenue collection      28    1   0   0  -2  -2 
29  N_gov't to establish indicators for distr. NST & IT        29    2   2   3   1   2 
30  L_decisions will better reflect L_interests                30   -1   2   1   0   1 
31  N_grants can stimulate local private investments           31    3  -1  -1  -3   0 
32  Law on L_Budgeting should be enacted for N_monitoring      32    4  -1  -4   0  -3 
33  N_gov't should guarantee sufficient L_revenue              33    1   4   1   1   4 
34  L_gov't establ. the notion paying L_services by L_reven.   34    4   2   4   4   1 
35  Over_decen. will make N_wide fiscal policy impossible      35    2   0  -1   0   2 
36  L_people to involve in L_policy to realize costs & bene.   36    0   0   4   3   3 
37  N_gov't should organize a technical assistance team        37    2   1   0   0  -2 
38  Progressive income tax for I_grants can equalize           38    0  -2   0  -3   3 
39  Purpose of IA is to offset inefficiency from spillover     39   -4  -3  -3   1  -3 
40  Sufficient N_resources to promote balanced L_growth        40    3  -2   0   2   3 
 
Variance =  5.450  St. Dev. =  2.335 
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APPENDIX B 
FACTOR ARRAYS 
B.1 FACTOR ARRAYS OF FIVE REVEALED PATTERNS 
Factor Array of Pattern I 
Most Agree      Most Disagree
4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 
34 40 29 12 05 15 24 04 39 
32 31 18 09 38 25 26 01 16 
02 11 37 20 03 08 27 13 21 
(3) 06 07 33 36 30 10 14 (3) 
 (4) 35 28 23 17 22 (4)  
  (5) (5) 19 (5) (5)   
    (6)     
 
 
 
 
Factor Array of Pattern II 
Most Agree      Most Disagree
4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 
33 26 23 06 36 25 40 04 21 
24 03 34 07 35 02 05 10 22 
12 01 15 20 28 32 16 39 13 
(3) 18 29 14 11 27 38 08 (3) 
 (4) 30 37 17 31 19 (4)  
  (5) (5) 09 (5) (5)   
    (6)     
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Factor Array of Pattern III 
Most Agree      Most Disagree
4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 
34 26 06 23 37 27 01 24 21 
18 09 20 17 04 22 05 02 25 
36 07 12 30 40 35 16 14 32 
(3) 29 11 33 28 13 15 39 (3) 
 (4) 03 08 10 31 19 (4)  
  (5) (5) 38 (5) (5)   
    (6)     
 
 
 
 
Factor Array of Pattern IV 
Most Agree      Most Disagree
4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 
06 15 40 13 35 07 18 31 09 
01 36 12 08 16 26 28 02 04 
34 23 10 29 30 05 03 38 24 
(3) 22 14 39 37 27 21 19 (3) 
 (4) 11 33 25 20 17 (4)  
  (5) (5) 32 (5) (5)   
    (6)     
 
 
 
 
Factor Array of Pattern V 
Most Agree      Most Disagree
4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 
33 07 12 30 14 15 01 05 13 
25 40 35 20 24 26 37 32 27 
06 36 18 11 23 04 10 39 19 
(3) 38 03 02 09 08 22 17 (3) 
 (4) 29 34 31 21 28 (4)  
  (5) (5) 16 (5) (5)   
    (6)     
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B.2 FACTOR ARRAYS BY CATEGORIES 
 
C N Q Statements I II III IV V
39 
The main purpose of granting intergovernmental aid is to 
offset inefficiency caused by the spillover effect, which means 
benefits of local services can be enjoyed by residents in other 
jurisdictions. 
-4 -3 -3 1 -3
06 Due to local politics, interests lobbying, and pressure groups, local spending keeps growing and becomes inefficient. 3 1 2 4 4 
25 
Once local government officials obtain authority to determine 
local tax bases and rates, it is easy for them to engage in a 
competition for tax reduction. 
-1 -1 -4 0 4 
Ef
fic
ie
nc
y-
C
en
tra
l C
on
tro
l 
35 
Over decentralization will make a consistent nation-wide 
fiscal policy impossible, resulting in an even more severe 
fiscal imbalance among localities. 
2 0 -1 0 2 
03 
It would be far more efficient to allow local governments to 
provide local public services at different levels than to 
regulate them under a uniform level set by the national 
government. 
0 3 2 -2 2 
19 Tax competition will enhance the efficiency of economic resource allocation. 0 -2 -2 -3 -4
23 Decentralization will facilitate local governments’ creativity to differentiate service provisions for meeting different needs. 0 2 1 3 0 
Ef
fic
ie
nc
y-
Lo
ca
l F
re
ed
om
 
21 Intergovernmental grants from the national government will foster local overspending. -4 -4 -4 -2 -1
07 The establishment of self-governance and local fiscal systems should be enacted into law. 2 1 3 -1 3 
18 The Law of Shared Tax should be enacted to regulate standards, formulas, and procedures of shared tax distribution. 2 3 4 -2 2 
20 
A law should be enacted to regulate the system of 
intergovernmental transfer in order to minimize the possibility 
that national government would use intergovernmental 
transfers as a policy tool to intervene in local affairs. 
1 1 2 -1 1 
A
ut
on
om
y-
C
en
tra
l C
on
tro
l 
12 
The national government should reduce the amount of 
conditional grants year by year to allow local governments 
more flexibility for resource allocation. 
1 4 2 2 2 
 206 
C N Q Statements I II III IV V
09 The principle of regulating local governments is to itemize what they are prohibited to do. 1 0 3 -4 0 
28 The national government should revoke control of local revenue collection. 1 0 0 -2 -2 
13 
Following certain administrative procedures, local residents 
should be able to vote on proposals for local revenue 
collection. 
-3 -4 -1 1 -4 
A
ut
on
om
y-
Lo
ca
l F
re
ed
om
 
26 
Local government should have complete independent 
autonomy to set policy priorities for its administrative 
activities. 
-2 3 3 -1 -1 
11 
In order to ensure a link between local public service 
provision and local tax collection, the national government 
should establish a mechanism to reward or punish local 
governments. 
3 0 2 2 1 
29 
The national government should establish a set of objective 
indicators to evaluate local fiscal efforts and take them into 
account in the mechanism of distributing national shared tax 
revenue and intergovernmental transfers. 
2 2 3 1 2 
02 
The national government should have the authority to monitor 
and control local governments’ practices in raising debts, 
budgeting, taxing, and collecting other local revenues. 
4 -1 -3 -3 1 
A
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
-C
en
tra
l C
on
tro
l 
32 
The Law on Local Budgeting, which includes penalties for 
unlawful practices, should be enacted to strengthen the ability 
of the Ministry of Finance and Directorate General of Budget 
Accounting and Statistics in the national government to 
monitor local budgeting processes and implementation. 
4 -1 -4 0 -3
36 
Local people should be encouraged to get involved in the local 
policy making process to realize the costs and benefits of local 
services, and to better hold local officials accountable for local 
spending. 
0 0 4 3 3 
34 
Local government officials should recognize the essence of 
local self-governance, establish the notion of paying local 
services by local revenues, and aggressively collect own-
source revenue based on the law. 
4 2 4 4 1 
22 
In order to better hold local government officials accountable, 
a system of referenda on local fiscal issues should be 
established. 
-2 -4 -1 3 -2
A
cc
ou
nt
ab
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ty
-L
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al
 F
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08 
Only after local people feel the pain of paying taxes, will they 
actively ask local government officials for more cost reduction 
and effectiveness improvement. 
-1 -3 1 1 -1
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C N Q Statements I II III IV V
40 
When sufficient financial resources are retained, the national 
government will be better able to push development projects 
with national significance in order to promote balanced 
growth among localities. 
3 -2 0 2 3 
31 Grants from the national government can stimulate local private investments. 3 -1 -1 -3 0 
33 
The national government should guarantee local governments 
sufficient financial resources to support their basic public 
programs. 
1 4 1 1 4 
D
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t-C
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l C
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37 
The national government should organize a technical 
assistance team to help each local government develop a 
financial plan based on their unique economic activities to 
ensure sufficient financial resources for local development. 
2 1 0 0 -2
16 
Reliance on national grants will lead local governments to 
ignore projects not funded by the central government, 
resulting in an imbalance of local development. 
-4 -2 -2 0 0 
24 
Money and power are centralized to make local governments 
unable to actively design and implement local development 
projects. 
-2 4 -3 -4 0 
30 
Local governments’ decisions on resource allocation will 
better reflect local interests because they are closer to local 
people. 
-1 2 1 0 1 
D
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m
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01 
Local governments continually and chronically rely on 
national grants to support local spending needs, rendering 
comprehensive local development planning impossible. 
-3 3 -2 4 -2
15 
Local governments are incapable of dealing with 
unemployment, inflation, and income redistribution 
successfully. 
-1 2 -2 3 -1
14 If local governments get involved in the policies to promote equity, local economic resources will be drained. -3 1 -3 2 0 
38 
If revenues collected from the progressive income tax can be 
the source for intergovernmental grants, income distribution 
will be better equalized. 
0 -2 0 -3 3 
Eq
ui
ty
-C
en
tra
l C
on
tro
l 
10 
If a local government performs redistribution functions, such 
as social welfare policies, rich residents will move out and the 
poor will move in. 
-2 -3 0 2 -2
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C N Q Statements I II III IV V
04 
Generally speaking, local governments can achieve 
distributional objectives by getting involved in policy areas 
such as education, medical care, or housing assistance. 
-3 -3 0 -4 -1 
17 Local governments are expected to respond creatively and effectively if given increased responsibility for welfare policy. -1 0 1 -2 -3 
27 
Locating more responsibility for redistributive policy with 
local governments allows them to design welfare programs 
that are more appropriate to their own needs and better reflect 
the preferences of their residents. 
-2 -1 -1 -1 -4 
Eq
ui
ty
-L
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05 Redistributive policies can also be a local public good implemented by local governments. 0 -2 -2 -1 -3 
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